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Abstract
Despite ample research on corporate financing decisions, there is a growing interest in
deepening our understanding of how firms structure their financing needs. In this dis-
sertation, we build upon previous work on capital structure by examining the impact of
firm-specific and macroeconomic risks on the capital structure of UK manufacturing firms.
In particular, the dissertation consists of three separate, yet related essays. Each essay
intends to serve a specific objective. The essays, in the order in which they appear, are
entitled as follows:
Essay I: The Response of Firms’ Leverage to Risks: Evidence from UK Public versus
Non-Public Firms
Essay II: Capital Structure Adjustments: Do Macroeconomic and Business Risks Matter?
Essay III: Macroeconomic Dynamics, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Firms’ Security Issuance
Decisions: An Empirical Investigation of UK Manufacturing Firms
In the first essay, we empirically investigate whether the sensitivity of leverage to firm-
specific (idiosyncratic) and macroeconomic risk differs across publicly listed and privately
owned firms. We also study the implications of cash reserves-risk interactions for firms’
leverage decisions. Using data from the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database,
the analysis is carried out for a large panel of UK manufacturing firms over the period
1999-2008. The results provide significant evidence that UK manufacturing firms use less
short-term debt in their capital structure during periods of high risk. This finding holds
for both types of risk. The results on the differential effects of risk across public and
non-public firms indicate that while the leverage of non-public firms is more sensitive to
firm-specific risk in comparison to their public counterparts, the effects of macroeconomic
risk on leverage are similar for both types of firms. The results of the indirect effects of
risk show that firms with high levels of cash holdings are more (less) likely to reduce their
leverage in periods when firm-specific (macroeconomic) is risk. On the whole, the results
that we document in this essay provide strong evidence of the heterogenous sensitivities of
leverage to risk across both types of firms and across different levels of firms’ cash holdings.
Essay II examines how risk affects firms’ leverage adjustment decisions. Specifically, in
this essay, we study the impact of risk about firms’ own business activity and macroeco-
nomic conditions on the speed with which firms adjust their capital structure toward their
iii
specific leverage targets. In doing this, we use an annual panel data obtained from the
WorldScope file via DataStream for a fairly large sample of quoted UK manufacturing,
covering the period 1981-2009. The results suggest that the adjustment is asymmetric and
it depends on the magnitude of risk, the type of risk, and whether firms’ actual leverage
is above or below the target. Further, we find that firms with financial surpluses and
above-target leverage adjust their leverage faster when firm-specific risk is low and when
macroeconomic risk is high. In contrast, firms with financial deficits and below-target
leverage are more likely to align their leverage toward their target in periods when both
types of risk are low. Taken as a whole, our results suggest that firms adjust their lever-
age toward the target very asymmetrically across different levels and types of risk. This
finding holds true even when we take into account several firm characteristics known to
affect firms’ adjustment speeds.
The third essay analyzes how risk about firms’ own business activity and macroeconomic
conditions influences the security issuance decisions of listed UK manufacturing firms
appeared on the WorldScope database during the period from 1981-2009. Estimating dy-
namic panel models using the system GMM estimator, we show that the issuance of new
debt is significantly negatively related to idiosyncratic risk while both the issuance of new
equity and the use of internally generated funds (retained earnings) are positively related
to the risk. In contrast, we find that all these three sources of financing are significantly
negatively associated with macroeconomic risk. Nevertheless, our results suggest that the
aggregate dynamics of firms’ target leverage are significantly negatively linked with these
two types of risk. The results, from the debt-equity choice regression, indicate that the
effect of both firm-specific and macroeconomic risk is significant and negative, implying
that firms are likely to have low debt-equity ratio in periods when either type of risk is high.
JEL classification: C23; D81; E44; G32
Keywords: macroeconomic risk; idiosyncratic risk; firm-level uncertainty/volatility; firm
leverage; cash holdings; capital structure rebalancing; the speed of adjustment; asym-
metry in adjustment rates; deviations from target leverage ratios; financing deficits and
surpluses, security issuance, retentions, public versus non-public firms; spillover effects;
firm-level panel data; system GMM
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
How do firms determine their capital structure? What factors affect capital structure
choices? Do firms have specific target capital structures? How and when do firms adjust
toward these targets? These are the fundamental questions in corporate finance that have
extensively been explored in the literature. Traditional theories of firm capital structure
suggest that firms determine their leverage by trading off the costs and benefits of debt
versus equity financing. Empirical studies have successfully identified many firm-specific
factors that are important to firms’ financing decisions. In addition, despite little consensus
on the speed of adjustments toward the target, several authors have recently provided
convincing evidence on the leverage-targeting behavior of firms.
In explaining the capital structure of firms, most studies have mainly emphasized what
and how firm-specific factors affect firms’ financing decisions. While the firm-specific de-
terminants of capital structure are immensely important for understanding corporate fi-
nancing, it is also worth exploring how variations in macroeconomic conditions or firms’
own business activity affect the capital structure decisions of firms. Our understanding
of the role of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk in corporate financial policies is rela-
tively imperfect. Although mostly neglected in the literature, the impact of risk on firms’
financing strategies is an important aspect without which one cannot have a good under-
standing of firms’ financing behavior. In this study, we conjecture that if various costs
and benefits associated with firms’ financing options (e.g., retentions, debt borrowing, and
equity financing) are affected by risk, so does the optimal capital structure of firms.
1.2 What Does this Study Explore?
The main aim of the study is to empirically explore the effect of risk on the capital struc-
ture of UK manufacturing firms. Specifically, we analyze how risk about macroeconomic
conditions and firms’ own business activity affects firms’ leverage targets, the rebalancing
behavior of firms, the security issuance decisions of firms, and firms’ choice between debt
and equity financing. In doing this, we take several firm characteristics, such as cash hold-
ings, cash flow imbalances, and the deviations of leverage from the target, into account in
addition to the conventional determinants of corporate capital structure. Given that our
empirical models have a dynamic panel data context, we use the robust two-step system
dynamic panel data (DPD) estimator (system GMM approach). This estimator is also
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effective in mitigating potential endogeneity problems and controlling for heterogeneity
across individual firms.
The second chapter of this dissertation aims at analyzing the effects of firm-specific and
macroeconomic risk on the capital structure of UK public and non-public firms.1 To carry
out our investigation, we use a fairly large panel of UK manufacturing firms over the period
1999-2008. A unique aspect of our dataset is that we can differentiate the firms by their
legal form. Non-public (aka private) firms significantly differ from public firms in terms
of their access to external financing markets, size, and opaqueness. Further, non-public
firms are more likely to suffer from the negative business shocks as compared to their
public counterparts. Given a different financial and operating environment within which
public and non-public firms operate, we expect the sensitivity of capital structure to risk
to be different across public and non-public firms. To test this conjecture, we construct
public and non-public firm dummies and interact our explanatory variables with these two
dummies. This design allows us to properly test whether the sensitivity of leverage to risk
varies across the two groups of firms.
Researchers have also documented evidence that risk not only affects firm behavior on
its own but it also affects in conjunction with various other firm-specific factors. To take
into account this possibility, we also examine the spillover effect of risk on public and non-
public firms’ leverage. Specifically, we augment our leverage specification by introducing
the interactions between our risk measures and firms’ cash holdings. This approach allows
us to examine whether the effect of risk on leverage increases or decreases when firms build
up their cash holdings.
The analysis of firm leverage adjustments has recently become the center of the em-
pirical studies in the corporate finance literature. Several recent studies provide evidence
that firms considerably adjust their capital structure toward their leverage targets, yet the
speed with which firms move toward these targets is not a settled issue. The third chapter
of this study therefore investigates the role of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk in
capital structure adjustments. Specifically, we condition the adjustment speed of firms on
the level and the type of risk. It should also be noted that some previous studies have
explored the firm-specific source(s) of asymmetry in the speed of adjustment. However,
we are the first to relate adjustments speeds with risk as well as firm characteristics. In
particular, we estimate firms’ adjustment speeds across different levels of risk after tak-
ing into account firms’ financing needs and leverage deviations from the target. In other
words, we squarely examine the implications of both risk-leverage deviations interactions
1Throughout this study, we use the terms risk and uncertainty, idiosyncratic risk and firm-specific risk,
non-public firms and privately owned firms, publicly traded firms and public/listed firms, and cash flow
imbalances and financing deficits/surpluses interchangeably.
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and risk-financing needs interactions for firms’ capital structure adjustments. We expect,
as various costs and benefits of adjusting toward a leverage target vary with changes in
the degree of risk that a firm experiences, so does the speed of adjustment. We examine
this issue, using an extensive firm-level dataset for a fairly large panel of publicly quoted
UK manufacturing firms over the period from 1981-2009.
While most of the empirical evidence on corporate financing comes either from studies
that explore the determinants of firms’ leverage decisions or from studies that analyze
the choice of firms between debt and equity financing, there is a growing interest among
researchers in exploring when and how firms issue securities. Recent work, such as Baker
and Wurgler (2002), Welch (2004), Hovakimian (2006), Alti (2006), Huang and Ritter
(2009), Hovakimian and Hutton (2010), and Almeida and Campello (2010), on the security
issuance decisions of firms provide ample evidence, suggesting firm managers considerably
take into account the relative cost of issuing different securities and market conditions
when they issue securities. Only a few studies have investigated the interactions between
security issuance and macroeconomic conditions, yet not focusing on the risk associated
with the overall macroeconomic environment. These studies are Korajczyk and Levy
(2003), Covas and Den Haan (2007), and Huang and Ritter (2009).
Although we have little empirical evidence, recent theoretical studies relate firms’ fi-
nancing choices to business-cycle risk more systematically. These studies argue that as
higher macroeconomic risk increases discount rates (risk premia), deteriorates prospective
future cash flows, and reduces the market value of equity, so it will affect the firms’ pref-
erence for financing their capital needs. The empirical validity of these arguments would
definitely enhance our understanding of firms’ issuance decisions. The forth chapter of
this study therefor studies the effects of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk on security
issuance. We do so by examining how risk influences firms’ ability to use internally gener-
ated funds (retentions), debt borrowing, and equity financing. Specifically, we decompose
the aggregate change in leverage into three components, namely the net change in debt
financing, the net change in equity financing, and the change in retained earnings. We
then analyze how each of these components responds to firm-specific and macroeconomic
risk.
By examining the effects of risk on the components of the change in leverage, we are
also able to identify the channel(s) through which the effect of risk comes to leverage. In
this chapter, we also study how risk affects the choice of firms between issuing debt and
issuing equity. Examining the effect of risk on firms’ debt-equity choice, we are likely to
infer more explicitly whether firms prefer debt or equity financing in periods when firm-
specific and macroeconomic risks are high. We use an unbalanced panel dataset for listed
UK manufacturing firms, covering the period from 1981-2009.
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1.3 Contribution
This dissertation contributes to the literature on capital structure on several grounds.
We empirically examine the role of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk in determining
the target (optimal) level of firms’ leverage, the speed of adjustment toward the target,
the issuing of financial securities, and firms’ preference for debt versus equity financing.
This potentially important dimension of corporate capital structure has not been highly
explored previously in the literature. The dissertation’s primary contributions are as
follows.
First, we examine how risk affects firms’ choice for optimal leverage ratios. Prior work
on the risk-leverage relationship have mainly focused on publicly traded firms in the United
States. Instead, we study the impact of risk on the financing behavior of both public and
non-public firms in the United Kingdom as our data allow us to stratify the firms according
to their legal form. By doing so, we provide an interesting comparison of the sensitivity
of leverage to risk across public and non-public firms. This comparison not only provides
new insights into the role of risk in determining the optimal capital structure of firms but
it also improves our understanding of how publicly listed and privately owned firms design
their financing policies differently when facing risks in their operations. Privately owned
firms are generally small and medium in size and do not have excess to stock markets and
thus mainly rely on bank-loans, whereas, public firms have excess to equity markets and
can issue public equity to finance their financing needs. In this context, the analysis of the
effects of risk on the leverage policies of publicly listed and privately owned firms would
definitely enhance our knowledge about the importance of risks in the corporate financing
decisions of firms with different characteristics.
Private owned firms are generally more opaque to outside investors, face higher asym-
metric information problems, and have a limited access to external financing markets.
Given this, private (non-public) firms, compared to their public counterparts, face more
problems in acquiring the finance they need from external capital markets. That is, non-
public firms are more likely to be financially constrained. In this context, our analysis also
enables us to infer whether risk affects the leverage decisions of financially constrained and
unconstrained firms differently. Thus, we not only contribute to the literature related to
the determinants of leverage but also to the literature that relates firms’ financing deci-
sions to financial constraints. The impacts of risk on the financing decisions of financially
constrained and unconstrained firms may provide new insights into the issue of how access
to capital market plays a role in corporate financing decisions.
We also contribute to the literature of the indirect effect of risk on firm behavior by
exploring the implications of the interactions of risk and the cash holdings of firms for firms’
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leverage decisions. Our results on the impact of risk on leverage through its effect on the
cash-holding decisions of firms are new and so far have not been presented in the previous
literature. The risk-cash-holding-leverage interactions are important as a firm’ financing
policy substantially depends on its investment opportunities and available reserves of cash.
The investigation of the indirect effects of risk on the capital structure of public and
private firms may improve our understanding of the role of the cash holdings of firms in
their leverage policies. This investigation may also help us understand the nonlinearity in
the risk-leverage linkage and thus, extend our understanding of the importance of risks in
corporate financing policies.
Our third contribution to literature is that we study the effects of firm-specific and
macroeconomic risk on the adjustment behavior of firms and therefore we relate the asym-
metry of adjustment speed to risk that a firm experiences. Most studies on the asymmetry
in capital structure adjustment across firms have mainly focused on firm characteristics.
Going outside the box, we estimate the speed of adjustment conditional on the level and
type of risk after controlling for the firm-specific factors that are known to affect firms’
adjustment speeds. By systematically relating the speed with which firms adjust toward
their leverage targets to the types and levels of risk, we provide a new avenue for research
on capital structure adjustments. The investigation of the effects of risk on the rebalanc-
ing behaviour of firms provide further insight to understand the role of firm-specific and
macroeconomic risk in the capital structure decisions of firms. Our results on the asym-
metric adjustment speeds conditional on the level and type of risk provide some important
understanding about how, when, and at what speed firms adjust their capital structure
toward their leverage targets. The heterogeneity in the capital structure adjustments of
firms across different levels and across different types of risk would definitely extend our
knowledge about how firms’ managers economize on the costs of issuing securities and
deviating from or moving toward their target capital structure as well as optimize on the
benefits of maintaining their leverage targets.
Our findings that firms adjust their leverage asymmetrically depending on the level and
the type of risk are of interest because they suggest that the differences in the adjustment
speeds are not fully explained by the imbalances of firms’ cash nor by the deviations of
firms’ actual leverage from the target leverage as reported by previous studies but also
they relate to the levels of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk. In that sense, our findings
are useful to interpret earlier research which discusses why firms are not always responsive
to changes in the market value of their equity (Welch (2004)) or gains and losses in their
earnings (Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004)), and why they significantly
time the debt and equity market conditions while financing external capital (Baker and
Wurgler (2002) and Antoniou, Zhao, and Zhou (2009)).
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The final contribution of the dissertation is that we examine the impact of both types
of risk on net debt borrowing, the newly retained earnings, and net equity issues and con-
tribute to the literature on the effects of macroeconomic conditions on corporate security
issuance decisions. We also build upon previous work on the leverage-risk relationship by
examining how the dynamics of firms’ leverage ratios relate to unpredictable variations
in firms’ own business activities as well as the volatility of the overall macroeconomic
environment. One should note that prior studies estimating the effect of risk on firms’
capital structure have largely focused on relating the target leverage of firms to risk. And,
therefore, the impacts of risks on leverage dynamics and the security issuance decisions
of firms have not been squarely studied previously. Rather, here, our focus is to examine
more explicitly how risk affects changes in leverage and the components of a change in
leverage (i.e., net debt issues, net equity financing, and the newly retained earnings).
By examining the impacts of risk on different components of the change in leverage,
we not only document the role of risk in the external financing decisions of firms (debt
borrowing and equity financing) but we also provide evidence on how risk about firms’ own
business activity and macroeconomic conditions affects firms’ use of internally generated
funds (the newly retained earnings). The analysis of the impact of risk on these financing
instruments also helps identify a channel through which risk affects the change in leverage.
We also extend the literature by studying the impact of risk on a firm’s choice of debt versus
equity issuance. This provides us the opportunity to analyze more explicitly whether
equity financing is preferred to debt borrowing or vice-versa when a firm experiences
a high volatility in its own earnings and when macroeconomic conditions become more
volatile.
1.4 Background
In spite of numerous papers, there is a continuing debate on corporate financing. Since
Weston (1955), several ideas published in the field journals and theories have been pro-
posed to understand firms’ financing policy. These include the Modigliani-Miller theorem
(Modigliani and Miller (1958)), the trade-off theory (Modigliani and Miller (1963)),2 the
agency theory of capital structure (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), the capital signalling
theory (Ross (1977)), the target-adjustment behavior (Myers (1984)), the pecking order
theory (Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984)), the free cash flow theory (Jensen
(1986)), organizational behaviour (Myers (1993)), the market timing theory of capital
structure (Baker and Wurgler (2002)), managerial overoptimism (Heaton (2002)), and the
inertia theory (Welch (2004)).
2See Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) and Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) for the static trade-off theory,
and Kane, Marcus, and McDonald (1984) and Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) for the dynamic trade-
off theory.
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Despite these theoretical advances, several fundamental questions either remain unan-
swered or are not well answered on empirical grounds. Some examples of these questions
follow. How do firms choose the optimal level of capital structure? Do firms have a target
capital structure? Do firms adjust toward their targets when they deviate from those tar-
gets? If yes, at which speed? How does risk affect leverage adjustment decisions? Do firms
time their security issues? What are the determinants of firms’ choice between debt and
equity financing? How does risk about macroeconomic conditions influence the financing
decisions of firms? Does the financing policy of non-public firms differ from that of public
firms? Do public and non-public firms respond to risks differently?
According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, the optimal level of firms’ lever-
age reflects trade-offs between the tax benefits of debt financing and the costs of financial
distress. Further, as in Myers (1984), firms that follow the trade-off theory have lever-
age targets. Thus, firms adjust their leverage toward these targets gradually when they
deviate from those targets (a` la trade-off theory). In contrast, the pecking order theory
suggests that the adverse selection costs induce a strict financing hierarchy. Firms prefer
internal financing over external financing to finance their financing needs. Debt borrowing
is preferred to equity financing when firms need external financing. Only as a last resort,
firms issue equity. In this context, one can say that the change in firms’ debt ratio mainly
depends on firms’ need for external financing rather than firms intentionally change their
debt ratio to reach any predetermined optimum leverage ratio. Likewise, the market tim-
ing and the inertia theory of capital structure indicate that firms do not quickly align their
capital structure with changes in market equity values, suggesting firms do not appear to
adjust capital structure quickly.
Reviewing empirical literature, we find that recent papers by Hovakimian, Opler, and
Titman (2001), Ozkan (2001), Fama and French (2002), Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and
Tehranian (2004), Leary and Roberts (2005), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Frank and
Goyal (2009), Harford, Klasa, and Walcott (2009), Huang and Ritter (2009), and Goyal,
Nova, and Zanetti (2011) provide convincing evidence of firms having their leverage targets.
These studies indicate that the target (optimal) level of firms’ leverage is mainly a function
of firms’ market-to-book value, the profitability of firms, firm size, the tangibility of assets,
stock prices, and non-debt tax shields.
However, in the empirical literature, there is a lack of consensus on the speed of
adjustment with which firms adjust their leverage toward these targets. On one hand,
studies estimating adjustment speeds provide evidence of either a slow or negative speed
of adjustment (see, for example, Fama and French (2002), Kayhan and Titman (2007),
Brav (2009), and Iliev and Welch (2010)). Welch (2004) finds that about 60% of year-
to-year fluctuations of firms’ leverage are just the result of firms’ issuance activity rather
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than of firms changing their leverage in order to achieve any specific leverage target.
Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that the effects of historical market valuations on leverage
are relatively long-lasting, suggesting firms do not adjust their capital structure actively.
One the other hand, several studies, such as Ozkan (2001), Flannery and Rangan (2006),
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008), Chang and
Dasgupta (2009), Cook and Tang (2010), Elsas and Florysiak (2011), and Faulkender,
Flannery, Hankins, and Smith (2011), have documented evidence of a relatively rapid
adjustment toward the target.
Recent research suggests that the evidence of the passive attitude of firms toward
leverage targets is generally imputed to mismeasurement of the speed of adjustment. Some
researchers argue that the standard partial-adjustment models of leverage do not have
enough power to separate the benefits of achieving targets from other motivations of
financing (see, for example, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Chang and Dasgupta
(2009)). Others indicate that estimated leverage adjustment speeds in most previous
studies are biased (see, for example, Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon, Roberts, and
Zender (2008), and Huang and Ritter (2009)).
In explaining the speed of adjustment toward the target, most of the previous studies
assume the uniformity of adjustment speed across firms and estimate a standard partial
adjustment model of leverage. However, as the costs and benefits of capital structure
adjustments vary across firms, so does the speed at which firms do move toward the
target. Asymmetry in estimated leverage adjustment speeds move researchers’ attention
toward a research for the determinant(s) of heterogeneity in adjustment speeds. In fact,
diverging from the assumption of the homogenous speed of adjustment for all sample firms,
several recent studies estimate a modified form of partial-adjustment model to take into
account heterogeneity in adjustment speeds across firms. As a results, we find a handful
of papers estimating the speed of adjustment of firms with a specific focus when and why
firms adjust toward a leverage target with asymmetrical speeds. These papers include
Flannery and Hankins (2007), Byoun (2008), Cook and Tang (2010), Elsas and Florysiak
(2011), Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith (2011), and Warr, Elliott, Koe¨ter-
Kant, and O¨ztekin (2011). Almost all of these papers successfully relate the asymmetry
of adjustment speed to firm characteristics such as cash flow imbalances, equity market
valuations, deviations from target leverage, and firm size.3
Another stream of capital structure literature focuses on firms’ security issuance deci-
sions and firms’ choice of debt versus equity financing. A substantial part of this literature
3Cook and Tang (2010) is an exception, who examine the effect of macroeconomic conditions on US
firms’ rebalancing behavior. Similarly, another study by Haas and Peeters (2006) also relate the speed of
adjustment to GDP growth and inflation for Central and Eastern European firms.
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has been devoted to explore what and how firm characteristics affect firms’ preference for
financing instruments.4 However, other studies, such as Baker and Wurgler (2002), Welch
(2004), Hovakimian (2006), Alti (2006), and Hovakimian and Hutton (2010) have linked
the security issuance decisions of firms to equity market valuations and stock prices. Baker
and Wurgler (2002) document that firms with high equity market values relative to their
book and past equity market values issue equity–rather than debt–to finance their exter-
nal financing needs. They also show that firms have a greater tendency to purchase their
equity in periods when their market value is low. Welch (2004) provides evidence of a
significant and long-lasting effect of stock price on the issuance and repurchase decisions
of firms. However, Hovakimian (2006) finds that while firms time their equity issues, the
impacts of issuing equity on firms’ leverage ratio are not large economically.
Alti (2006) and Chen and Zhao (2007) decompose the annual change in leverage ratio
into new debt borrowing, new equity financing, and the newly retained earnings and
examine how these components respond to firm-specific factors known to affect corporate
financing. In a recent paper, Hovakimian and Hutton (2010) provide evidence of a positive
relationship between first-year post-issue returns and follow-on debt and equity issuance.
Further, they show that this relationship remains significant at least for the next 5 years.
To our knowledge, only a few studies in the literature have examined the impact of
macroeconomic conditions on corporate security issuance decisions.5 Korajczyk and Levy
(2003) find that while macroeconomic conditions significantly affect the issuance decisions
of financially unconstrained firms, the issue choice of financially constrained firms are not
significantly related to macroeconomic conditions. Covas and Den Haan (2007) examine
the behavior of firms’ retained earnings, debt borrowing, and net-equity issuance over the
business cycle and show that firms’ leverage decisions are pro-cyclical.6 Huang and Ritter
(2009) show that the the likelihood of corporate security issuance is significantly positively
related to the real GDP growth rate. They also document that in periods when the growth
rate is high relatively, firms are more likely to issue debt vis-a`-vis equity.
In spite of prior empirical studies have provided relatively rich evidence on how firm-
specific factors affect firms’ financing policy, these studies leave a great gap in our knowl-
edge about the effect of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk on firms’ financing decisions.
4Studies of this genre include, among many others, Marsh (1982), Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman
(2001), Fama and French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003), Hovakimian (2004), Hovakimian, Hovakimian,
and Tehranian (2004), Fama and French (2005), Frank and Goyal (2008), Almeida and Campello (2010),
and Bessler, Drobetz, and Gru¨ninger (2011).
5It should be noted that the focus of these studies was to analyze the security issuance patterns of firms
over the business cycle. Instead, the aim of our study is to examine how risk associated with macroeconomic
conditions and firms’ own business activity influences corporate financing.
6Korteweg (2010) also documents the empirical evidence on the pro-cyclicality of leverage. Likewise,
recently Akhtar (2011) examines the relationship between firms’ leverage and different phases of the busi-
ness cycle and finds that all four business cycle phases are crucial in explaining the dynamics of capital
structure of firms.
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Notably, our understanding of the effects of risk on firms’ leverage targets, the rebalancing
behavior of firms, the security issuance decisions of firms, and firms’ choice between debt
borrowing and equity financing is relatively incomplete. In this study, we bridge this gap
by exploring how firm-specific and macroeconomic risk affects corporate financing policies.
1.5 Importance of Risk
1.5.1 Firm-Specific Risk
“If projections indicate relatively stable earnings, debt financing is usually ad-
vantageous; if future earnings are unstable, the risk of debt may shift the deci-
sions to equity financing.”
—Weston (1955) (p. 135)
Fisher (1959) argues that the risk premium which firms pay is significantly associated with
their earnings volatility. Likewise, Baxter (1967) documents that the variance of firms’
earnings have a negative impact on firms’ desirability to rely on debt financing. Brealey
and Myers (1981) also argue that firms find financial distress to be costly regardless of the
presence or absence of bankruptcy. Firms therefore generally have a tendency to repress
their financial distress costs, implying that firms with relatively volatile potential future
cash flow streams use less debt in their capital structure than the others. Consistent with
these arguments, Taub (1975), Ferri and Jones (1979), and Marsh (1982) present empirical
evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship between the uncertainty of
firms’ earnings and firms’ ability to “tolerate” leverage.
From a theoretical prospective, Castanias (1983) shows that with a given marginal tax
rate and marginal default cost function, higher business risk compels firms to reduce their
use of debt. In the manner of the static trade-off theory of corporate financing, Bradley,
Jarrell, and Kim (1984) show that idiosyncratic risk specifically when it is relatively high
negatively affects a firm’s debt ratio. In contrast, Myers (1977) suggests that the rela-
tionship between idiosyncratic risk and the optimal level of firms’ debt is positive. In this
regard, Myers argues that a large amount of risk associated with firms’ own business ac-
tivity may tend to reduce the debt-related agency costs. These lower agency costs induce
firms to use more debt in their capital structure.
In practice, banks and other lending institutions may avoid offer funding to risky firms
or, at least, they require a higher risk premium (interest rate), making debt financing
relatively costly. Because of this, firms with relatively unstable earnings reduce their use
of debt, while they prefer to utilize internally generated funds (retained earnings). And if
external financing is required, more volatile firms are more likely to issue equity. These
firms do so for two reasons. First, they find that equity financing is cheaper than debt
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borrowing. Second, the issuance of equity minimizes their likelihood to go bankrupt,
resulting in a reduction in their leverage (debt/assets) ratio.
In addition to the significance of firm-specific risk in determining firms’ optimal (target)
leverage ratio, the firm-level risk has also an important role to play in firms’ capital
structure adjustment decisions. Firms when making adjustments toward their leverage
targets take into account variance in their potential future earnings along with other firm-
specific factors known to affect the cost and benefit of adjusting. For instance, over-levered
firms may adjust toward the target relatively quickly in periods when their earnings are
relatively more volatile. These firms do so because large variations in earnings reduce
their ability to rely heavily on debt financing by increasing debt-related costs (e.g., the
probability of bankruptcy). However, when firms are under-levered and experience risk in
their income streams, they are likely to adjust their leverage slowly because the variance
of earnings makes adjusting procedure (i.e., debt issues or equity repurchases) relatively
expensive for these firms.
1.5.2 Macroeconomic Risk
“If firms did not have to forgo the tax subsidy for debt, they would opt for a
financial structure with greater insulation against aggregate risks.”
–Gertler and Hubbard (1993) (p. 288)
Unlike the case of firm-specific risk, early studies of capital structure do not put much
stress on how corporate financing policies respond to risk associated with the overall
macroeconomic environment. Recent theoretical studies, such as Bhamra, Kuehn, and
Strebulaev (2010) and Chen (2010), however, document that variations in macroeconomic
conditions are significant for firms’ financing choices. Specifically, these studies predict
that firms are likely to choose lower optimal coupons in times of high macroeconomic risk
in order to increase their financial flexibility. In particular, Chen (2010) predicts that
higher macroeconomic risks increase discount rates (risk premia) and deteriorate future
cash flows, which lessens the discounted value of expected tax benefits, which lowers the
advantages related to the outstanding stock of debt. Hence, firms are likely to reduce their
leverage ratios by reducing their outstanding amounts of debt in bad times.
Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010) develop a dynamic capital structure model to
examine how corporate financing policy responds to macroeconomic fluctuations. They
show that unpredictable variations in macroeconomic conditions have a significant impact
on firms’ financing policies. Levy and Hennessy (2007) examine firms’ financing choices
in a general equilibrium framework and show that firms are more likely to reduce their
outstanding debt in periods of poor macroeconomic conditions. Hackbarth, Miao, and
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Morellec (2006) relating the cash flows of firms to both idiosyncratic risk and macroe-
conomic conditions predict that firms’ borrowing capacity exhibits pro-cyclicity and that
both the pace and the size of capital structure changes depend on macroeconomic condi-
tions.
According to the market timing hypothesis, firms significantly time their security issues
(Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) and Baker and Wurgler (2002)). That is, firms
issue equity when their market values are high and they repurchase equity when their
market values are low. Since risks about macroeconomic conditions affect the market
value of equity, firms are less likely to issue equity when macroeconomic risk is high.
Macroeconomic risks also affect the ability of firms to use internally generated funds.
When macroeconomic conditions are uncertain, firms might become more cautious about
financial distress costs. Thus, they prefer to keep cash on hand rather than investing it
as they regard cash holdings as a buffer against any future insolvency.7 Macroeconomic
risk is also important for an adjustment toward a target capital structure. It is very likely
that macroeconomic risk can affect the costs and benefits of adjusting toward the target,
by affecting the risk premia that firms pay, deteriorating expected potential cash flow
streams, and destroying the market value of equity. And thus, it affects the rate at which
firms adjust their capital structure.
1.6 Datasets, Measuring Risk, and Estimation Methods
1.6.1 Data and Methodology
We analyze the role of risk in corporate financing decisions using two different datasets.
To examine the impact of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk on the capital structure of
publicly listed and privately owned firms, we use a fairly large panel of manufacturing firms
in the United Kingdom. In particular, we construct an annual panel dataset covering the
period from 1999 to 2008 using the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) dataset. The
data on macroeconomic variables which we use to generate risk measures are extracted
from the International Financial Statistics (IFS), an International Monetary Fund (IMF)
database.
The FAME database is made available for commercial use by Jordans Bureau van Dijk
(BvD) Electronic Publishing. FAME contains data for both non-public (privately owned)
and public limited companies and over 99% of the companies in the database are small
and not traded on the stock exchange. Hence, our dataset gives us a unique opportunity
to investigate the behavior of non-public versus public limited companies.
7A number of papers, such as Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), Almeida, Campello,
and Weisbach (2004), Han and Qiu (2007), Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007), Riddick and Whited
(2009), and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), relate the cash holding behavior of firms to their precautionary
motives.
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The FAME database provides information on both active and inactive public/non-
public limited liability companies in the UK up to a maximum of a 10-year period. The
data coverage may vary in terms of the number of observations for a given company as
there may be entry or exit from the dataset. The main advantage of the FAME database
is that it includes both balance-sheet and off-balance sheet information, such as income
statements, cash flows statements, profit and loss accounts, and ownership information.8
To study the effect of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk on the speed of adjustments
toward target capital structure and firms’ security issuance decisions, we use data on a large
sample of publicly listed UK firms over a relatively longer time period, spanning a 29-year
period. We focus only on manufacturing firms quoted on the London Stock Exchange at
any point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope database
via DataStream. To compute macroeconomic risk, seasonally adjusted quarterly data
spanning 1975Q1-2009Q4 on UK real GDP are taken from the Office for National Statistics
(ONS) database.
The main estimator that we use in this study is a robust two-step system dynamic panel
data (DPD) estimator–also known as “system GMM” estimator–proposed by Blundell and
Bond (1998). In contrast to the conventional ordinary least square (OLS), Within-Groups
and first-difference GMM estimators, the system GMM estimator not only mitigates poten-
tial endogeneity problems, controls for heterogeneity across individual firms, and removes
unobserved firm-specific fixed effects, but it also allows researchers to make use of differ-
ent instruments with different lag structure for both the levels and the first-differenced
equations (Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000) and Bond (2002)). Further, the Blundell and
Bond (1998) system GMM estimator utilizes all available moment conditions by combing
moment conditions for the model in first differences and moment conditions for the model
in levels. Finally, this estimator improves the estimation over others GMM estimators,
such as first differenced estimator, particularly in the case when the underlying series
are moderately persistent (Blundell and Bond (2000) and Bond, Nauges, and Windmeijer
(2005)).
Since there is no well-established process that assists a prior to choose the optimal
instrument set for the system GMM estimation, the blind use of instruments may lead
to the problem of “many instruments”. As in Roodman (2009a,b), this problem would
be even more severe if the sample size has a relatively short-horizon. Therefore, the
Hansen (1982) test for overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano and Bond (1991) test
for autocorrelation are applied to ensure the validity of the instruments that we use in our
estimations.
8Further details on the FAME database are given in Section 3 , Chapter 2.
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1.6.2 Measuring Risk
To study the effect of risk on the capital structure of firms, we consider two types of
risk: firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk and macroeconomic risk. Researchers generally use
the moving standard deviation, state space models, ARCH/GARCH models, stochastic
volatility models, the intra-annual variation approach, and survey-based methods to gen-
erate proxy for risk.
Although these methods are appropriate when the focus is on large publicly traded
firms, they may introduce a bias into the constructed measure of risk for relatively small
firms. Since our focus, in Chapter 2, is on the response of public versus non-public firms
to risk, and since non-public firms are generally small in size, we pay careful attention
to selection of methods for generating risk proxies. Specifically, the methods we use for
generating proxies for firm-level risk are time-variant and suitable even for small firms.
Our first method is similar to that of Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004). Specifically, we
regress the firms’ net sales-to-total assets ratio on firm and year fixed-effects. We then use
the absolute value of the residuals obtained from this regression as a proxy for firm-specific
risk.
To construct a second measure of risk, we follow Bo (2002) and estimate an AR(1)
model for net sales normalized by total assets. Using the one-period-ahead residuals, we
compute the cumulative-variance for each underlying firm in the sample over the examined
period. The square root of estimated cumulative variance is then used as a proxy for firm-
specific risk. Both of these methods enable us to generate risk using the unpredictable
components of the movement of the underlying variable rather than the variability of the
variable per se. Further, unlike the conventional measures of firm-specific uncertainty,
these methods yield a time-varying measure of firm-specific risk and are suitable even for
relatively small firms.
To generate a time-varying proxy for macroeconomic risk, we estimate an ARCH for
quarterly real UK GDP and GARCH models for both Treasury bills (T-bills) rates and
Consumer Prices Index (CPI) over the period under investigation. The obtained condi-
tional variance series are then annualized by averaging over four quarters for GDP series
and over twelve months in the case of T-bills rate and CPI series to match the frequency
of the firm-level panel data.
1.7 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter 2 examines the impact of risk on
the capital structure of publicly listed and privately owned UK manufacturing firms.
Specifically, this chapter begins the investigation by analyzing the role of firm-specific
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and macroeconomic risk in firms’ leverage decisions for a sample of public and non-public
firms. This chapter also studies whether the effects of risk on leverage differ across public
and non-public firms. Finally, the chapter explores the implications of firms’ cash holdings
in the leverage-risk relationship.
Chapter 3 examines how risk about firms’ own activity and macroeconomic conditions
affects the speed of adjustment of firms toward the target capital structure. In particular,
the chapter starts with a brief review of recent work on the capital structure adjustments
and describes our hypotheses regarding the interactions between risk and firms’ leverage
adjustment decisions. The chapter next presents the estimates of the speed of adjustment
toward the target from estimating the partial-adjustment model of capital structure. Fi-
nally, this chapter discusses the effect of risk on firms’ rebalancing behavior when we allow
asymmetries in adjustments speeds across firms.
Chapter 4 explores the role of both types of risk in corporate security issuance decisions.
First, this chapter examines how the dynamics of leverage respond to risk. Second, the
chapter looks for the associations between risk and the components of the change in
leverage, namely, the net change in debt issues, the net change in equity issues, and the
newly retained earnings. Finally, we conclude the chapter by examining the effects of
firm-specific and macroeconomic risk on firms’ choice between debt and equity financing.
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation. Specifically, this chapter begins by presenting
thesis background. Next, the chapter presents a summary of the empirical findings of
the dissertation and discusses the policy implications of the findings. In this chapter, we
also discuss the limitations of our study. Finally, we end with an eye toward highlighting
fruitful areas for future research on risk-capital structure interlinkages.
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Chapter 2
The Response of Firms’ Leverage to Risks: Evidence from
UK Public versus Non-Public Firms
2.1 Key Findings
This chapter empirically investigates the effects of macroeconomic and firm-specific risk
on firms’ leverage. The analysis is carried out for a large panel of public and non-public
UK manufacturing firms over the period 1999-2008. Our investigation provides evidence
that UK firms use less short-term debt in their capital structure during periods of high
firm-specific and macroeconomic risk. However, the leverage of non-public firms is more
sensitive to firm-specific risk in comparison to their public counterparts while macroeco-
nomic risk affects the leverage decisions of both types of firms similarly.9
2.2 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), researchers proposed several the-
ories to understand the factors that affect firms’ financing decisions. While these theories
help us to understand the role of firm-specific factors such as profitability, the effective
tax rate, firm growth, tangible assets, firm size, stock returns, and non-debt tax shields
in the determination of firms’ leverage, there is comparatively less research that exam-
ines the role of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk on leverage.10 For instance, studies
that investigate the role of macroeconomic conditions on firms’ borrowing behavior show
that managers, in consideration of the financial strength of the firm, design the capital
structure of the firm in alignment with the state of the economy to minimize the adverse
effects of business cycles but they do not necessarily examine the effects of macroeconomic
risk on firms’ capital structure.11 To our knowledge, only Baum, Stephan, and Talavera
(2009) and Hatzinikolaou, Katsimbris, and Noulas (2002) empirically examine the impact
9A paper based on the findings presented in this chapter has been published as a working paper in
Sheffield Economics Research Papers Series, the Department of Economics, University of Sheffield, and
submitted for publication under the title: Caglayan, M. and Rashid, A. (2011), The Response of Firms’
Leverage to Risks: Evidence from UK Public versus Non-Public Firms.
10See, for instance, among others, Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Fama and French (2002), and
Hennessy and Whited (2005) on the empirical validity of these factors. Also see Kolasinski (2009) and
Graham and Leary (2011) for an excellent survey of the empirical literature on capital structure. Several
early studies, such as Marsh (1982), Bennett and Donnelly (1993), Lasfer (1995), Walsh and Ryan (1997),
and Ozkan (2001) have also examined the empirical determinants of capital structure using firm-level data
from the UK. Ozkan (2001) provides an excellent review of evidence in studies of UK firms.
11See, for instance, among others, Levy and Hennessy (2007), Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006),
Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Suarez and Sussman (1999), and Gertler and Hubbard (1993).
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of macroeconomic risk on public firms’ leverage and show that an increase in macroeco-
nomic risk would lead to a decrease in borrowing.12 In contrast, studies that focus on the
impact of firm-specific (idiosyncratic) risk on firms’ capital structure arrive at conflict-
ing results: while some studies provide evidence that idiosyncratic risk exerts a negative
impact on leverage, others suggest that the effect is positive.
One major gap in the literature is the lack of information about the behavior of pri-
vately owned (non-public) firms under risk as researchers mainly focus on publicly traded
companies. However, there are important differences between public and non-public firms
regarding ownership structure, the level of information asymmetry between insiders and
outsiders, bargaining power, secondary market trading, governance, management, com-
pensation structure, future performance, and ability to absorb negative business shocks.
As a result, both groups of firms are likely to face different market frictions when visiting
external capital markets.
The most important difference between privately owned and publicly traded firms is
the differences in their ownership structure. Publicly traded firms are owned by a large
number of atomistic equityholders and they do not have any virtual control over the firm.
Rather, professional managers and boards of directors run public firms. They clearly
state corporate objectives and design strategies to achieve these objectives with an aim
to maximize equityholders’ wealth. By contrast, privately owned firms are generally held
by a small number of shareholders. Each of these shareholders has significant control
over the firm. As compared to public firms, private firms may have a narrow objectives to
economize various costs and benefits associated with different financing choices or maintain
relationships with key suppliers and customers.
A higher concentration of ownership in privately owned firms leads to agency-related
issues. Specifically, the fear of losing control of the business makes private firms’ equity-
holders reluctant to issue new external equity (see, for example, Stulz (1988) and Amihud,
Lev, and Travlos (1990)). Since the issuance of equity reduces the control of existing
shareholders, the costs of equity issuance is higher for privately owned firms than their
publicly traded counterparts. On the other hand, since there is separation between public
firm ownership and management, public firms’ managers may observe rational to lessen
the control of any single equityholders. As as result, they may find the issuance of equity
attractive and less costly as compared to private firms (Morellec (2004)).
Another reason of the higher relative equity issuing costs of private firms is the dif-
ferences in the quality of their disclosures and protections to minority shareholders as
compared with publicly traded firms. As a result, minority investors are likely to be re-
luctant to purchase private equity, thereby making private equity relatively costly (Brav
12However, one should note that both studies focus solely on publicly traded US firms.
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(2009)).
Another notable distinction between privately owned and publicly traded firms is the
differences in the level of opacity at the time when raising external capital. In general,
private firms are relatively more opaque to outside lenders/investors as compared with
public firms. Therefore, the level of extent of information asymmetry between private
firm management and outsiders is higher in private firms than public firms. We expect,
due to the presence of the greater information asymmetry at privately owned firms, private
firms are more likely to suffer from adverse selection problems than their publicly listed
counterparts. Hence, the relative costs of issuing equity to debt financing are expected
to be larger for privately owed firms than for publicly traded firms. This is because the
value of equity as compared to debt is likely to be relatively more sensitive to private
information as equity is generally considered junior to debt (Myers and Majluf (1984) and
Noe (1988)).13
Another important difference between privately owned and publicly traded firms is
the differences in their ability to raise capital from the general public. Public firms have
an unrestricted access to stock markets and thus, they can raise capital by issuing public
equity or debentures, whereas, privately owned firms do not have access to stock markets
and thus, they can not issue shares to the general public and mainly rely on bank-loans.14
Frank and Goyal (2008) show empirically that non-public firms exhibit a greater reliance
on retained earnings and bank borrowing than do public firms. However, private firms
are generally small and medium-sized firms (Brav (2009) and Goyal, Nova, and Zanetti
(2011)), and thus, they have even limited access to debt markets due to lack of the collateral
necessary back up their loans (Whited (1992)). Further, private firms have less bargaining
power as compared with their lenders. Private firms also significantly differ from their
publicly traded counterparts in terms of their future investment opportunities. As a
result, the relative borrowing costs of private firms is higher as lenders may anticipate
these difference and demand higher spreads (Saunders and Steffen (2011)).
It is also well accepted in the literature that private firms have less potential to absorb
the negative shocks (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)). Given all these characteristics, privately
owned firms have to overcome more hurdles to access outside sources of finance.15 As
a consequence, privately owned firms are expected to have more constrained access to
external funds including bank borrowing. We expect private firms face these constraints
13See Klein, O’Brien, and Peters (2002), who provide an excellent review of previous empirical studies
that have focused on the relationship between information asymmetry and debt-equity choice.
14Section 81 of Companies Act, 1985.
15Goyal, Nova, and Zanetti (2011) further point out that privately owned firms are significantly younger,
exhibit lower sales growth, and have higher leverage ratios than their publicly listed counterparts. Likewise,
Brav (2009) documents evidence that privately owned firms build up their cash hoards in good times and
appear to dilute their cash reserves in times when they face risks. See, Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Brav
(2009), and Goyal, Nova, and Zanetti (2011) for more on how private firms differ from public firms.
18
with a relatively greater extent during periods of high risk when they experience shortfalls
in their potential cash between existing shareholders and new shareholders flows.
In this chapter, we hypothesize that given a different structure of the environment
within which public and non-public firms operate and different characteristics of both
types of firms, the sensitivity of a non-public firm’s leverage decisions to risks associated
with the firm’s own business activities or macroeconomic conditions should differ from the
sensitivity of a public firm’s leverage decisions to risks. To achieve our goal we use a large
panel of UK manufacturing as our dataset allows us to differentiate the firms by their legal
form. The data on public and non-public UK manufacturing firms are extracted from the
FAME database and cover the period 1999-2008. An initial inspection of the data shows
that non-public firms are relatively small in size, appears to rely more on short-term debt
than on long-term debt, and they significantly differ from their public counterparts in the
context of their access to the capital markets. These observations are broadly speaking
consistent with those of Goyal, Nova, and Zanetti (2011), who do a comparison between
private and public firms in 18 European countries.
Research has also shown that risk not only affects firm behavior on its own but also
in conjunction with various firm-specific variables. For instance, as Baum, Caglayan,
and Talavera (2010) suggest, when risk varies over time, lenders may fail to evaluate the
creditworthiness of a firm and render the firm credit constrained by raising the liquidity
premium required to provide funds. In such circumstances, firm managers will be more
dependent on firms’ retained earnings or liquid assets to overcome the difficulties that the
firm has to go through. In their investigation, Baum, Caglayan, and Talavera (2010) show
that the impact of risk on a firm’s fixed capital investment can also be gauged through its
effects on the firm’s cash holdings (spillover effects) in addition to the own (direct) effects
of risk. Therefore, in this paper, we additionally explore whether risk has spillover effects
on leverage in addition to its direct effects, an issue that has not been examined earlier in
the literature.
We begin our analysis by separately estimating the effects of macroeconomic and id-
iosyncratic risk on the target leverage of public and non-public manufacturing firms. Once
we establish the role of each type of risk on firms’ leverage, we introduce an interaction
term between our measures of risk and the cash stock of the firm to examine how the
impact of risk on leverage changes as the cash holdings of the firm vary over time — the
spillover effect. In our empirical investigation we use several risk measures to capture the
impact of both firm-specific and macroeconomic risk on public versus non-public firms’
leverage while controlling for firm-specific variables to gauge the robustness of our findings.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. Using the System-GMM estimator we
find that the effects of firm-specific variables, namely the investment-to-total assets ratio,
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the sales-to-total assets ratio, and the cash-to-total assets ratio, on leverage are generally
similar to earlier empirical findings.16 Therefore, throughout the discussion of our findings
we do not place too much emphasis on the role of firm-specific determinants on leverage.
Instead, we mainly focus on the impact of time-varying idiosyncratic and macroeconomic
risk on firms’ leverage, whether the leverage of public versus non-public firms behaves
differently in response to either sources of risk, and whether firms’ cash holdings affect the
marginal impact of risk on firms’ leverage.
We find that an increase in idiosyncratic risk has a negative impact on firms’ leverage.
This observation that we gather for the UK data supports the findings of Titman and
Wessels (1988), MacKie-Mason (1990), and Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009), all of
whom using data on US publicly-traded firms show that a firm’s leverage is significantly
negatively correlated with its earnings volatility.17 We also find that the leverage of
non-public firms exhibits a greater sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk as compared to their
public counterparts. This finding is consistent with the view that the financing policy of
non-public firms depends more on their in-house performance as their ability to tap into
external finance is expected to diminish during periods of volatility due to the presence
of frictions. When we turn to investigate the effects of macroeconomic risk, we observe
that an increase in macroeconomic risk also leads to both public and non-public firms
to use less short-term debt in their capital structure. Yet we find no evidence that the
impact is statistically different across each category. This indicates that during periods of
macroeconomic turmoil debt becomes an unattractive source of finance for either type of
firm.18
Last, but not least, we examine the spillover effects of risk on leverage through firms’
cash holdings. We show that both types of risk have significant spillover effects on public
firms’ leverage, but we find no such significant effects for non-public firms. We close our
investigation considering the joint impacts of direct and spillover effects of risk and show
that although the full impact of idiosyncratic risk on leverage is negative, this negative
effect becomes stronger as the firm holds more cash stocks. In other words, we show that
during periods of higher idiosyncratic risk, firms with higher levels of cash holdings have
a larger propensity to reduce their leverage relative to those firms that hold lower levels
of cash stocks. In the case of macroeconomic risk, we observe that the adverse effects of
macroeconomic risk on leverage is stronger when firms’ cash holding is low than when firms
16See, for instance, Titman and Wessels (1988), Fama and French (2002), and Brav (2009).
17Myers (1977), in contrast, argues that large business risk may reduce the agency cost of debt leading
to an increase in the firm’s debt.
18The closest study to our work is that of Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009). In particular, they
examine the effect of risk on the short-term debt to total assets ratio of listed firms in the United States.
Regarding the effects of risk on the leverage of firms, Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009) present similar
evidence as we do here.
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hold relatively high levels of cash. Furthermore, the negative effect of macroeconomic risk
on leverage becomes weaker and, in fact, insignificant statistically as firms accumulate
a stockpile of cash. Our these findings, on the whole, suggest that the level of cash
holdings plays an important role in establishing the relationship between the risk that a
firm experiences and the optimal level of the firm’s leverage.
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the effects of
macroeconomic and idiosyncratic risk on a firm’s financing behavior. Section 3 provides a
description of the dataset we use for our empirical investigation, explains the construction
of variables, and gives the basic summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the empirical
models. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the study.
2.3 The Link between Risk and Leverage
In what follows below, we provide a brief discussion on the role of macroeconomic and
firm-specific risk in determining a firm’s leverage.
2.3.1 Macroeconomic Risk and Firm Leverage
There is an extensive empirical literature which investigates how macroeconomic volatility
affects firms’ behavior. Several researchers, including Leahy and Whited (1996), Ghosal
and Loungani (1996), Baum, Caglayan, and Talavera (2010), and Rashid (2011) indicate
that firms significantly reduce their fixed investment expenditures during periods of high
risk.19 Bartram (2002) presents evidence that the measures of firm liquidity is signifi-
cantly associated with interest rate exposure. Studies, among others, Almeida, Campello,
and Weisbach (2004) and Baum, Caglayan, Stephan, and Talavera (2008), find that firms
increase their demand for liquid assets in response to an increase in macroeconomic un-
certainty. Collectively, these empirical findings indicate that managers fine tune the fixed
investment behavior and liquid assets of the firms to shield the firm against the adverse
effects of risk associated with the aggregate economic activities. Theoretically, the effects
of macroeconomic disturbance on firms’ financing decisions can be explained through the
financial propagation mechanism. That is, the volatility of macroeconomic conditions in-
fluences the borrowers’ collateralizeable net worth (net financial assets, tangible physical
assets, and unencumbered potential earnings), and therefore affects the premium for exter-
nal funds. The countercyclical movements of the premium required for external financing
in turn influences the borrowers’ ability to borrow funds from external sources (Bernanke
and Gertler (1989), Calomiris and Hubbard (1990), Gertler (1992), Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)).
19 Also see Aizenman and Marion (1999), Beaudry, Caglayan, and Schiantarelli (2001), and Bloom,
Bond, and Reenen (2007), who present evidence on the adverse effects of risk on fixed investment.
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Interestingly, there is not much empirical research that investigates the impact of
macroeconomic risk on firms’ debt structure. Gertler and Hubbard (1993) discuss how
firms face both idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk in their production and financial
decisions. According to them, although firms can mitigate the effect of the first one, they
are not able to manipulate the effects of macroeconomic risk. Therefore, firms opt for
equity rather than debt to shift (at least some of) the business-cycle risk to their lenders
during periods of higher macroeconomic risk. In this context, the effect of macroeconomic
volatility on leverage is expected to be negative. Despite its significance to firms, to our
knowledge, only two studies empirically examine the link between leverage and macroeco-
nomic risk. Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009) show for a set of large US nonfinancial
firms drawn from COMPUSTAT that an increase in macroeconomic risk leads to a sig-
nificant decrease in firms’ optimal short-term leverage. Hatzinikolaou, Katsimbris, and
Noulas (2002) examine the impact of inflation risk on firms’ debt-equity ratios for the
firms included in the Dow Jones Industrial Index and they find that inflation risk has a
significant negative effect on a firm’s debt-equity ratio.20
Given the lack of empirical research, it is of particular interest to investigate to what
extent macroeconomic risk affects the target leverage of firms. It must also be noted that
this issue is not only relevant for public companies but more so for non-public companies
whose main source of financing is bank debt as these firms are severely constrained due
to the presence of asymmetric information when it comes to raising funds to finance their
daily activities as well as their capital investment projects.21 All together, our investigation
would help us to understand the linkages between macroeconomic risk and leverage for
public and non-public firms.
2.3.2 Firm-Specific Risk and Firm Leverage
When we review the literature we find that while some researchers report a negative impact
of idiosyncratic risk on leverage, others find no or positive effects. The trade-off theory of
capital structure predicts an inverse link between firm-specific risk and firms’ optimal debt
levels. The rationale for this prediction is that higher business risk as measured by an
increase in the volatility of cash flows heightens the probability of bankruptcy. Therefore,
due to the presence of positive bankruptcy costs, firms use less debt in their capital
structure when there is a large variation in their earnings. To that end, Bradley, Jarrell,
and Kim (1984) present a single period corporate capital structure model and show that
20Despite giving very little attention to empirically examine the role of macroeconomic risk in firm financ-
ing strategies in the literature, several empirical papers, such as Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993), Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994), Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Amdur (2009), Cook and Tang (2010), and Akhtar
(2011) provide evidence of significant relations between business cycles and capital structure dynamics.
21See, for instance, Whited (1992), who points out that small firms have limited access to debt markets
due to the lack of the collateral necessary to back up their loans.
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there is a negative association between firm volatility and its optimal debt. Subsequently,
Titman and Wessels (1988) report a negative association between earnings volatility and
leverage. Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009) report a significant and negative impact of
idiosyncratic risk on the optimal short-term leverage for US non-financial public firms.22
Wald (1999) investigates how earnings volatility affects the target leverage by examining
the determinants of capital structure in France, Germany, Japan, the US and the UK.
They find a significant negative effect of firm-level risk on the debt-to-assets ratio for
firms established in the US and Germany. For the remaining countries, however, they
do not find any significant association between firms’ business risk and their leverage.23
Overall similar findings are reported in Baxter (1967), Ferri and Jones (1979), Friend
and Lang (1988), and MacKie-Mason (1990), indicating the presence of a significant and
negative impact of firm-level risk on leverage.24
In contrast, Myers (1977) predicts a positive relationship between a firms risk and its
level of debt. He argues that large business risk may reduce the agency cost of debt and
thus firms use more debt in their capital structure. Jaffe and Westerfield (1987) also derive
a positive association between risk and the optimal debt level. Several other empirical
studies, including Kim and Sorensen (1986) and Chu, Wu, and Chiou (1992), report
a significant and positive impact of firm-level risk on leverage. Earlier, Toy, Stonehill,
Remmers, and Wright (1974) report the presence of a significant and positive effect of
earnings volatility on the debt ratio of manufacturing firms in Japan, Norway and the US.
Kale, Noe, and Ramirez (1991) examine the impact of business risk on the optimal debt
level by developing a model similar to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). They show that an
increase in business risk initially leads to a decline in debt. However, once the debt of a
firm exceeds a certain limit, the firm uses more debt in its capital structure as business
risk increases.
Overall, we observe that prior research leads to conflicting conclusions on the associa-
tion between idiosyncratic risk and leverage. In the case of theoretical models, results are
related to the underlying assumptions and in the case of empirical studies, results differ
based on the sample and measure of risk used in the investigation. In addition, none of
the studies cited above examines this relationship for non-public companies. Since non-
public firms’ financing options significantly differ from that of public firms, as they are not
22In addition, they show that highly leveraged firms and small firms are more sensitive to firm-specific
risk as compared to relatively low leveraged or large firms.
23Flath and Knoeber (1980) also show that the firm’s earning volatility does not have any significant
impact on leverage in 38 major industries over the period 1957-1972 using a dataset drawn form the IRS
Statistics of Income, Corporate Income Tax Returns database.
24Graham and Harvey (2001b) conducting a survey of U.S. Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) find that
firm managers take earnings volatility into account considerably when making debt decisions. The surveys
of European firms’ CFOs also reveal similar evidence (see, for example, Bancel and Mittoo (2004) and
Brounen, De Jong, and Koedijk (2004)).
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legally allowed to issue debt instruments, it is important to investigate how non-public
firms’ leverage evolves under risk. In this paper, we therefore investigate the impact of
firm-specific risk on public and non-public firms’ leverage using UK firm-level data.
2.4 Data, Variable Construction, and Measuring Risk
To carry out our investigation we construct an annual panel dataset for public and non-
public manufacturing firms using the FAME database which is made available by Bureau
van Dijk (BvD) Electronic Publishing. The data on macroeconomic variables which we
use to generate risk measures are extracted from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS), an International Monetary Fund (IMF) database. The dataset covers a ten-year
period from 1999 to 2008.
2.4.1 Public and Non-Public Company Data Collection
Under the UK Companies Act, all limited liability companies register themselves with the
Companies House as either public or non-public companies. Companies House is basically
an executive agency of the United Kingdom Department for Business, Innovation and
Skills (BIS). The fundamental functions of the Companies House are to incorporate and
dissolve limited liability companies, accumulate and scrutinize company information and
make this information available to the public.25
According to the Companies Act of 1967, in the United Kingdom, all public and
non-public companies must submit their annual financial statements to the Register of
Companies House. However, the Companies Act of 1981 which modified the 1967 Act,
allows small firms to file an abbreviated balance sheet without a profit and loss statement
and medium sized companies to submit an abbreviated financial statement.26 Currently,
both public and non-public companies must file their financial statements within a period
of ten and seven months respectively of their accounting year-end date.
It should be noted that all accounting statements are compiled according to the UK
accounting standards. Both non-public and public companies’ financial statements must
be audited by a professional and a qualified auditing firm if the company’s annual turnover
is more than one million pounds. However, public firms should provide some additional
information to the general public to be listed on the London Stock Exchange. Hence, this
source provides compatible and consistent information across public and non-public firms.
25 For more information about Companies House, see http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/.
26 According to the Companies Act, a company to be classified into “medium” (“small”) category based
on execution of any two of the following criteria for at least two consecutive years: (i) annual sales should
not be more than 11.2 (2.8) million pounds, (ii) the book value of total assets should not be more than
5.6 (1.4) million pounds, and (iii) the number of workers should not be more than 250 (50).
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2.4.2 The FAME Database
As mentioned earlier, according to the UK Companies Act, all limited liability companies
must submit their annual financial statements to Companies House during a specific period
of time from the year-end date. Once a company files its accounting statements, Companies
House carefully investigates and checks this information and makes it available to the
general public. Jordans, one of the leading providers of legal information in the UK,
collects this data from Companies House. Finally, BvD collects the data from Jordans
and makes it available for commercial uses through the FAME database.
The FAME database provides information on both active and inactive public/non-
public limited liability companies in the UK up to a maximum of a 10-year period. The
data coverage may vary in terms of the number of observations for a given company as
there may be entry or exit from the dataset. The main advantage of the FAME database
is that it includes both balance-sheet and off-balance sheet information, such as income
statements, cash flows statements, profit and loss accounts, and ownership information.
Firms in the database operate in a wide range of industrial sectors including agri-
culture, forestry and mining, manufacturing, construction, retail and wholesale, hotels
and restaurants, the financial sector, the public sector, and the regulated utility industry.
FAME contains data for both non-public and public limited companies and over 99% of
the companies in the database are small and not traded on the stock exchange. Hence,
our dataset gives us a unique opportunity to investigate the behavior of non-public versus
public limited companies.
The FAME database reports two sorts of variables in the form of static and annual
observations. An annual variable is a variable whose values are reported for each end of
accounting year. Whereas, in the case of a static variable (a “header” variable), such as
ownership information, company type (public or non-public, listed or unlisted, etc), date
of incorporation, registration number, and SIC primary and secondary codes, only the
previous year’s reported value exists. The FAME database that we use for this study con-
tained information for 1999-2008 on both static variables and annual financial statements
for approximately 4 million public and non-public companies in the UK from all sectors.
All incorporated entities are classified by the 2003 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes.
2.4.3 Sample Selection Criteria, Initial Screening, and Variable Construction
In this paper, we only focus on the manufacturing firms and exclude companies that have
changed the date of their accounting year-end by more than a few weeks. The dataset
refers to 12-month accounting periods for all companies. As an initial screening, we exclude
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companies that have less than 3 years of consecutive data on debt, investment, cash and
equivalence, or sales. Second, we set all negative values for all variables (except cash
flows) in the sample as missing. After the initial screening, our dataset contains a total
of 120,337 firm-year observations over a ten-year period from 1999 to 2008. The dataset
has an unbalanced panel structure where each firm contributes between 3 to 10 years of
observations. We flag each firm as either public or non-public based on their “Company
Type” as provided by FAME.
We construct leverage as the book value of the short-term debt to total assets ratio as
we aim to understand the behavior of public and non-public firms’ short-term debt as risk
evolves over time.27 We should note that Titman and Wessels (1988) also use the ratio of
short-term debt to total assets as one of the proxies for firm leverage while several other
researchers including Marsh (1982), Fama and French (2002), Rajan and Zingales (1995),
and Leary and Roberts (2005), define leverage as a ratio of the book value of debt to total
assets.
Following the previous empirical studies, we include a number of firm-specific control
variables in our empirical model. We define investment as expenditure by the firm on the
purchase of fixed tangible assets during a year. Cash is set equal to cash and equivalents.
Sales are defined as the total turnover of the company during an accounting year period.
To control for the potential influence of outliers in our empirical analysis, all variables
that enter into our model in ratios are winsorized at the lower and upper one-percentile
to purge the impact of outliers and reporting errors on the data.28 Further details on the
variables are given in Table 2-A of Appendix A.
2.4.4 Generating Firm-Specific Risk
Researchers implement different methods to generate a proxy for firm-specific risk. For
instance, Huizinga (1993) uses the conditional variance obtained from a GARCH-type
specification on wage and materials cost. Pindyck and Solimano (1993) and Caballero and
Pindyck (1996) use a geometric Brownian model to derive the variance of the marginal
revenue product of capital. Ghosal and Loungani (2000) measure the firm-level risk by
the standard deviation of the firm’s unpredictable profit. Bo (2002) constructs an AR(1)
model for sales and then uses the cumulative standard deviation of the residuals obtained
from the model for each year as a measure of firm-specific risk. Bo and Lensink (2005)
use stock price volatility as well as the volatility of the number of employees to measure
firm-level uncertainty. They compute stock price volatility as the difference between the
highest and lowest stock price for each underlying firm normalized by the lowest price.
27 It should be noted that the market value of debt is not available for non-public firms.
28See, for instance, Brav (2009), who have applied similar screening methods.
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To construct volatility based on employees, they use the coefficient of variance over a
seven-year period. Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009) estimate idiosyncratic risk by
calculating the standard deviation of the closing price of the firm’s shares.29 Likewise,
Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) also simply use the standard deviation of cash flows normalized
by average total assets as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk in their analysis of the empirical
determinants of cash holdings of UK firms.
Most of the measures described above are well suited for cases where the focus is on
large publicly traded firms as these methods may introduce a bias into the constructed
measure of risk for small firms.30 Given that the focus of our paper is on the behavior
of public versus non-public firms, and non-public firms are much smaller than the public
firms, we follow Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004) to compute time-varying measures of
firm-specific risk. Their approach requires us to estimate a model on firm sales scaled by
total assets (Sit) using firm (fi) and year fixed-effects (ft). Specifically, we estimate the
following specification:
Sit = fi + ft + ψit (2.1)
where i and t denote firm and year, respectively and ψit is the white-noise error term. The
absolute value of these residuals, σlevelit = |ψit| , is then used as a proxy for firm-specific
risk.
To construct a second measure of risk, we estimate an AR(1) model for sales nor-
malized by total assets. Using the one-period-ahead residuals obtained from this model,
we compute the cumulative-volatility in sales, σcumulativeit . Specifically, the risk proxy for
2000 is constructed by calculating the standard deviation of the residuals obtained from
the AR(1) model of sales that uses data for 2000 and 1999. Similarly, the risk measure for
2001 is constructed calculating the standard deviation of the residuals obtained from the
same model using the data for 2001, 2000, and 1999. The process is repeated similarly.
The downside of this approach is the loss of one observation per firm.
2.4.5 Computing Macroeconomic Risk
Similar to the case of generating firm-specific risk, researchers use different methodologies
to construct measures of macroeconomic risk. For instance, Aizenman and Marion (1999)
use conditional variances obtained from government expenditures as a share of GDP,
nominal money growth, and the real exchange rate to proxy for macroeconomic risk.
Driver, Temple, and Urga (2005) construct a proxy for macroeconomic risk from the
29Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) also estimate the market, industry and firm-level volatility
for listed U.S. firms by using firm-level return data.
30 For more details on this issue, see Comin and Philippon (2005).
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conditional variance of manufacturing output obtained from a GARCH model. Baum,
Stephan, and Talavera (2009) fit a generalized ARCH model to derive the conditional
variance of the index of leading macroeconomic indicators as a proxy for the macro-level
uncertainty.
In contrast to the researchers above, Ghosal and Loungani (2000) use the moving stan-
dard deviation of energy prices and the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) to proxy for macroeco-
nomic fluctuations. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) use two-year aggregate domestic nonfinan-
cial corporate profit growth and two-year equity market returns to proxy macroeconomic
conditions. Several other researchers, including Kaufmann, Mehrez, and Schmukler (2005)
and Graham and Harvey (2001a), utilize survey-based methods based on the dispersion of
forecasts, which are collected from firm or bank managers, as a measure of macroeconomic
risk.
In our investigation, we use the ARCH/GARCH methodology to measure macroeco-
nomic risk. To generate macroeconomic risk, given that companies tend to consider their
production as well as financing decisions, we use monthly T-bills rate and quarterly GDP
series for the period between 1996 and 2008. Once the conditional variances for each series
are obtained, we annualize these series by taking average across four quarters and across
twelve months for GDP and T-bills rate series, respectively, to match the frequency of the
firm-level panel data. Table 2-B in Appendix B presents the estimated ARCH/GARCH
specifications. As the table reveals, the estimates on diagnostic tests provide evidence that
our models are well-specified and there is no remaining ARCH effect in the residuals.
2.4.6 Preview: Summary Statistics and Correlations
Table 2.1 provides the descriptive statistics for the full sample as well as public and non-
public firms. We apply nonparametric equality tests to examine if the means, medians,
and standard deviations of those variables that we employ in our models differ across
public and non-public firms.
We observe that the mean leverage for non-public firms is significantly higher than
their public counterparts over the sample period. In particular, the average short-term
debt to total assets of non-public firms is 19.8% compared with 13.8% for their public
counterparts. This difference implies that the non-public firms in our dataset depend
more on short-term debt to finance their activities in comparison to the public firms.
This observation makes sense as debt financing is one of the major means for non-public
firms to raise funds. This observation is also in line with that of Brav (2009) who shows
that non-public firms use relatively more debt to finance their fixed capital investments
than public firms. Recently, Goyal, Nova, and Zanetti (2011) examining the differences
in financing policies of public and private firms in 18 European countries also document
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics of Firm-Specific Variables for Public versus
Non-Public Firms
Variables Firms
Statistics
Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Leverage ratio Full Sample 120337 0. 196 0. 116 0. 223
Public 5361 0. 138 0. 067 0. 183
Non-public 114976 0. 198 0. 119 0. 225
Difference 0. 060* 0. 052* 0. 042*
Sales-to-total assets ratio Full Sample 105006 1. 575 1. 443 0. 892
Public 5060 1. 085 1. 019 0. 631
Non-public 99946 1. 600 1. 469 0. 869
Difference 0. 515* 0. 450* 0. 238*
Cash & equivalent-to-assets ratio Full Sample 140544 0. 121 0. 057 0. 555
Public 5477 0. 111 0. 054 0. 146
Non-public 135067 0. 122 0. 057 0. 156
Difference 0. 011 0. 003 0. 010
Investment-to-total assets ratio Full Sample 57991 0. 155 0. 028 0. 265
Public 4292 0. 184 0. 041 0. 283
Non-public 53699 0. 152 0. 026 0. 263
Difference - 0. 032* -0. 015* -0. 020*
Notes: The difference between the means, medians, and standard deviation (Std.Dev.) of public and
non-public firms are reported in brackets. * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level of significance.
similar evidence. We also observe that the leverage of non-public firms is more volatile as
compared to that of public firms. Similarly, there is a significant difference between non-
public and public firms’ sales-to-total assets ratios. The mean value of the sales-to-total
assets ratio is 1.60 for non-public firms, whereas, it is 1.08 for the public firms. This ratio
is also significantly more volatile for the non-public firms as compared to that of public
firms.
The statistics on cash and equivalent do not show any significant difference between
the two groups. Non-public firms have a cash and equivalent-to-total assets ratio of 12.2%,
on average, whereas, this figure is 11.1% for public firms. We should also note that, on
average, public firms have higher investment normalized by total assets as compared to
their non-public counterparts. The mean value of the investment to asset ratio is 15% and
18% for non-public firms and public firms, respectively. This differential is statistically
significant for both the mean and median values. The size of the standard deviation
for this variable provides evidence that public firms’ investment rates are slightly more
variable than that of non-public firms over the period under consideration.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics of our macroeconomic and idiosyncratic risk
measures. The table reports the means, standard deviations, as well as the 25th, 50th and
75th percentiles of these proxies. There are considerable differences within each group of
risk measure. The mean and the standard deviation of firm-specific risk measure based
on absolute errors (σlevel) is much smaller than that of cumulative (σcumulative) risk mea-
sure. A similar observation is valid for macroeconomic risk based on T-bills and GDP. To
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investigate whether the risk proxies gauge similar movements in the business and macroe-
conomic environment, we compute their correlations. Table 2.3 shows that the correlation
coefficients are very low and they are not statistically significant at any reasonable level
of significance. Hence, we conclude that each of our measures captures a different aspect
of the risk within which firms operate.
Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Proxies for Risk
The table presents summary statistics of the risk measures. We construct two time-varying prox-
ies for firm-specific risk which are based on sales, σlevelit and σ
cumulative
it . Note that σ
cumulative
it
is cumulative volatility in the level of sales. Similarly, we compute two time-varying proxies for
macroeconomic risk based on the conditional variance of T-bills rates (σT−billt ) and GPD (σ
GDP
t ).
Statistics
Firm-Specific Risk Macroeconomic Risk
σlevelit σ
cumulative
it σ
T−bill
t σ
GDP
t
Mean 0.240 0.500 0.033 4.475
Std. Deviation 2.023 7.707 0.046 3.142
P25 0.033 0.007 0.011 1.988
P50 0.069 0.024 0.015 2.202
P75 0.185 0.087 0.026 8.017
Table 2.3: Correlations of Idiosyncratic and Macroeconomic Risk Proxies
The table presents the coefficients of correlation for macroeconomic and idiosyncratic risk measures. We
construct two time-varying proxies for firm-specific uncertainties which are based on sales, σlevelit and
σcumulativeit . Note that σ
cumulative
it is cumulative volatility in the level of sales. Similarly, we compute two
time-varying proxies for macroeconomic risk based on the conditional variance of T-bills rates (σT−billt )
and GPD (σGDPt ).
Firm-Specific Risk
σlevelit σ
cumulative
it
M
a
c
ro
e
c
o
n
o
m
ic
R
is
k
σGDPt 0.024 0.001
σT−billt 0.022 0.011
In Table 2.4, we report simple correlation coefficients between our main variables and
leverage for non-public and public firms. For both types of firms (public and non-public),
leverage has a negative correlation with the sales to total asset ratio. However, this asso-
ciation is statistically insignificant in the case of public firms, reflecting that the optimal
leverage may be more sensitive to sales for non-public firms as compared to public firms.
The cash and equivalent to total assets ratio is significantly and negatively correlated
with leverage for both non-public and public firms. This correlation suggests that cash
rich firms borrow less.
Table 2.4 also shows that the correlation between the ratio of investment to total assets
and firms’ leverage is statistically significant and positive for both groups of firms. The
intensity of this relationship is considerably higher for public firms as the magnitude of
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Table 2.4: Correlation of Risk and Firm-Specific Variables with Leverage
The table presents correlations between firm leverage and the remaining variables in the model. The
sample covers the period from 1999 to 2008. We categorize a firm as public if it is listed in the stock
exchange and as non-public if it is not. The leverage is defined as the ratio of the short-term debt to total
assets. The method of measuring volatility and definitions of the firm-specific independent variables are
given in Table 2-A, Appendix A. ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
Variables
Leverage
Non-public Public
Sales-to-total assets ratio -0.007** -0.015
Cash & equivalent-to-total assets ratio -0.117** -0.182**
Investment-to-total assets ratio 0.172** 0.446**
Volatility in levels of sales -0.008** -0.035**
Cumulative-volatility in levels of sales -0.025** -0.021**
T-bills rate volatility -0.012** -0.002**
GDP volatility -0.009** 0.037**
the correlation coefficient is 0.45, while, for non-public firms the correlation coefficient is
only 0.17. This evidence suggests that public firms use relatively more short-term debt to
finance their investment opportunities than the non-public firms do.
Regarding the correlation between risk and leverage, Table 2.4 provides a prima facia
evidence for the presence of a significant and negative association between leverage and all
measures of risk. Furthermore, the table shows that this observation holds for both public
and non-public firms. However, to properly examine the causal effects of both types of
risk on firms’ leverage decisions, we need to have a well-specified model which incorporates
the relevant firm-specific variables while considering the dynamics.
2.5 Econometric Framework
2.5.1 Specification of the Baseline Empirical Model
To examine the association between risk and leverage, we estimate several models for public
and non-public firms. Our baseline model incorporates risk measures to a standard model
allowing us to examine the linkages between leverage and risk. Among others, similar
to Brav (2009), Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009) and Auerbach (1985), our model
contains the lagged leverage (lagged dependent variable) to control for the persistence in
debt holdings. Specifically, we express the model as follows:
Levit = λ0+λ1Levit−1+λ2Salesit+λ3Cashit+λ4Invtit+λ5σ
firm
it−1 +λ6σ
macro
t−1 +fi+εit (2.2)
where subscript i and t denote firms and years, respectively. Levit is the leverage in year
t for firm i and is defined as the ratio of short-term debt to total assets. Salesit, Cashit,
and Invtit denote sales, cash and equivalents, and fixed investment, correspondingly, and
each variable is normalized by total assets to remove scale effects. In our model, the
risk measure enters the model with a lag, where σfirmit−1 is one of our time-varying firm-
specific risk measures for firm i in year t and σmacrot−1 denotes one of our time-varying
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macroeconomic risk measures. fi denotes firm-specific fixed effects and εit is the error
term. All estimations are carried out for the period 1999-2008. The key coefficients of
interest are λ5 and λ6 which capture the effects of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk
on firms’ leverage, respectively. Particularly, we are interested to see if these coefficients
attain a negative or a positive sign so that we can determine the effect of risk on the
leverage of manufacturing firms in the UK.
2.5.2 Differential Effects of Risk
Whilst estimating the effects of risk on the firm’s short-term leverage, equation (2.2) does
not enable us to test whether the impact of risk on public firms is statistically different
from that of non-public firms. To scrutinize this issue, we extend our basic model so that
all variables of interest in equation (2.2) assume a different coefficient across public and
non-public firms within the same framework. To achieve our goal, we generate two sets of
dummies that allow us to separate public firms from non-public firms and interact them
with all variables in the model. Specifically, we generate a public-firm dummy (Dpublici )
which is equal to one if the firm is categorized as a public firm and zero otherwise. We
then generate a dummy for non-public firms (Dnonpublici ) which is equal to (1 −Dpublici ).
The extended model takes the following form:
Levit = φ1Levit−1D
public
i + φ2Levit−1D
nonpublic
i + φ3SalesitD
public
i + φ4SalesitD
nonpublic
i
+ φ5CashitD
public
i + φ6CashitD
nonpublic
i + φ7InvtitD
public
i + φ8InvtitD
nonpublic
i
+ φ9σ
firm
it−1 D
public
i + φ10σ
firm
it−1 D
nonpublic
i + φ11σ
macro
t−1 D
public
i
+ φ12σ
macro
t−1 D
nonpublic
i + φ0 + fi + εit (2.3)
We prefer this approach over estimating leverage models on separate sub-samples of public
and non-public firms owing to the following two reasons. First, our approach allows us to
work with higher degrees of freedom. Second, our approach allows us to properly test the
differential effects of risk on leverage for both groups of firms.31 More specifically, we test
the following two hypotheses:
H10 : The impact of σ
firm
it−1 on Levit is the same for public and non-public firms. (φ9 = φ10)
H20 : The impact of σ
macro
t−1 on Levit is the same for public and non-public firms. (φ11 = φ12)
2.5.3 Spillover Effects of Risk
Baum, Caglayan, Stephan, and Talavera (2008) develop a partial equilibrium model of pre-
cautionary demand for liquid assets to examine how macroeconomic risk and idiosyncratic
31 This approach also allows one to test the differential effects of the remaining variables across public
versus non-public firms. Nevertheless, we leave this step to the reader to save space as we concentrate on
the effects of risk on firms’ leverage.
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uncertainty affect firms’ cash holdings. Their empirical results indicate that risk has a sig-
nificant impact on the non-financial U.S. firms’ optimal liquidity and firms increase their
demand for liquid assets in response to an increase in either macroeconomic risk or firm-
specific risk. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) also show that macroeconomic con-
ditions have a significant impact on financially constrained firms’ cash holdings.32 Since a
firm’s financing policy markedly depends on the firm’s investment opportunities and avail-
ability of internal funds, risk is likely to have indirect (spillover) effects, possibly through
its impact on cash holdings, as well while directly affecting firms’ capital investment or
borrowing behavior.
In fact, Baum, Caglayan, and Talavera (2010) provide evidence that risk affects firms’
capital investments on its own (the direct effect of uncertainty) and through its impact on
those firms’ cash holdings (the indirect effect of uncertainty). To see whether the effects
of risk spill over to firms’ leverage behavior through its effects on firms’ cash holdings,
we augment our basic specification by incorporating cash-holding-risk interactions. In
particular, we estimate the following augmented model:
Levit = β1Levit−1D
public
i + β2Levit−1D
nonpublic
i + β3SalesitD
public
i + β4SalesitD
nonpublic
i
+ β5CashitD
public
i + β6CashitD
nonpublic
i + β7InvtitD
public
i + β8InvtitD
nonpublic
i
+ β9σ
firm
it−1 D
public
i + β10σ
firm
it−1 D
nonpublic
i + β11σ
macro
t−1 D
public
i + β12σ
macro
t−1 D
nonpublic
i
+ β13Cashitσ
firm
it−1 D
public
i + β14Cashitσ
firm
it−1 D
nonpublic
i + β15Cashitσ
macro
t−1 D
public
i
+ β16Cashitσ
macro
t−1 D
nonpublic
i
+ β0 + fi + εit (2.4)
We assess the spillover effects of idiosyncratic risk on the firm’s leverage by investigating
the significance of β13 and β14 in equation (2.4):
H10 : β13 = 0, for public firms.
H20 : β14 = 0, for non-public firms.
To examine the spillover impact of macroeconomic risk on leverage, we test the significance
of β15 and β16 in equation (2.4):
H30 : β15 = 0, for public firms.
H40 : β16 = 0, for non-public firms.
The rejection of the null hypotheses suggest that idiosyncratic volatility as well as
macroeconomic volatility affect leverage in conjunction with movements in firms’ cash
holdings.
32Several other papers including Kim and Sorensen (1986), Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998), Opler,
Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Han
and Qiu (2007), Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007), Riddick and Whited (2009), and Bates, Kahle,
and Stulz (2009) also provide evidence on the relationship between the cash structure of the firms and
idiosyncratic risk.
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2.5.4 Estimation Procedure
To estimate the models discussed above, one must use an instrumental variable (IV) ap-
proach due to endogeneity problem. Here, we use a robust two-step system dynamic
panel data (DPD) estimator (system GMM approach) developed by Blundell and Bond
(1998). This methodology allows us to remove fixed effects by design as we can estimate
the model in first-differences. Specifically, this estimation procedure combines equations
in differences of the variables with equations in levels and controls for possible endogene-
ity problems by using the lagged values of the regressors as instruments. Finally, this
approach is quite flexible and allows the researcher to make use of different instruments
with different lag structure for both the levels and the first-differenced equations. To test
for the validity of the instruments, we use the J-statistic of Hansen (1982). This statis-
tic is asymptotically distributed as χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
overidentifying restrictions (i.e., the number of instruments less the number of estimated
parameters). Under the null hypothesis, the instruments are orthogonal to the errors.
To examine the presence of serial correlation in the error terms, we employ the Arellano
and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation. Under the null of no serial correlation, the test
asymptotically follows a standard normal distribution. It also provides a further check on
the correct specification of the System-GMM process. In a dynamic panel data context,
the first-order serial correlation is likely to be present, but the residuals should not exhibit
the second-order serial correlation if the instruments are strictly exogenous.
The estimates from the J test are reported in each table that we present below. These
estimates indicate that the instruments used in the System GMM estimations are appro-
priate and satisfy the orthogonality conditions. The Arellano-Bond AR(2) tests do not
provide any evidence for the presence of second-order serial correlation in the residuals.
This indicates that the instruments that we use in our estimation are appropriate. For
the purpose of consistency and brevity, we do not make any further comments on these
aspects of the estimated models when we discuss our results.
2.6 Empirical Findings
We commence our empirical analysis by estimating equation (2.2) to pin down the effects
of idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk on firms’ leverage, using two different measures
for each type of risk. We next investigate whether risk has a differential impact on the
leverage of non-public versus public firms as equation (2.3) depicts. Finally, we estimate
equation (2.4) to examine whether the effects of risk spill over to leverage through its
impact on the cash holdings of firms and to discuss the total impact of risk on firms’
leverage.
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2.6.1 The Impact of Risk on Leverage
The results for equation (2.2) that relates the leverage of firms to risk as well as several
firm-specific variables are given in Table 2.5. The first two columns, indicated as the first
and second models, use risk measures based on GDP in conjunction with the volatility
in the level of sales and the cumulative volatility in sales, correspondingly. The third
and fourth models use the risk measure based on T-bill rates while firm-specific risks are
same as before. Recalling the correlations depicted in Table 2.3 , we believe that each
measure captures a different aspect of risk in the environment within which firms operate.
Furthermore, given the simple correlations in Table 2.4, we expect to find an inverse
association between risk and leverage.
Before we examine the effects of risk on leverage, let us observe the role of the lagged
dependent variable and the other firm-specific variables on leverage. Table 2.5 shows that
the lagged leverage attains a positive sign providing evidence on the persistence of leverage:
firms that borrowed in the previous period continue to use debt financing. As expected,
the coefficients of Sales and Cash to total asset ratios are significant and negative implying
that an improvement in sales and cash holdings enables firms to borrow less funds. The
coefficient of investment rate is positive suggesting that increases in capital investment
lead to an increase in the use of short-term debt as a means of external finance. Our
findings for the firm-specific variables are generally consistent with the previous empirical
work including that of Titman and Wessels (1988), Fama and French (2002), Rajan and
Zingales (1995), Brav (2009), and Goyal, Nova, and Zanetti (2011).
The key finding emerging from Table 2.5 is that both types of risk exert a significant
and negative effect on leverage. Specifically, for each model depicted in the table, we
observe that idiosyncratic risk attains a significant and negative coefficient. The negative
effect of idiosyncratic risk on firms’ leverage is consistent with Titman and Wessels (1988),
MacKie-Mason (1990), Wald (1999), and Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009), who also
show empirically that firm-level risk has a negative and significant impact on leverage.33
Table 2.5 also presents evidence that macroeconomic risk has a significant and negative
impact on firms’ leverage in all models, although the intensity of the estimated impact of
macroeconomic risk on leverage depends on the risk measure used. Our observations are
consistent with the findings of Hatzinikolaou, Katsimbris, and Noulas (2002) and Baum,
Stephan, and Talavera (2009), who report a negative association between macroeconomic
risk and the leverage of US non-financial firms.
The results in Table 2.5 provide evidence that the effects of risk on leverage are not only
33Our finding on the negative effect of firm-specific risk on a firm’s leverage is, however, in contrast to
the findings of Campello and Giambona (2010), who find a negative but statistically insignificant effect of
earnings volatility on the choice of leverage of firms.
35
Table 2.5: Robust Two-step System-GMM Estimates for the Effects of Risk
on Leverage
Panel A of the table reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step System-GMM estimations for
combined effects of macroeconomic risk and firm-specific risk on firms’ leverage. The figures given in
parentheses are standard errors which are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation within panels. The dependent variable is leverage, defined as the ratio of short-term debt
to total assets. The analysis covers the period 1999-2008 for panel of UK public and non-public firms.
Model 1 estimates the joint impact of volatility in GDP and volatility in the level of sales on leverage.
Model 2 estimates the joint impact of volatility in GDP and accumulative volatility in firms’ sales on
leverage. Model 3 estimates the joint impact of volatility in T-bills rates and volatility in the level of sales
on firm’s leverage. Model 4 estimates the joint impact of volatility in T-bills rates and cumulative volatility
in sales on leverage. In all four models, the one period lagged values of the first difference of the right-hand
side variables are used as instruments for the equations in levels. The instruments for differenced equations
are the first and second lags for Model 1, 2, and 3. For Model 4, the second to fourth lags of the right-hand
variables are used as instruments for first differenced equations. The method of measuring volatility and
definitions of the remaining independent variables are given in Table 2-A, Appendix A. Panel C of the table
reports the J statistics, which is a test of the over identifying restrictions and distributed as chi-squared
under the null of instrument validity and the Arellano-Bond, AR(2), test of second-order autocorrelation
in the first-differenced residuals. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level of significance. **
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
Panel A: Estimation results
Regressors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
Levit−1 0.358 (0.134)*** 0.316 (0.156)*** 0.339 (0.127)*** 0.439 (0.148)***
Salesit -0.015 (0.002)*** -0.014 (0.002)*** -0.016 (0.002)*** -0.017 (0.003)***
Cashit -0.113 (0.041)*** -0.116 (0.041)*** -0.126 (0.042)*** -0.127 (0.042)***
Invtit 0.044 (0.020)** 0.049 (0.021)** 0.045 (0.020)** 0.043 (0.025)*
σGDPt−1 -0.010 (0.002)*** -0.010 (0.002)***
σT−billt−1 -0.453 (0.159)*** -0.844 (0.233)***
σlevelit−1 -0.022 (0.008)*** -0.023 (0.009)***
σcumulativeit−1 -0.029 (0.012)** -0.069 (0.002)***
Constant 0.153 (0.026)*** 0.157 (0.029)*** 0.164 (0.025)*** 0.156 (0.031)***
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 23487 21001 23487 21001
Firm 5436 5301 5436 5301
AR(2) -1.010 -1.011 -1.140 -0.14
p-value 0.310 0.311 0.254 0.889
J-statistic 12.77 10.86 12.29 9.04
p-value 0.850 0.828 0.583 0.433
similar across different measures of risk but they are robust when we implement different
pairs of idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk. Our findings so far provide support to
the claim that manufacturing firms in the UK use less short-term debt in their capital
structure when there is an increase in either macroeconomic or firm-specific risk. These
results hold for each proxy that we use for either types of risk. Nevertheless, these results
are too general and do not allow us to comment on whether risk affects public versus non-
public firms differently. This is an important question as there are significant differences
between the two types of firms. In particular, non-public firms are relatively small in size
and they differ in terms of their ability to access the capital markets. Furthermore, they
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have generally less potential to absorb negative business shocks which render banks to act
more cautiously towards non-public firms. Last, but not least, non-public firms exhibit
relatively a high leverage ratio. We therefore continue our investigation to examine if risk
affects leverage across public and non-public firms differently.
2.6.2 The Differential Impact of Risk across Public and Non-Public Firms
In this section, we seek to find out if risk has differential effects across public and non-public
firms. To test for the possibility that risk exerts differential effects on public versus non-
public firms, we estimate equation (2.3) where all firm-specific variables and risk measures
are interacted with Public and Non-public dummies. The Public dummy is set to one if
the firm is public and zero otherwise. The Non-public dummy is equal to (1− Public).
We estimate four dynamic models. Similar to Table 2.5, Models 1 and 2 use the
volatility measure based on GDP to capture macroeconomic risks and that based on
the level of sales and the cumulative-volatility measure to capture idiosyncratic risks,
respectively. Models 3 and 4, use risk proxies based on Treasury bill rates along with the
above two types of firm-specific volatility measures. Table 2.6, Panel A, reports the results.
In all four cases, lagged leverage attains a positive and significant sign for both types of
firms. However, the size of the coefficient for non-public firms is significantly larger than
that of public firms showing that non-public firms’ leverage has a greater persistence than
that of public firms. This is expected as non-public firms generally depend on short-term
debt to carry out their daily business activities while public firms have a wider choice to
finance theirs. Sales and cash to total assets ratios also exhibit significant and negative
effects on leverage. This effect is significantly greater in absolute value for public firms,
once more signalling the fact that non-public firms cannot reduce their dependence on
short-term borrowing as much as public firms when their sales and cash holdings improve.
We also find that the effect of investment on leverage is insignificant for non-public
firms and significant for public firms. It is possible that the insignificance of the investment
ratio for non-public firms is due to the fact that they have on average significantly less
expenditure on capital investment as compared to their public counterparts (see Table
2.1). All of these variables in the remaining models in the table attain the same signs as in
Model 1 and we therefore do not make further comments on them.34 Overall, our results
regarding firm-specific variables are in line with the earlier findings.35
When we turn to inspect the role of risk on leverage, we see from Table 2.6 that both
34To our knowledge, the impact of firm-specific variables on leverage, which we provide here for public
versus non-public firms, has not been studied in the literature with the exception of Brav (2009) and
Goyal, Nova, and Zanetti (2011).
35 See, for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender
(2008), Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009), Brav (2009), Hovakimian and Li (2010a), and Goyal, Nova,
and Zanetti (2011), among many others.
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Table 2.6: Robust Two-step System-GMM Estimates for the Differential Ef-
fects of Risk on the Leverage of Public and Non-Public Firms
Panel A reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step System-GMM estimations for the effects
of macroeconomic and firm-specific risk on firms’ leverage, separately for non-public and public firms.
The figures given in parentheses are standard errors which are asymptotically robust to the presence of
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within panels. To examine the differential impact of risk across
both groups of firms, we construct Dnonpublici .X (D
public
i .X) as the explanatory variable X interacted with
a dummy equal to one (zero) if the firm is non-public and zero (one) if the firm is public. The dependent
variable is leverage, defined as the short-term debt scaled by total assets. The analysis covers the period
1999-2008 for a panel of UK non-public and public firms. Model 1 estimates the joint impact of volatility
in GDP and volatility in the level of sales on leverage. Model 2 estimates the joint impact of volatility in
GDP and cumulative volatility in firms’ sales on leverage. Model 3 estimates the joint impact of volatility
in T-bills rates and volatility in the level of sales on firm’s leverage. Model 4 estimates the joint impact of
volatility in T-bills rates and cumulative volatility in sales on leverage. The method of measuring volatility
and definitions of the remaining independent variables are given in Table 2-A, Appendix A. Panel B of the
table reports the test statistics along with its p-values for testing a differential effect of uncertainty. Panel
C reports the J statistics, which is a test of the over identifying restrictions and distributed as chi-squared
under the null of instrument validity and the Arellano-Bond, AR(2), test of second-order autocorrelation
in the first-differenced residuals. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation results
Regressors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
Dnonpublici .Levit−1 0.759 (0.026)*** 0.761 (0.031)*** 0.775 (0.026)*** 0.768 (0.033)***
Dpublici .Levit−1 0.528 (0.162)* 0.639 (0.184)* 0.340 (0.138)*** 0.395 (0.135)*
Dnonpublici .Salesit -0.015 (0.002)*** -0.014 (0.002)*** -0.016 (0.001)*** -0.015 (0.002)***
Dpublici .Salesit -0.019 (0.007)*** -0.025 (0.009)*** -0.027 (0.010)*** -0.012 (0.006)*
Dnonpublici .Cashit -0.054 (0.009)*** -0.061 (0.011)*** -0.056 (0.009)*** -0.061 (0.012)***
Dpublici .Cashit -0.090 (0.028)*** -0.081 (0.027)*** -0.076 (0.035)*** -0.058 (0.028)***
Dnonpublici .Invtit 0.001 (0.009) 0.002 (0.011) 0.003 (0.010) 0.001 (0.011)
Dpublici .Invtit 0.111 (0.061)* 0.117 (0.058)** 0.146 (0.059)** 0.136 (0.059)***
Dnonpublici .σ
GDP
t−1 -0.009 (0.003)*** -0.007 (0.003)**
Dpublici .σ
GDP
t−1 -0.016 (0.007)** -0.015 (0.008)*
Dnonpublici .σ
T−bill
t−1 -0.621 (0.294)** -0.926 (0.328)***
Dpublici .σ
T−bill
t−1 -0.922 (0.418)** -1.093 (0.461)**
Dnonpublici .σ
level
it−1 -0.025 (0.005)*** -0.027 (0.005)***
Dpublici .σ
level
it−1 -0.004 (0.002)** -0.005 (0.002)**
Dnonpublici .σ
cumulative
it−1 -0.050 (0.013)*** -0.056 (0.013)***
Dpublici .σ
cumulative
it−1 -0.004 (0.002)** -0.007 (0.002)***
Constant 0.078 (0.006)*** 0.074 (0.007)*** 0.085 (0.008)*** 0.086 (0.008)***
Panel B: Tests for differential effects of risk
σpublicfirm = σ
nonpublic
firm 15.410 11.010 16.290 13.170
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
σpublicmacro = σ
nonpublic
macro 0.530 0.580 0.330 0.090
p-value 0.467 0.445 0.565 0.760
Panel C: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 23,487 21,001 23,487 21,001
Firm 5,436 5,301 5,436 5,301
AR(2) 0.210 -0.003 0.170 -0.160
p-value 0.837 0.998 0.869 0.873
J-statistic 39.210 42.370 40.080 28.640
p-value 0.211 0.127 0.113 0.156
idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk exert a significant and negative impact on leverage.
However, the impact of idiosyncratic risk on non-public firms is significantly stronger than
that on public firms as equality test results in Panel B of the table shows. Equality test
results indicate that the equality of coefficients is strongly rejected in all four models
for idiosyncratic risk. As expected, this confirms that non-public firms’ leverage is more
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sensitive to idiosyncratic risk as compared to public firms. In contrast, the magnitude
of the estimates on macroeconomic risk is larger for public firms in comparison to that
of non-public firms, yet they are not statistically different from that of non-public firms.
This suggests that both groups of firms experience negative effects due to macroeconomic
risk of similar intensity.
In summary, the results presented in Table 2.6 indicate that both groups of firms exhibit
a negative sensitivity to idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk. Our results also suggest
that the leverage of non-public firms is relatively more sensitive to idiosyncratic risk than
that of public firms. The greater sensitivity of non-public firms to idiosyncratic risk is
sensible as non-public firms are more informationally opaque to their external financiers,
and since banks are likely to be more cautious about adverse selection and moral hazard
problems in an environment where business risk is high, non-public firms will be unable
to attract external financing in periods of heightened risk. As a result, they use less debt
in their capital structure as reflected in reductions of their leverage ratio.
2.6.3 The Spillover Effects of Risk: Does Risk Affect Firm’s Leverage through
Cash Holdings?
Having established the impacts of both types of risk on leverage and the differential effects
of risk across public versus non-public firms’ leverage, we next turn to investigate whether
risk affects firms’ leverage through the cash holdings of firms as shown in equation (2.4).
In other words, we would like to find out whether the effect of risk on a firm’s leverage
changes as the amount of the cash holdings of the firm evolves over time. We therefore
introduce an interaction term between our measures of risk and firms’ cash holding levels.
This term captures the ‘spillover effect’ of risk on leverage through firms’ cash holdings and
in turn tests whether the sensitivity of the leverage of firms to risks intensified when firms
hold high levels of cash. Table 2.7 presents the results for three models which make use of
risk measures based on sales level and that based on GDP as depicted by σlevel and σGDP ,
respectively.36 Models 1 and 2 respectively quantify the spillover effects of idiosyncratic
risk and macroeconomic risk separately and Model 3 presents our results when both types
of risk are simultaneously present in the environment. We should note prior to discussing
the interaction terms that the own effects of risk in this set of regressions are similar to
those reported earlier. The only difference is that the coefficient of firm-specific risk is
statistically insignificant for public firms for Models 1 and 3. However, this finding does
not necessarily mean that firm-specific risk in not operational for the case of public firms,
which we will come back to later when we discuss the interaction terms.
Table 2.7 shows that the coefficient on the idiosyncratic risk-cash holdings interaction
36The results from other combinations are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2.7 and are available
from the authors on request.
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Table 2.7: Robust Two-step System-GMM Estimates for the Spillover Effects
of Risk on the Leverage of Public and Non-Public Firms
Panel A reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step System-GMM estimations, separately as well
as jointly, for the spillover effects of macroeconomic and firm-specific risk on firms’ leverage, separately
for non-public and public firms. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors which are asymp-
totically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within panels. To examine the
differential impact of risk across non-public and public firms, we construct Dnonpublici .X (D
public
i .X) as the
explanatory variable X interacted with a dummy equal to one (zero) if the firm is non-public and zero (one)
if the firm is public. The dependent variable is leverage, defined as the ratio of short-term debt to total
assets. The analysis covers the period 1999-2008 for a panel of UK non-public and public firms. Model 1
estimates the spillover effect of firm-specific risk on firms’ leverage. Model 2 estimates the spillover effect
of macroeconomic risk on firms’ leverage and Model 3 estimates the spillover effects of both macroeco-
nomic and firm-specific risk on firm leverage jointly. The method of measuring volatility and definitions
of the remaining independent variables are given in Table 2-A, Appendix A. Panel B of the table reports
the J statistics, which is a test of the over identifying restrictions and distributed as chi-squared under
the null of instrument validity and the Arellano-Bond, AR(2), test of second-order autocorrelation in the
first-differenced residuals. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
Panel A: Estimation results
Regressors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
Dnonpublici .Levit−1 0.636 (0.049)*** 0.584 (0.032)*** 0.588 (0.032)***
Dpublici .Levit−1 0.348 (0.184)* 0.418 (0.132)*** 0.420 (0.132)***
Dnonpublici .Salesit -0.016 (0.001)*** -0.015 (0.001)*** -0.015 (0.002)***
Dpublici .Salesit -0.024 (0.009)*** -0.031 (0.007)*** -0.030 (0.007)***
Dnonpublici .Cashit -0.076 (0.012)*** -0.099 (0.014)*** -0.098 (0.015)***
Dpublici .Cashit -0.096 (0.040)*** -0.167 (0.046)*** -0.156 (0.046)***
Dnonpublici .Invtit 0.007 (0.012) 0.014 (0.012) 0.015 (0.012)
Dpublici .Invtit 0.155 (0.069)** 0.121 (0.059)** 0.122 (0.059)**
Dnonpublici .σ
GDP
t−1 -0.009 (0.003)*** -0.011 (0.003)*** -0.012 (0.003)***
Dpublici .σ
GDP
t−1 -0.017 (0.008)** -0.029 (0.010)*** -0.029 (0.010)***
Dnonpublici .σ
level
it−1 -0.032 (0.009)*** -0.038 (0.007)*** -0.035 (0.009)***
Dpublici .σ
level
it−1 -0.002 (0.002) -0.006 (0.002)** -0.001 (0.002)
Dnonpublici .Cashit.σ
level
it−1 -0.037 (0.093) -0.056 (0.099)
Dpublici .Cashit.σ
level
it−1 -0.164 (0.075)** -0.165 (0.078)**
Dnonpublici .Cashit.σ
GDP
t−1 0.033 (0.025) 0.034 (0.025)
Dpublici .Cashit.σ
GDP
t−1 0.119 (0.069)* 0.117 (0.069)*
Constant 0.106 (0.011)*** 0.115 (0.007)*** 0.114 (0.008)***
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 23,487 23,487 23,487
Firm 5,436 5,436 5,436
AR(2) -0.060 -0.180 -0.170
p-value 0.954 0.858 0.869
J-statistic 52.360 65.960 87.500
p-value 0.309 0.195 0.118
is negative for both public and non-public firms. However, the interaction is statistically
meaningful only for the public firms. This implies that when (public) firms experience
idiosyncratic risk, an increase in cash holdings will lead firms to further reduce their
debt holdings.37 In contrast, the estimates on the interaction of macroeconomic risk and
37This finding is in line with the findings of Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) that indicate that those UK firms
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cash holdings are positive for both groups of firms while this interaction is statistically
meaningful only for the public firms. The positive coefficient on the interaction term
suggests that an increase in cash holdings will motivate the manager to increase the firms’
leverage in times of high macroeconomic risk: in times of macroeconomic risk the manager
of the (public) firm can convince the lenders to extend more credit in the short run, given
that the firm’s cash stocks are high. That is, the fact that higher macroeconomic risks
would not prevent a firm rich in cash holdings to borrow more funds in the short run.
An alternative rationale is that during uncertain states of the economy, firms are more
likely to face volatility in their retained earnings. As a result, they would prefer to use
short-term debt to finance their operations rather than depleting their internal funds.
2.6.4 The Full Impact of Risk on Leverage
To gauge the full impact of risk at a particular level of cash holdings, we must compute
the total derivative of leverage with respect to idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk as
shown in the following equations:
∂Lev
∂σfirm
= Ψˆσfirm + ΨˆσfirmCash × Cash∗ (2.5)
∂Lev
∂σmacro
= Ψˆσmacro + ΨˆσmacroCash × Cash∗ (2.6)
where Ψˆσfirm , ΨˆσfirmCash refer to the estimated coefficients associated with the idiosyn-
cratic risk and the idiosyncratic risk—cash holdings interaction, respectively. Similarly,
Ψˆσmacro and ΨˆσmacroCash denote the coefficients associated with macroeconomic risk and
the macroeconomic risk—cash holdings interaction. Cash∗ refers to a particular level of
cash holdings which we compute at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 80th and 90th percentiles.
The results of these total derivatives are reported in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 for public and
non-public firms separately while we plot these estimates in Figures 2.1–2.4 along with
the 95% confidence interval.
Panel A of Table 2.8 gives the total derivatives with respect to idiosyncratic risk for
public firms. These values are negative and significantly different from zero at all levels of
cash holdings apart from when cash holding is very low. For those firms that that operate
with very low cash holdings (around or less than the 10th percentile), idiosyncratic risks
do not affect the public firms’ leverage. However, as cash stocks of the firm increase,
idiosyncratic risk begins to adversely affect public firms’ leverage. These estimates provide
evidence that the total effect of risk on leverage is substantially related to cash holdings of
the company. In Panel B of the same table, we present the estimates of total derivatives
that have higher levels of cash holdings appear to have lower levels of leverage and bank debt.
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Table 2.8: Sensitivity of Public Firms’ Leverage to Risk and Cash Holdings
Panel A reports the percentiles of the cash-to-total assets ratio, estimates of the total derivatives
of leverage (Lev) with respective to idiosyncratic risk (σfirm) at particular levels of cash holdings,
standard errors and p-values associated with the test of the significance of the estimates. Panel
B reports the percentiles of the cash-to-total assets ratio, estimates of the total derivatives of
leverage (Lev) with respective to macroeconomic risk (σmacro) at particular levels of cash hold-
ings, standard errors and p-values associated with the test of the significance of the estimates.
Panel A: Idiosyncratic Risk Effects and Cash/Assets Holdings
P10 P25 P50 P75 P80 P90
Cash/assets 2.1E-03 1.6E-02 5.4E-02 1.5E-01 1.8E-01 3.1E-01
∂Lev
∂σfirm
-0.002 -0.004 -0.010 -0.025 -0.031 -0.051
Std. Error 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.010 0.013 0.020
p-value 0.508 0.069 0.004 0.013 0.016 0.022
Panel B: Macroeconomic Risk Effects and Cash/Assets Holdings
Cash/assets 2.1E-03 1.6E-02 5.4E-02 1.5E-01 1.8E-01 3.1E-01
∂Lev
∂σmacro
-0.029 -0.027 -0.023 -0.012 -0.008 0.007
Std. Error 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.016
p-value 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.102 0.331 0.673
of leverage with respect to macroeconomic risk. Although the total effect is significantly
negative at lower levels cash holdings, it becomes insignificant as public firms accumulate
higher levels (at around or more than 75th percentile) of cash.38 This suggests that those
firms which hold low levels of cash during uncertain states of the economy tend to reduce
their leverage more than those that hold higher levels of cash. In fact macroeconomic risk
does not affect the capital structure of the firm when it holds high levels of cash. This
finding is the opposite to that for the case of idiosyncratic risk.
Next we calculate the same set of derivatives for non-public firms and report these
estimates in Table 2.9. Panel A of the table shows that the aggregate effect of idiosyncratic
risk is negative and significant at all levels of cash holdings. Indeed, this effect increases
monotonically as firms accumulate more cash implying that in response to higher business-
risk, firms with big cash hoards tend to reduce their leverage by a greater amount as
compared to those firms which have relatively lower levels of cash holdings. Looking
at Panel B of Table 2.9, we see that the total derivative of leverage with respective to
macroeconomic risk is negative and significant unless firms’ cash holdings exceed the 75th
percentile level. That is, firms that hold high levels of cash do not change their leverage
in response to macroeconomic risk. These observations are similar to that of public firms
but are more pronounced.
Figures 2.1 to 2.4 plot the estimates and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals
given in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 helping us to visually compare the effects of both types of risk
for public and non-public firms. Figures 2.1 and 2.3 show that the effect of risk on leverage
38The total derivative with respect to macroeconomic risk becomes insignificant and positive at or above
the 90th percentile of cash holdings.
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Table 2.9: Sensitivity of Non-Public Firms’ Leverage to Risk and Cash Hold-
ings
Panel A reports the percentiles of the cash-to-total assets ratio, estimates of the total derivatives
of leverage (Lev) with respective to idiosyncratic risk (σfirm) at particular levels of cash hold-
ings, standard errors and p-values associated with the test of the significance of the estimates.
Panel B reports the percentiles of the cash-to-total assets ratio, estimates of the derivatives of
leverage (Lev) with respective to macroeconomic risk (σmacro ) at particular levels of cash hold-
ings, standard errors and p-values associated with the test of the significance of the estimates.
Panel A: Idiosyncratic Risk Effects and Cash/Assets Holdings
P10 P25 P50 P75 P80 P90
Cash/assets 4.3E-04 9.2E-03 5.7E-02 1.7E-01 2.2E-01 3.5E-01
∂Lev
∂σfirm
-0.034 -0.035 -0.038 -0.044 -0.047 -0.054
Std. Error 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.013 0.017 0.029
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.069
Panel B: Macroeconomic Risk Effects and Cash/Assets Holdings
Cash/assets 4.3E-04 9.2E-03 5.7E-02 1.7E-01 2.2E-01 3.5E-01
∂Lev
∂σmacro
-0.012 -0.011 -0.009 -0.005 -0.004 0.000
Std. Error 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.007
p-value 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.114 0.325 0.967
for both type of firms is negative and relates to the amount of firms’ cash holdings. In
particular, we see that the adverse effect of idiosyncratic risk strengthens as firms’ cash
holdings increase. We also see that non-public firms are affected worse than public firms.
At low levels of cash, public firms do not respond to idiosyncratic risk. Perhaps this is due
to the fact that public firms have a track record and they can borrow easily despite the fact
that they are going through a rough period. However, non-public firms do not have such
a luxury; in periods of high idiosyncratic risk they can only borrow less due to financial
frictions. Interestingly, when both types of firm carry very high levels of cash, the effect
of risk on leverage is almost the same across the two types of firms. This is perhaps due
to firm managers trying to avoid high risk premiums demanded by the lenders in periods
of internal unrest.
When we compare Figures 2.2 and 2.4, we see that the impact of macroeconomic
risk on both types of firms is almost the same except for the impact size: the effect of
macroeconomic risk on both types of firms is negative but the impact is much higher for
public firms. The figure also clearly shows that the adverse effect of macroeconomic risk for
both types of firms becomes insignificant as firms’ cash stocks exceed the 70th percentile.
One possibility why public firms are more affected in times of higher macroeconomic risk
than non-public firms is that public firms can afford to reduce their short-term borrowing
in comparison to non-public firms as they can rely on raising funds from nonbank sources
of finance such as equity financing and commercial paper (see Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox
(1993)). Whereas non-public firms cannot do so and are constrained to borrow from banks.
Once banks start to contract their loans in periods of macroeconomic turmoil, non-public
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Figure 2.1 
Marginal Effects of Idiosyncratic Uncertainty on Public Firms’ Leverage 
 
Figure 2.2 
Marginal Effects of Macroeconomic Uncertainty on Public Firms’ Leverage 
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firms cannot borrow as much as despite their willingness to pay high risk premiums. As
the figure shows, it is only when cash holdings of companies improve the overall impact
of macroeconomic risk on leverage disappears. We conjecture that companies rich in cash
can borrow at better terms as they are considered to be less likely to default in periods of
high macroeconomic risk.
The analysis above suggests that a firm with high levels of cash holdings tend to reduce
short-term debt financing by a larger amount relative to a firm with low levels of cash
holdings in response to an increase in idiosyncratic risk. In contrast the leverage of a firm
that holds high levels of cash is not necessarily affected from an increase in macroeconomic
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Figure 2.3 
Marginal Effects of Idiosyncratic Uncertainty on Non-Public Firms’ Leverage 
 
Figure 2.4 
Marginal Effects of Macroeconomic Uncertainty on Public Firms’ Leverage 
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risk in comparison to those firms which has less cash holdings. This observation indicates
that models that do not take into account the interaction between risk and firms’ cash
holdings are likely to yield inaccurate conclusions regarding the effect of risk on leverage.
Overall, our results indicate that i) there are (significant) differences on the size of the
impact of risk on firms’ leverage across public and non-public companies; ii) the effect of
risk on leverage depends on the type of risk and the extent of cash holdings that each firm
holds.
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2.7 Robustness Tests
In our analysis, we examine the effects of idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk on firms’
leverage by incorporating both types of risk in the same model as we assume that these
measures of risks are jointly operational. However, it is possible that the macroeconomic
risk may drive the effect of idiosyncratic risk on firms’ leverage, and vise versa. Therefore,
in order to ensure that the effect of one source of risk is not driven by the other source
of risk, we re-estimate our models separately to examine separately the effect of macroe-
conomic and idiosyncratic risk on the target leverage of public and non-public firms. It
is also possible that the (negative) effects of risk on firms’ target leverage are driven by a
specific measure of risk. To guard ourself from this possibility, we re-estimate our models
using an alternative measure of risk for each source of risk.
The measure of firm-specific risk is constricted by estimating a model on the growth of
firm sale (∆lnSit) using firm fixed-effects (f´i) and year fixed-effects (f´t). More specifically,
we estimate the model: ∆lnSit = f´i + f´t + ψ´it, where ψ´it is the error term with zero mean
and finite variance. In particular, the absolute value of the residual obtained from this
model, σgrowthit = |ψ
′
it|, represents the fluctuations with respect to both the cross-firm
and the cross-year average growth of sales which we use as a proxy for idiosyncratic
risk. This measure is earlier used by Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2004) and Kalemli-
Ozcan, Sørensen, and Volosovych (2010). To proxy macroeconomic risk, we compute the
equal weighted conditional variance index (σIndext ) using the conditional variance of gross
domestic product, Treasury bills rates, and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) obtained
from GARCH models.
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 present the results on the impact of idiosyncratic and macroeco-
nomic risk on firms’ leverage, respectively. In particular, Table 2.10 displays the impact
of three different measures of firm-specific risk on leverage. Model 1 consider the impact
of risk based on the level of sales. Model 2 implements the impact of cumulative volatil-
ity in the level of sales and Model 3 estimates the impact of volatility constricted based
on the growth sales. Table 2.11 provides the estimates of a model similar to Table 2.10
except that we now concentrate on the effects of macroeconomic risk on firms’ leverage.
In particular, Models 1 and 2 use risk measures based on gross domestic product, and
Treasury bill rates, respectively. Model 3 uses a weighted index based on gross domestic
product, Treasury bill rates and the consumer price index. Observing the coefficient of the
uncertainty measures in both tables, we see that the coefficient is negative and statistically
significant in each model. These findings provide evidence that our results are not only
similar across different measures of risk but they are also robust when we estimate the
effect of idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk on firms’ leverage separately. The results
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Table 2.10: Robustness: Robust Two-step System-GMM Estimates for Firm-
Specific Risk Effects on Leverage
Panel A of the table reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step System-GMM estimations for
firm-specific risk effects on firms’ leverage decisions. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors
and they are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is leverage, defined as
the short-term debt scaled by total assets. The analysis covers the period 1999-2008 for a panel of UK
public and non-public firms. Model 1 estimates the impact of volatility in the level of sales on a firm’s
leverage. Model 2 estimates the impact of cumulative volatility in level of sales on a firm’s leverage and
Model 3 estimates the impact of volatility in growth of sales on leverage. In all three models, the one
period lagged values of the first difference of the right-hand side variables are used as instruments for the
equations in levels. The instruments for differenced equations are the second to fourth lags, the second to
sixth lags and the first to sixth lags of the right-hand side variables for Model 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
The method of measuring volatility and definitions of the remaining independent variables are given in
Table 2-A, Appendix A. Panel B reports the J statistics, which is a test of the over identifying restrictions
and distributed as chi-squared under the null of instrument validity and the Arellano-Bond, AR(2), test of
second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1%
level of significance. ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. * indicates statistical significance
at the 10% level.
Panel A: Estimation results
Regressors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
Levit−1 0.338 (0.098)*** 0.437 (0.112)*** 0.361 (0.100)***
Salesit -0.014 (0.002)*** -0.012 (0.002)*** -0.015 (0.002)***
Cashit -0.062 (0.025)*** -0.107 (0.039)*** -0.087 (0.035)***
Invtit 0.053 (0.017)*** 0.041 (0.018)** 0.057 (0.018)***
σlevelit−1 -0.021 (0.007)***
σcumulativeit−1 -0.012 0.003)***
σgrowthit−1 -0.047 (0.026)**
Constant 0.146 (0.018)*** 0.127 (0.021)*** 0.153 (0.020)***
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 23,487 21,001 19,741
Firm 5,436 5,301 4,944
AR(2) -1.202 -0.558 -1.034
p-value 0.229 0.576 0.301
J-statistic 37.470 32.030 48.290
p-value 0.164 0.778 0.173
related to firm-specific variables reveal that the effects of firms-specific factors hold true
regardless of whether we incorporate both idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk into our
model separately or jointly.
We also examine the robustness of the differential effects of idiosyncratic and macroe-
conomic risk across public and non-public firms by estimating the the differential effects
of both types of risk separately and using alternative risk measures for each source of risk.
The results are presents in Tables 2.12 and 2.13. In both tables, our results regrading
firm-specific variables for both public and non-public firms are similar to that in Panel A
of Table 2.6. The results provide evidence that the effect of firm-specific risk on leverage is
significant and negative for both public and non-public firms. Equality test results, shown
in Panel B of Table 2.12 , indicate that the equality of coefficients is strongly rejected in
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Table 2.11: Robustness: Robust Two-step System-GMM Estimates for
Macroeconomic Risk Effects on Leverage
Panel A of the table reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step System-GMM estimations for
macroeconomic uncertainty effects on firms’ leverage decisions. The figures given in parentheses are
standard errors which are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
within panels. The dependent variable is leverage, defined as the short-term debt scaled by total assets.
The analysis covers the span 1999-2008 for a panel of UK public and non-public firms. Model 1 estimates
the impact of volatility in GDP on leverage. Model 2 estimates the impact of volatility in T-bills rates
on leverage and Model 3 estimates the impact of equal weighed volatility index on firm’s leverage. In
all three models, the one period lagged values of first difference of the right-hand side variables are used
as instruments for the equations in levels. The instruments for differenced equations are the second and
third lags of the right-hand side variables for all three models. The method of measuring volatility and
definitions of the remaining independent variables are given in Table 2-A, Appendix A. Panel B of the table
reports the J statistics, which is a test of the over identifying restrictions and distributed as chi-squared
under the null of instrument validity and the Arellano-Bond, AR(2), test of second-order autocorrelation
in the first-differenced residuals. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level of significance. **
indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
Panel A: Estimation results
Regressors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
Levit−1 0.318 (0.127)** 0.327 (0.128)*** 0.317 (0.127)**
Salesit -0.014 (0.002)*** -0.015 (0.002)*** -0.014 (0.001)***
Cashit -0.115 (0.041)*** -0.123 (0.041)*** -0.116 (0.041)***
Invtit 0.047 (0.019)** 0.044 (0.019)** 0.047 (0.020)**
σGDPt−1 -0.010 (0.003)***
σT−billt−1 -0.460 (0.159)***
σIndext−1 -0.040 (0.010)***
Constant 0.157 (0.024)*** 0.162 (0.025)*** 0.156 (0.024)***
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 24394 24394 24394
Firm 5713 5713 5713
AR(2) -1.129 -1.066 -1.130
p-value 0.259 0.286 0.258
J-statistic 14.080 12.550 14.130
p-value 0.779 0.562 0.776
all three models. This confirms that our finding that non-public firms’ leverage decisions
are more sensitive to idiosyncratic risk than public firms’ leverage decisions are robust not
only to an alternative measure of firm-specific risk but they are also robust when only
firm-specific risk is incorporated in the model.
The results in Table 2.13 confirm the robustness of the finding that the leverage de-
cisions of both public and non-public firms are negatively (and significantly) affected by
macroeconomic risk. Further, equality tests provide evidence that macroeconomic risks
have a similar impact on both public and non-public firms’ leverage decisions. Overall,
the results from robustness tests suggest that our earlier findings are robust and confirm
that both idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk have significant negative effects on the
capital structure decisions of firms. The tests of robustness also confirm that non-public
firms’ leverage exhibits a greater sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk as compared to public
48
firms while the sensitivity of leverage to macroeconomic uncertainty is similar for public
and non-public firms.
We also use an alternative definition of leverage in order to examine the robustness of
the effects of risk on the leverage decisions of firms. Specifically, we examine the sensitive
of leverage to firm-specific and macroeconomic risk across publicly listed and privately
owned firms and the differential impacts of both types of risk on leverage across different
levels of firms’ cash holdings by re-estimating the models with the total debt (short-term
debt + long-term debt) to total assets ratio. We consider this measure of leverage to
ensure that the effects of risk that we reported earlier are not driven by a specific measure
of leverage.
Table 2.14 presents the results from regressions of total debt to total assets ratio on
both firm-specific and macroeconomic risks as well as firm-specific control variables. In
particular, we re-estimate two models. Model 1 estimates the effects of volatility in real
GDP and volatility in the level of firms’ net sales normalized by total assets on the leverage
decisions of publicly listed and private owned firms, while Model 2 estimates the effects
of volatility in real GDP and cumulative volatility in firms’ net sales normalized by total
assets on the leverage of both groups of firms. Other specifications are similar to those
reported in Table 2.6 except that the dependent variable in these models is the ratio of
the total debt (short-term debt + long-term debt) to total assets ratio.
Regarding the impacts of both types of risk on the leverage of public and private firms,
the results from these models are generally similar to those reported in Table 2.6 in terms
of their sign and statistical significance. Specifically, as one can see from the table, the
coefficient estimates of both types of risk are negative and statistically significant. This
suggests that firms appear to reduce their use of total debt in their capital structure when
they face higher risks in their own business activities and when macroeconomic conditions
become relatively more volatile.
The coefficient estimates on other firm-specific variables are also similar to those re-
ported earlier. As before, the results suggest that privately owned firms exhibit greater
leverage persistence than that public firms do. The leverage of a firm decrease with the
firm’s net sales to total assets ratio regardless of the type of the firm. Likewise, leverage
is negatively related to the cash holdings of firms for both publicly listed and privately
owned firms. However, while the impact of firms’ investment spending is positive both
categories of firms, it is statistically significant for only public firms. This finding is also
similar to our earlier findings. The results from Model 2 suggest that the effects of both
types of risk on the leverage decisions of publicly listed and privately owned firms are
robust to different measures of firm-specific risk.
Table 2.15 presents from the regression where we include the interactions between our
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measures of risk and the cash holdings of firms. Specifically, we study how firm-specific
and macroeconomic risk affect the leverage policies of publicly listed and private owned
firms differently as firms stockpile their cash reserves. The model specification is similar
to those we use in Table 2.7. The only difference is that we now consider leverage as the
ratio of total debt (short-term debt + long-term debt) to total assets instead of the ratio
of short-term debt to total assets. Overall, the results presented in Table 2.15 are similar
to our earlier results presented in Table 2.7.
Consistent with the findings discussed above, the leverage of public and private firms is
negatively related with risk regardless of the type of risk. This suggest that firms appear
to reduce their outstanding amounts of debt when they go through periods of either
internal or external unrest. As we find earlier, the estimated coefficient on the interaction
term between firm-specific risk and the cash holdings of firms is negative for both public
and private firms. However, it appears statistically significant only for the publicly listed
firms. In combination with the direct impact of firm-specific risk on leverage, this negative
indirect impact suggests that public firms are likely to reduce their leverage by a relatively
greater amount in result of increases in firm-specific risk when they have higher levels of
cash holdings than when they have relatively lower levels of cash holdings.
The results on the impact of macroeconomic risk via the cash holding decisions of firms
are also similar to those presented in Table 2.7–it is positive for both publicly listed and
privately owned firms but it is statistically meaningful only for the former one. Taken
together with the direct of impact of macroeconomic risk on leverage decisions, these
results suggest that public firms are less likely to reduce their leverage ratios in response
to a rise in the volatility of macroeconomic conditions when they are rich in their cash
holdings. The results on other firm-specific variables in Table 2.15 are similar to those
in Tables 2.6 and 2.14. The only exception is the results on sales-to-asset ratio, which
now appears statistically significant only for privately owned firms. Taken as a whole, the
results presented in Tables 2.14 and 2.15 suggest that both direct and indirect effects of
firm-specific and macroeconomic risk are robust to alternative measures of leverage.
So far we show that the negative effects of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk on the
leverage decisions of private and public firms are robust to different proxies for firm-specific
and macroeconomic risk, alternative measures of firm leverage, and when only firm-specific
or macroeconomic risk is included into the leverage regression. The specifications of our
baseline leverage regression are similar to those in Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009).
Specifically, based on the firm value optimization problem, Baum, Stephan, and Talav-
era (2009) propose a theoretical model which establishes the link between firm leverage
and firm-specific and macroeconomic risk. In particular, the model proposed by Baum,
Stephan, and Talavera (2009) is a generalization of the standard Q models of investment
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proposed by Whited (1992) and Hubbard and Kashyap (1992).
As in Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009), we use the ratio of sales to total assets,
the ratio of investment to total assets, the ratio of cash to total assets, and the one-period
lagged of dependent variable (leverage) as firm-specific control variables when estimat-
ing the impact of risks of leverage. However, one may argue that not controlling for
firm-specific factors that are commonly used in capital structure studies (e.g., Rajan and
Zingales (1995), Baker and Wurgler (2002), and Hovakimian (2006)) can affect our finding
that leverage is negatively related to risks. Therefore, we re-estimate the effects of risk on
the leverage decisions of private and public firms by using the profitability of firm, firm
size, tangibility, firm growth, and cash to total assets as control variables.39 The results
are presented in Table 2.17. Specifically, we estimate two models. Model 1 only estimates
the direct impact of risks on firm leverage decisions. The specifications of Model 2 are
similar to those in Model 1 except it includes the interactions between risk measures and
the cash holdings of firms.
The results on the direct and indirect impact of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk
are qualitatively similar to those in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. Specifically, the results in Table
2.17 indicate that the leverage decisions of both private and public firms are negatively and
statistically significantly related to firm-specific and macroeconomic risk. These findings
confirm that the effects of risk on firm leverage that we reported earlier are robust, even
after controlling for firm-specific factors commonly used in the literature. From Model 1,
the coefficient estimates on these firm-specific variables indicate that consistent with the
findings of Brav (2009) and Goyal, Nova, and Zanetti (2011), leverage increases with firm
size, while it decreases with the profitability of firm for both private and public firms. The
leverage decisions of both private and public firms are negatively affected by past sales
growth. However, leverage is positively and statistically significantly related to tangibility
only for private firms.
As we discussed earlier, privately owned firms are generally smaller on average than
publicly traded firms and thus, they could have different investment and financing policies.
Although we report above that the results on the impact of risks on firm leverage decisions
are unaffected, both in terms of sign and statistical significance, by controlling for firm size,
the differences in firm size may nonlinearly affect the estimated coefficient. In other words,
the differences in size between public and private firms may cause the sample selection
bias problem. To insure that our findings are not suffered from the the sample selection
bias problem, we also study the effects of risk on leverage for a sub-sample of privately
owned and publicly traded firms matched on the basis of size, industry and the year-end.
39For this exercise, firm leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt (short-term debt + long-term debt)
to total assets.
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The results are presented in Table 2.18.40
For each privately owned firm and in each year, we select, without and with replace-
ment, a size-matched firm from the sample of publicly traded firms with the same industry
and year. The chosen public firms are the closest in size measured based on total assets to
the privately owned firms, the maximum difference is not more than 5%. The results from
this matched sample indicate that the coefficient on both firm-specific and macroeconomic
risk are consistent, in terms of their signs and statistical significance, with the full sample
results presented in Table 2.17. These results confirm that our earlier findings are not
driven by the greater percentage of privately owned firms compared to that of publicly
traded firms in the sample.
2.8 Conclusions
Implementing a dynamic panel data methodology, we investigate the impact of idiosyn-
cratic and macroeconomic risk on non-public and public manufacturing firms’ short-term
leverage in the United Kingdom. We hypothesize that given a different structure of the en-
vironment within which public and non-public firms operate, risks associated with a firm’s
own business activities or macroeconomic conditions affect non-public firms’ leverage dif-
ferently than public firms’ leverage. Our dataset is collected from the FAME database
and covers the period between 1999-2008. To quantify the effects of risk, we employ two
different proxies for both firm-specific and macroeconomic risk while we control for several
firm-specific factors whose effects on leverage are similar to those reported in earlier re-
search including Titman and Wessels (1988), Fama and French (2002), Rajan and Zingales
(1995), and Brav (2009).
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we show that there is a significant
negative association between idiosyncratic risk and the leverage of firms. However, non-
public firms’ leverage exhibits a greater sensitivity to idiosyncratic risk as compared to
their public counterparts. This observation is in line with the view that an increase in
business risk leads to non-public firms depend more on their in-house performance as
external finance is restricted due to the presence of financial frictions. Second, we show
that both types of firms exhibit a negative and significant sensitivity to macroeconomic risk
while the sensitivity of each type of firm is similar. It appears that firms in each category
become cautious about the cost of financial distress during periods of macroeconomic
instability, and thus carry less short-term debt. These results hold true for different
proxies that we use for either type of underlying risk.
We next investigate the presence of spillover (indirect) effects of risk on leverage
40We also study the effects of firms-specific and macroeconomic risk on firm leverage decisions separately
for the sample of privately owned and publicly listed firms. The results are presented in Table 2.16.
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through firms’ cash holdings. An investigation of the full impact of risk on leverage
provides evidence that the effects of risk on leverage change as the amount of the cash
holdings of a company evolves over time. In particular, it turns out that during periods
of high idiosyncratic (macroeconomic) risk, firms reduce their leverage more (less) if they
hold higher levels of cash balances. This is an interesting finding and provides evidence
that the total effect of risk on leverage varies with respect to its source and the size of
liquid assets that each firm holds.
Our findings suggest that researchers should consider the effects of both macroeconomic
and idiosyncratic sources of risk while studying firms’ optimal leverage over and above the
other factors that have been investigated in the literature. While doing this, the possibility
of spillover effects should also be considered.
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Table 2.12: Robustness: Robust Two-step System-GMM Estimates for a Dif-
ferential Effect of Firm-Specific Risk on the Leverage of Public and Non-Public
Firms
Panel A reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step System-GMM estimations. The figures given
in parentheses are standard errors which are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation within panels. To examine the differential impact of uncertainty across both non-public
and public firms, we construct Dnonpublici .X (D
public
i .X) as the explanatory variable X interacted with a
dummy equal to one (zero) if the firm is non-public and zero (one) if the firm is public. The dependent
variable is leverage, defined as the ratio of short-term debt to total assets. The analysis covers the period
1999-2008 for a panel of UK non-public and public firms. Model 1 estimates the impact of volatility in the
level of firms’ sales on firms’ leverage. Model 2 estimates the impact of cumulative volatility in the level
of firms’ sales on firms’ leverage. Model 3 estimates the impact of volatility in growth of sales on firms’
leverage. In all three models, the one period lagged values of the first difference of the right-hand side
variables are used as instruments for the equations in levels. The instruments for differenced equations
are the second to fourth lags of the right-hand side variables for all models. The method of measuring
volatility and definitions of the remaining independent variables are given in Table 2-A, Appendix A.
Panel B of the table reports the test statistics along with its p-values for testing a differential effect of
idiosyncratic uncertainty. Panel C reports the J statistics, which is a test of the over identifying restrictions
and distributed as chi-squared under the null of instrument validity and the Arellano-Bond, AR(2), test of
second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation results
Regressors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
Dnonpublici .Levit−1 0.624 (0.048)*** 0.629 (0.052)*** 0.694 (0.050)***
Dpublici .Levit−1 0.338 (0.181)** 0.348 (0.189)* 0.393 (0.188)**
Dnonpublici .Salesit -0.015 (0.001)*** -0.015 (0.002)*** -0.017 (0.002)***
Dpublici .Salesit -0.027 (0.010)*** -0.027 (0.010)*** -0.026 (0.010)***
Dnonpublici .Cashit -0.076 (0.012)*** -0.079 (0.013)*** -0.066 (0.012)***
Dpublici .Cashit -0.119 (0.037)*** -0.108 (0.039)*** -0.091 (0.040)**
Dnonpublici .Invtit 0.010 (0.011) 0.011 (0.012) 0.012 (0.012)
Dpublici .Invtit 0.127 (0.074)* 0.126 (0.075)* 0.158 (0.087)*
Dnonpublici .σ
level
it−1 -0.035 (0.007)***
Dpublici .σ
level
it−1 -0.006 (0.002)**
Dnonpublici .σ
cumulative
it−1 -0.076 (0.016)***
Dpublici .σ
cumulative
it−1 -0.007 (0.003)**
Dnonpublici .σ
growth
it−1 -0.048 (0.014)***
Dpublici .σ
growth
it−1 -0.044 (0.023)*
Constant 0.104 (0.010)*** 0.099 (0.011)*** 0.097 (0.012)***
Panel B: Tests for differential effects of uncertainty
σpublicfirm = σ
nonpublic
firm 14.370 18.070 10.030
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.013
Panel C: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 23,487 21,001 19,741
Firm 5,436 5,301 4,944
AR(2) -0.080 -0.220 -0.300
p-value 0.936 0.826 0.766
J-statistic 22.560 15.060 28.990
p-value 0.546 0.591 0.220
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Table 2.13: Robustness: Robust Two-step System-GMM Estimates for a Dif-
ferential Effect of Macroeconomic Risk on the Leverage of Public and Non-
public Firms
Panel A of the table reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step System-GMM estimations for
the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on firms’ leverage, separately for non-public and public firms.
The figures given in parentheses are standard errors which are asymptotically robust to the presence of
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within panels. To examine the differential impact of uncertainty
across non-public and public firms, we construct Dnonpublici .X (D
public
i .X) as the explanatory variable X
interacted with a dummy equal to one (zero) if the firm is non-public and zero (one) if the firm is public.
The dependent variable is leverage, defined as the ratio of short-term debt to total assets. The analysis
covers the period 1999-2008 for a panel of UK non-public and public firms. Model 1 estimates the impact
of volatility in GDP on leverage. Model 2 estimates the impact of volatility in T-bills rates on leverage
and Model 3 estimates the impact of equal weighed volatility index on firm’s leverage. In all three models,
the one period lagged values of the first difference of the right-hand side variables are used as instruments
for the equations in levels. The instruments for differenced equations are the second and the third lags of
the right-hand side variables for Model 1 and 2. For Model 3, the third and fourth lags of the right-hand
side variables (excluding uncertainty) are used as instruments in first differenced equations. The method
of measuring volatility and definitions of the remaining independent variables are given in Table 2-A,
Appendix A. Panel B of the table reports the test statistics along with its p-values for testing a differential
effect of macroeconomic uncertainty. Panel C of the table reports the J statistics, which is a test of the
over identifying restrictions and distributed as chi-squared under the null of instrument validity and the
Arellano-Bond, AR(2), test of second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals. ***, **, and
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation results
Regressors
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
Dnonpublici .Levit−1 0.617 (0.048)*** 0.675 (0.064)*** 0.617 (0.048)***
Dpublici .Levit−1 0.409 (0.192)** 0.242 (0.136)* 0.413 (0.192)**
Dnonpublici .Salesit -0.015 (0.002)*** -0.016 (0.001)*** -0.014 (0.001)***
Dpublici .Salesit -0.029 (0.009)*** -0.014 (0.008)* -0.029 (0.009)***
Dnonpublici .Cashit -0.076 (0.012)*** -0.071 (0.013)*** -0.077 (0.012)***
Dpublici .Cashit -0.113 (0.030)*** -0.090 (0.038)** -0.112 (0.036)***
Dnonpublici .Invtit 0.011 (0.012) 0.003 (0.011) 0.011 (0.013)
Dpublici .Invtit 0.123 (0.064)* 0.151 (0.059)** 0.122 (0.064)*
Dnonpublici .σ
GDP
t−1 -0.010 (0.002)***
Dpublici .σ
GDP
t−1 -0.021 (0.008)***
Dnonpublici .σ
T−bill
t−1 -0.596 (0.278)**
Dpublici .σ
T−bill
t−1 -0.992 (0.383)***
Dnonpublici .σ
Index
t−1 -0.029 (0.008)***
Dpublici .σ
Index
t−1 -0.067 (0.025)***
Constant 0.105 (0.010)*** 0.102 (0.014)*** 0.105 (0.011)***
Panel B: Tests for differential effects of uncertainty
σpublicmacro = σ
nonpublic
macro 1.670 0.680 1.820
p-value 0.195 0.414 0.177
Panel C: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 24,394 24,394 24,394
Firm 5,713 5,713 5,713
AR(2) 0.120 0.200 0.120
p-value 0.904 0.840 0.903
J-statistic 25.680 35.010 25.670
p-value 0.370 0.170 0.370
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Table 2.14: Robustness: An Alternative Definition of Leverage
Panel A of the table reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step System-GMM estimations for the
effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on firms’ leverage, separately for non-public and public firms. Here,
the leverage is the ratio of total debt (short-term debt + long-term debt) to total assets. The figures given
in parentheses are standard errors which are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation within panels. To examine the differential impact of uncertainty across both non-public
and public firms, we construct Dnonpublici .X (D
public
i .X) as the explanatory variable X interacted with a
dummy equal to one (zero) if the firm is non-public and zero (one) if the firm is public. The dependent
variable is leverage, defined as the ratio of short-term debt to total assets. The analysis covers the period
1999-2008 for a panel of UK non-public and public firms. Model 1 estimates the joint impact of volatility
in GDP and volatility in the level of firms’ sales on firm leverage. Model 2 estimates the joint impact
of volatility in GDP and cumulative volatility in firms’ sales on firm leverage. The method of measuring
volatility and definitions of the remaining independent variables are given in Table 2-A, Appendix A. Panel
B of the table reports the J statistics, which is a test of the over identifying restrictions and distributed
as chi-squared under the null of instrument validity and the Arellano-Bond, AR(2), test of second-order
autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation Results; Dependent Variable: Leverage
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Dnonpublici .Levit−1 0.642 (0.055)*** 0.652 (0.055)***
Dpublici .Levit−1 0.514 (0.078)*** 0.517 (0.079)***
Dnonpublici .Salesit -0.031 (0.003)*** -0.029 (0.003)***
Dpublici .Salesit -0.029 (0.010)*** -0.024 (0.011)**
Dnonpublici .Cashit -0.105 (0.029)*** -0.104 (0.030)***
Dpublici .Cashit -0.238 (0.055)*** -0.230 (0.055)***
Dnonpublici .Invtit 0.009 (0.019) 0.002 (0.018)
Dpublici .Invtit 0.087 (0.040)** 0.092 (0.045)**
Dnonpublici .σ
GDP
t−1 -0.002 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)***
Dpublici .σ
GDP
t−1 -0.004 (0.001)*** -0.003 (0.001)***
Dnonpublici .σ
level
it−1 -0.014 (0.007)**
Dpublici .σ
level
it−1 -0.005 (0.001)***
Dnonpublici .σ
cumulative
it−1 -0.028 (0.001)***
Dpublici .σ
cumulative
it−1 -0.012 (0.003)***
Constant 0.178 (0.022)*** 0.175 (0.022)***
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 23,487 21,001
Firm 5,436 5,301
AR(2) 1.430 1.420
p-value 0.152 0.155
J-statistic 74.570 71.390
p-value 0.131 0.194
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Table 2.15: Robustness: The Spillover Effects of Risk on Leverage with An
Alternative Definition of Leverage
Panel A of the table reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step System-GMM estimations for the
effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on firms’ leverage, separately for non-public and public firms. Here,
the leverage is the ratio of total debt (short-term debt + long-term debt) to total assets. The figures given
in parentheses are standard errors which are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation within panels. To examine the differential impact of uncertainty across both non-
public and public firms, we construct Dnonpublici .X (D
public
i .X) as the explanatory variable X interacted
with a dummy equal to one (zero) if the firm is non-public and zero (one) if the firm is public. The
dependent variable is leverage, defined as the ratio of short-term debt to total assets. The analysis covers
the period 1999-2008 for a panel of UK non-public and public firms. The method of measuring volatility
and definitions of the remaining independent variables are given in Table 2-A, Appendix A. Panel B of
the table reports the J statistics, which is a test of the over identifying restrictions and distributed as
chi-squared under the null of instrument validity and the Arellano-Bond, AR(2), test of second-order
autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation Results; Dependent Variable: Leverage
Coefficient Std. Error
Dnonpublici .Levit−1 0.649 (0.040)***
Dpublici .Levit−1 0.451 (0.053)***
Dnonpublici .Salesit -0.029 (0.003)***
Dpublici .Salesit -0.004 (0.011)
Dnonpublici .Cashit -0.176 (0.079)**
Dpublici .Cashit -0.389 (0.080)***
Dnonpublici .Invtit 0.014 (0.020)
Dpublici .Invtit 0.120 (0.041)***
Dnonpublici .σ
GDP
t−1 -0.003 (0.001)***
Dpublici .σ
GDP
t−1 -0.005 (0.001)***
Dnonpublici .σ
level
it−1 -0.012 (0.000)***
Dpublici .σ
level
it−1 -0.002 (0.001)**
Dnonpublici .Cashit.σ
level
it−1 -0.003 (0.070)
Dpublici .Cashit.σ
level
it−1 -0.082 (0.003)***
Dnonpublici .Cashit.σ
GDP
t−1 0.008 (0.013)
Dpublici .Cashit.σ
GDP
t−1 0.035 (0.012)***
Constant 0.181 (0.016)***
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 23,487
Firm 5,436
AR(2) 1.180
p-value 0.236
J-statistic 114.970
p-value 0.329
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Table 2.16: Robustness: The Effect of Risks on Leverage for the Sample of
Public and Private Firms
2.16 Panel A of the table reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step System-GMM estimations
for the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on firms’ leverage separately for the sample of public and non-
public firms. Here, the leverage is the ratio of total debt (short-term debt + long-term debt) to total assets.
The figures given in parentheses are standard errors which are asymptotically robust to the presence of
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within panels. The dependent variable is leverage, defined as the
ratio of short-term debt to total assets. The analysis covers the period 1999-2008 for a panel of UK non-
public and public firms. Model 1 estimates the joint impact of volatility in GDP and volatility in the level
of firms’ sales on firm leverage. Model 2 estimates the joint impact of volatility in GDP and cumulative
volatility in firms’ sales on firm leverage. The method of measuring volatility and definitions of the remain-
ing independent variables are given in Table 2-A, Appendix A. Panel B of the table reports the J statistics,
which is a test of the over identifying restrictions and distributed as chi-squared under the null of instru-
ment validity and the Arellano-Bond, AR(2), test of second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced
residuals. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation Results; Dependent Variable: Leverage
Public Firms Private Firms
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Levit−1 0.525 (0.081)*** 0.794 (0.037)***
Salesit -0.030 (0.008)*** -0.023 (0.003)***
Cashit -0.416 (0.066)*** -0.068 (0.026)***
Invtit 0.114 (0.040)*** -0.017 (0.019)
σGDPt−1 -0.002 (0.000)** -0.001 (0.000)***
σlevelit−1 -0.006 (0.001)*** -0.014 (0.005)***
Constant 0.188 (0.029)*** 0.116 (0.016)***
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 2,216 21,271
Firm 554 4,882
AR(2) 0.740 1.390
p-value 0.456 0.166
J-statistic 44.680 37.900
p-value 0.245 0.651
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Table 2.17: Robustness: The Impact of Risks on Leverage while Controlling
for Firm Size, Profitability, Tangibility, and Growth
Panel A of the table reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step System-GMM estimations for the
effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on firms’ leverage, separately for non-public and public firms. Here,
the leverage is the ratio of total debt (short-term debt + long-term debt) to total assets. The figures given
in parentheses are standard errors which are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation within panels. To examine the differential impact of uncertainty across both non-public
and public firms, we construct Dnonpublici .X (D
public
i .X) as the explanatory variable X interacted with a
dummy equal to one (zero) if the firm is non-public and zero (one) if the firm is public. The dependent
variable is leverage, defined as the ratio of short-term debt to total assets. The analysis covers the period
1999-2008 for a panel of UK non-public and public firms. Model 1 estimates the joint impact of volatility
in GDP and volatility in the level of firms’ sales on firm leverage. Model 2 estimates the joint impact
of volatility in GDP and cumulative volatility in firms’ sales on firm leverage. The method of measuring
volatility and definitions of the remaining independent variables are given in Table 2-A, Appendix A. Size
is the natural log of total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Profitability is
the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Growth is defined as the difference of the log
of net sales normalized by consumer price index. Panel B of the table reports the J statistics, which is a
test of the over identifying restrictions and distributed as chi-squared under the null of instrument validity
and the Arellano-Bond, AR(2), test of second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals. ***,
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation Results; Dependent Variable: Leverage
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Dnonpublici .Levit−1 0.717 (0.036)*** 0.834 (0.017)***
Dpublici .Levit−1 0.517 (0.083)*** 0.723 (0.027)***
Dnonpublici .Cashit -0.038 (0.018)** -0.085 (0.028)***
Dpublici .Cashit -0.243 (0.063)*** -0.192 (0.070)***
Dnonpublici .P rofitabilityit -0.190 (0.028)** -0.177 (0.042)***
Dpublici .P rofitabilityit -0.269 (0.093)*** -0.123 (0.022)***
Dnonpublici .Tangibilityit 0.033 (0.008)*** 0.035 (0.007)***
Dpublici .Tangibilityit -0.011 (0.033) 0.031 (0.016)**
Dnonpublici .Sizeit 0.030 (0.007)*** 0.014 (0.002)***
Dpublici .Sizeit 0.036 (0.005)*** 0.016 (0.003)***
Dnonpublici .Growthit -0.035 (0.008)*** -0.046 (0.018)***
Dpublici .Growthit -0.095 (0.048)** 0.009 (0.011)
Dnonpublici .σ
GDP
t−1 -0.001 (0.000)** -0.001 (0.000)***
Dpublici .σ
GDP
t−1 -0.002 (0.000)** -0.002 (0.001)**
Dnonpublici .σ
level
it−1 -0.024 (0.006)*** -0.081 (0.003)**
Dpublici .σ
level
it−1 -0.003 (0.000)*** -0.009 (0.004)**
Dnonpublici .Cashit.σ
level
it−1 -0.032 (0.039)
Dpublici .Cashit.σ
level
it−1 -0.028 (0.008)***
Dnonpublici .Cashit.σ
GDP
t−1 0.008 (0.004)**
Dpublici .Cashit.σ
GDP
t−1 0.006 (0.001)***
Constant -0.194 (0.068)*** -0.075 (0.027)***
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 22,375 22,375
Firm 5,254 5,254
AR(2) 1.340 1.260
p-value 0.179 0.208
J-statistic 68.030 138.41
p-value 0.250 0.826
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Table 2.18: Robustness: The Impact of Risks on Leverage when Private and
Public Firm Samples Matched on Size, Industry, and Fiscal Year-End
Panel A of the table reports the estimates obtained from robust two-step System-GMM estimations for the
effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on firms’ leverage, separately for non-public and public firms. Here,
the leverage is the ratio of total debt (short-term debt + long-term debt) to total assets. The figures given
in parentheses are standard errors which are asymptotically robust to the presence of heteroskedasticity and
serial correlation within panels. To examine the differential impact of uncertainty across both non-public
and public firms, we construct Dnonpublici .X (D
public
i .X) as the explanatory variable X interacted with a
dummy equal to one (zero) if the firm is non-public and zero (one) if the firm is public. The dependent
variable is leverage, defined as the ratio of short-term debt to total assets. The analysis covers the period
1999-2008 for a panel of UK non-public and public firms. Model 1 estimates the joint impact of volatility
in GDP and volatility in the level of firms’ sales on firm leverage. Model 2 estimates the joint impact
of volatility in GDP and cumulative volatility in firms’ sales on firm leverage. The method of measuring
volatility and definitions of the remaining independent variables are given in Table 2-A, Appendix A. Size
is the natural log of total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Profitability is
the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Growth is defined as the difference of the log
of net sales normalized by consumer price index. Panel B of the table reports the J statistics, which is a
test of the over identifying restrictions and distributed as chi-squared under the null of instrument validity
and the Arellano-Bond, AR(2), test of second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals. ***,
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation Results; Dependent Variable: Leverage
Without Replacement With Replacement
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Dnonpublici .Levit−1 0.877 (0.041)*** 0.846 (0.044)***
Dpublici .Levit−1 0.565 (0.037)*** 0.573 (0.037)***
Dnonpublici .Cashit -0.011 (0.042) -0.028 (0.044)
Dpublici .Cashit -0.202 (0.035)*** -0.181 (0.035)***
Dnonpublici .P rofitabilityit -0.266 (0.044)*** -0.293 (0.043)***
Dpublici .P rofitabilityit -0.162 (0.028)*** -0.176 (0.029)***
Dnonpublici .Tangibilityit 0.005 (0.021) 0.009 (0.025)
Dpublici .Tangibilityit -0.002 (0.018) -0.005 (0.018)
Dnonpublici .Sizeit 0.015 (0.005)*** 0.021 (0.005)***
Dpublici .Sizeit 0.017 (0.004)*** 0.022 (0.004)***
Dnonpublici .Growthit -0.025 (0.012)** -0.032 (0.017)*
Dpublici .Growthit -0.013 (0.007)* -0.011 (0.006)*
Dnonpublici .σ
GDP
t−1 -0.002 (0.001)** -0.002 (0.001)***
Dpublici .σ
GDP
t−1 -0.003 (0.000)** -0.003 (0.000)**
Dnonpublici .σ
level
it−1 -0.037 (0.003)*** -0.025 (0.007)***
Dpublici .σ
level
it−1 -0.002 (0.000)*** -0.001 (0.000)***
Constant -0.074 (0.058) -0.139 (0.058)***
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 2,199 1,992
Firm 1,145 1,022
AR(2) 0.640 0.490
p-value 0.524 0.623
J-statistic 100.170 83.560
p-value 0.338 0.793
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Appendix A: Definitions of Variables
Table 2-A: Symbol and Definition of Variables
Variable Variable Variable Contraction
abbreviation description
Levit Sort-term debt/total assets Short-term debt at the end of the year divided by
total assets
Total debt/total assets The sum of short-term and long-term debt at the end
of the year divided by total assets
Salesit Sales/total assets Total turnover during a year divided by total assets
Invtit Investment/total assets Aggregate investment divided by total assets
Cashit Cash/ total assets Cash and equivalent divided by total assets
Dnonpublici Non-public dummy Non-public is a dummy equal to one if the firm is
non-public and zero if the firm is public
Dpublici Public dummy Public is a dummy equal to one if the firm is public
and zero if the firm is non-public
σlevelit Volatility in the level of
sales as proxy for firm-
specific risk
It is the size of the deviation from average sales of
the firm over the period from 1999 to 2008 and from
average sales for all firms in a given year.
σcumulativeit Cumulative-volatility in
firm-level sales as proxy for
firm-specific risk
To measure the cumulative-volatility in sales for the
year 2000, we compute the standard deviation of
the residuals obtained from the state space model
of sales for years 2000, 1999; similarly for year 2001,
the residuals in 2001, 2000, and 1999 are used.
σgrowthit Volatility in the growth of
firms’ sales as proxy for
firm-specific risk
For a given firm-year, it is measured by the size of
the deviation from average growth of sales of the
firm over the period 1999 to 2008 and from average
growth for all firms in that year.
σGDPt Conditional variance for
gross domestic product
(GDP)
ARCH/GARCH specifications are used for GDP to
obtain the conditional variance as proxy for macroe-
conomic uncertainty.
σT−billst Conditional variance for
Treasury bills rates (T-bills
rates)
ARCH/GARCH models are estimated for T-bills
rates to proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty.
σIndext Conditional variance index We compute an equal weighted index using the
conditional variance obtained from ARCH/GARCH
specifications for GDP, T-bills rates, and Consumer
Price Index (CPI).
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Appendix B: Measuring Macroeconomic Risk
Table 2-B: ARCH/GARCH Estimates for Macroeconomic Risk
This table reports the estimates obtained by estimating a generalized ARCH (GARCH) model for Treasury
bill rates (TBR) and gross domestic product (GDP). X denotes the dependent variable in ARCH/GARCH
specifications. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors. The estimates on the log-likelihood,
Lagrange multiplier (ARCH LM) test, and Q-statistics to test for the remaining ARCH/GACRH effects
in the model are given in the lower panel. Quarterly data on GDP and monthly data on Treasury bills
rates and Consumer Price Index are obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) file, an
International Monetary Fund (IMF) database. The data covers the period from 1999 to 2008. We average
the conditional variance of GDP (T-bills rates and CPI) across four quarters (twelve months) to obtain a
yearly measure of the risk of macroeconomic conditions. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level is indicated by three, two, and one asterisks, correspondingly.
Regressors
∆TBR ∆CPI ∆GDP
Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error
∆Xt−1 -0.120 (0.271) -0.724 (0.112)** 0.232 (0.112)**
∆Xt−2 0.353 (0.187)* 0.129 (0.124) -0.001 (0.147)
Constant 0.013 (0.006)** 0.400 (0.096)*** 2.789 (0.917)***
MA(1) 0.577 (0.274)** 0.958 (0.049)***
ARCH(1) 0.724 (0.164)*** 0.259 (0.146)* 0.859 (0.368)**
GARCH(1) 0.271 (0.128)** 0.512 (0.269)*
Constant 0.005 (0.001)*** 0.031 (0.012)*** 1.281 (0.420)***
Diagnostic tests for remaining GARCH effects
Log-likelihood 92.569 -52.868 -103.101
Observations 148.000 148.000 51.000
LM-test(4) 0.140 2.010 2.510
P-value 0.997 0.733 0.643
Q(8) 3.274 4.936 11.225
P-value 0.916 0.764 0.189
Q(15) 3.865 18.999 16.009
P-value 0.998 0.213 0.381
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Chapter 3
Capital Structure Adjustments: Do Macroeconomic and
Business Risks Matter?
3.1 Key Findings
This chapter empirically examines the role of risk in firms’ capital structure adjustments.
The dataset used here consists of all available publicly traded UK manufacturing firms
from the WorldScope files for the period of 1981 to 2009. We find strong evidence of
asymmetry in firm leverage adjustments, depending on the magnitude and the type of
risk as well as whether firms’ actual leverage is above or below the target. We also find
that firms with a financial surplus and above-target leverage adjust their leverage faster
when firm-specific risk is low and when macroeconomic risk is high. In contrast, firms with
financial deficits and below-target leverage are more likely to align their leverage toward
their target in periods when both types of risk are low.
Overall, this chapter systematically relates firms’ capital structure rebalancing activ-
ities to risk using a large panel of listed UK manufacturing firms and contributes to the
literature in two major aspects. First, we show that risks exert a negative impact on firms’
target leverage and provide evidence that both firm-specific and macroeconomic risks play
a substantial role in the determination of firms’ capital structure adjustment process to-
ward a target. Second, we lay out how the interlinkages between risks, the imbalances in
a firm’s cash flows, and the level of a firm’s actual leverage relative to its target leverage
affect the firm in achieving its target capital structure. We also think that our findings
would be useful to understand the movements in firms’ target leverage, the managers’
effort to time equity and debt markets as well as their lack of desire for a quick capital
structure adjustment.
3.2 Introduction
Financial economists have devoted considerable attention to explain the capital structure
of firms. Nevertheless, still it is hard to fully explain the documented time-series or cross
sectional patterns referring to a specific theoretical reasoning. Perhaps managers strive
to adjust firms’ capital structure to achieve an optimal target leverage, but they cannot
do so because of adverse selection problems (Myers and Majluf (1984)), the presence of
relative time-varying costs of issuing debt to equity (Baker and Wurgler (2002)) or the
trade-offs between the costs and benefits of debt vis-a`-vis equity financing (Myers (1984)).
In fact, one would expect that the capital structure adjustment process is related to several
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factors and that firm managers carefully consider the state of the firm’s financial status
when making adjustments in firms’ capital structure.41
Besides examining the factors that affect the capital structure of firms, another im-
portant issue is the speed with which firms adjust their capital structure toward their
target leverage. In an environment without frictions, firms should achieve their target
level rather quickly. However, it may take firms several years to adjust to their desired
leverage ratio due to the presence of adjustment costs. Indeed, prior empirical research
has shown that the adjustment process takes several periods: while some studies suggest
that the speed of adjustment is in the range of 7-18% per year (Fama and French (2002)),
some others estimate it as high as 35% per year (Flannery and Rangan (2006)). Along
the same lines, recently, Byoun (2008) suggests that the capital structure adjustment
process is asymmetric with respect to the firm’s financial status. He argues that typical
partial adjustment models cannot capture the dynamics of capital structure adjustments
and shows that the adjustment speed is faster (about 33%) when firms have a financial
surplus with above-target debt but it drops substantially to single digit figures when firms
have a financial deficit with above-target debt or when they have a financial surplus with
below-target debt.
In this chapter, different from the earlier research on the speed of adjustment of firms’
capital structure, we condition adjustment speeds on risks about macroeconomic condi-
tions and firms’ own business activity. Specifically, we examine firms’ speed of adjustments
toward target capital structure with a focus on asymmetry in adjustments speeds across
different types of risk as well as across different levels of risk. To take asymmetry into
account, we estimate speeds of adjustment at low, medium, and high levels of risk in
general, as well as conditional on both firms’ cash flow imbalances (financing deficits ver-
sus surpluses) and deviations (positive versus negative) of firms’ actual leverage from the
target.
We hypothesize that if the optimal debt level varies by firm, the risk structure of the
environment within which the firm operates should affect the cost and benefit of adjusting
the leverage ratio toward the target.42 Given that the adjustment costs and benefits
would change as risk varies over time, so will the speed of adjustment. Particularly, it
is well accepted that risks associated with the state of the economy or the firm affect
41For more along these lines, see, for instance, Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Baker and
Wurgler (2002), Welch (2004), Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004), Huang and Ritter (2009),
and Elsas and Florysiak (2011).
42In theory, firms’ capital structure adjustment decisions reflect the trade-off between the benefits of
maintaining the target, such as the expected value of tax shields and the potential costs of distress,
and the cost of achieving the target, such as the relative costs of external financing, equity valuations,
and financial constraints (Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Leary
and Roberts (2005), Flannery and Hankins (2007), Elsas and Florysiak (2011), and Faulkender, Flannery,
Hankins, and Smith (2011)). We expect that as these costs and benefits of rebalancing the capital structure
vary with variations in risk, so does the speed with which firms adjust their leverage toward their targets.
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adverse selection problems, the relative cost of raising funds from equity or debt markets,
and the state of the firm’s retained earnings which directly impacting the firm’s capital
structure. However, the existing empirical studies on the adjustment speed of capital
structure toward the target have largely ignored the impact of risk on adjustment speeds.
Although mostly neglected in the literature, the impact of risk on the capital adjustment
process is an important aspect without which one cannot have a good understanding of
the adjustment process.43
In our investigation, we examine the effects of risk on the adjustment process of capital
structure using a large panel of UK manufacturing firms which spans the period 1981-2009.
We take into consideration the level of debt as well as the imbalances in cash flows while
we study the impact of both business and macroeconomic risks on leverage adjustments
within a dynamic framework. In our study, we also control for various firm-specific factors.
We predict that the capital adjustment speed will be asymmetric with respect to the level
and the type of risk that a firm experiences. This prediction can be rationalized realizing
that the costs and benefits of adjusting toward a target leverage are related to both the
source and the severity of risks.44
We begin our investigation by quantifying the impact of both firm-specific and macroe-
conomic risk on target leverage as we control for various firm-specific factors. We show
that both types of risk exert a negative impact on firms’ target leverage. That is, all else
remains unchanged, the higher the level of risk, the lower the level of firms’ leverage. When
we analyze speed of adjustments toward the target leverage ratio, we find asymmetry in
adjustment speeds across different levels of risks. Further, we observe that asymmetries
in leverage adjustments are also related to the type of risk. Specifically, estimating the
modified dynamic partial-adjustment model of capital structure, we show that the speed
of adjustment is highest when the firm enjoys low firm-specific risk, but the adjustment
slows down as macroeconomic risks rise.
Next, we estimate the speed of adjustment of firms at different levels of risks when
the actual leverage of firms is above or below the target leverage. To allow differential
leverage adjustment speeds across positive and negative leverage deviations, we modify the
standard leverage adjustment model by interacting our risk measures with indicators of
above- and below-target leverage. We provide strong evidence that both over-levered and
under-levered firms respond to risk very differently when adjusting their capital structure
toward their leverage target. In particular, we find that firms having leverage above the
43Empirical research has mainly focused on the effects of risk on leverage. See, for instance, Titman
and Wessels (1988), MacKie-Mason (1990), Wald (1999), Hatzinikolaou, Katsimbris, and Noulas (2002),
Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009), and Caglayan and Rashid (2010).
44See Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) and Flannery and Hankins (2007), who argue that firms with
differing adjustment costs tend to make asymmetric adjustments in their capital structure.
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target adjust their capital structure faster toward the target when firm-specific risk is high
and when macroeconomic risk is low. On the contrary, firms with below-target leverage
are likely to adjust their capital structure quickly toward their targets in times of low
firm-specific risk and high macroeconomic risk.
The last-and most important-model we examine allows the firm to face imbalances in
cash flows and its actual leverage to differ relative to the target leverage while interacting
our risk measures with its capital structure adjustments.45 We find that firms with finan-
cial surpluses and above-target leverage are likely to adjust their leverage more quickly
toward their target when both firm-specific and macroeconomic risks are high. Hence,
a firm that has a financial surplus with leverage exceeding the target quickly readjusts
its capital structure in periods of high risk to avoid the costs of financial distress along
with the likelihood of bankruptcy during periods of high risk. In contrast, we observe
that firms that experience financial surpluses with below-target leverage do not strive to
achieve their target capital structure but rather maintain their current state.
When we turn to firms that experience financial deficits with above-target leverage, we
see that these firms are more likely to issue equity to achieve their target leverage in times of
low risk (particularly macroeconomic).46 For such firms, given the level of macroeconomic
risk, an increase in firm-specific risk speeds up the capital adjustment process. Whereas,
firms that have financial deficits with below-target leverage are more likely to adjust their
capital structure by issuing debt in times when both firm-specific risk and macroeconomic
risks are relatively low. An increase in either type of risk simply delays the adjustment
process. Overall, our investigation provides evidence that the type (macroeconomic versus
firm-specific) and the extent (low, median, or high) of risk under which firms operate really
matter regarding the capital structure adjustment speed of firms. That is, asymmetries
in firms’ capital structure adjustments are significantly related to both the level and the
type of risk over and above the financial state or/and the level of leverage with respect to
a firm’s target leverage.
The results presented in this chapter are robust to both alternative proxies for firm-
specific and macroeconomic risk and alternative measures of the level of firms’ target
leverage. This confirms that the asymmetry in leverage adjustment speeds across dif-
ferent levels of risk are not driven by either the specific measure of risk or the specific
estimate of the target leverage. By proving evidence of the asymmetrical leverage adjust-
ments across different levels of risk and across different types of risk, we indicate that
45Byoun (2008), Elsas and Florysiak (2011), and Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith (2011)
investigate the importance of financial imbalances in capital structure adjustments when the firm is above
or below its target leverage. However, these studies are silent about the role of risk in leverage adjustments.
46Since good macroeconomic prospects (low macroeconomic risks) are positively related to the market
value of equities, firms generally issue new equity during such periods.
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ignoring the role of risk in capital structure adjustments would likely yield biased speed
of adjustment estimates. Our results on the asymmetry in capital structure adjustments
across firm characteristics also bear on the recent findings that the differential adjustment
speeds are conditional on firms’ financing deficits and the deviations of firms’ actual lever-
age from the leverage target (Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Flannery and Hankins (2007),
Byoun (2008), Dang, Kim, and Shin (2009), Elsas and Florysiak (2011), and Faulkender,
Flannery, Hankins, and Smith (2011)).
Our investigation proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature survey on
the capital structure adjustments and the impact of risk on corporate financing decisions.
Section 3 presents some basic information on the dataset. This section also lays out
the procedures we implement to generate firm-specific and macroeconomic risk measures.
Section 4 describes the estimation methods. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical
findings. Section 6 concludes the chapter.
3.3 Capital Structure Adjustments, Prior Evidence, and Risk
This section first reviews the existing empirical studies that focus on the speed of ad-
justment toward the target leverage. Then it provides the theoretical predictions and a
summary of the empirical evidence on the sensitivity of firms’ capital structure to risk.
Finally, the section presents the capital structure theories’ predictions on the relation
between firms’ financing decisions and firm-specific factors along with their empirical con-
firmations.
3.3.1 Empirical Evidence on Capital Structure Adjustments
3.3.1.1 The Speed of Adjustment to A Target Capital Structure
The question when and how quickly a firm adjusts its capital structure toward its target
has recently received substantial interest in the corporate finance literature. Numerous
existing papers estimate the speed at which firms move toward their target leverage ra-
tio. In their investigation, researchers relate the adjustment process of capital structure
to firm-specific characteristics as well as to macroeconomic conditions. For instance, in
a recent paper, Elsas and Florysiak (2011) analyze how firm-specific factors affect US
firms’ speed of adjustment by estimating the standard partial adjustment model of capital
structure. Specifically, to take asymmetry in adjustments across firms into account, they
sort their sample firms according to firm size, the market-to-book-equity ratio, industry
affiliation, and the deviation of observed leverage from target leverage. They find that
the market-to-book-equity value of firms affects speed of adjustment toward target capital
structure positively, while firm size affects adjustment speeds negatively. Further, they
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show that highly over-levered firms adjust their leverage with a relatively rapid speed of
about 50.5% per year, while highly under-levered firms do so with a speed of about 45%
per year. They also find that firms that have large deficits or surpluses with above-target
leverage adjust their leverage with a speed of as high as 59.2% per year.
Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith (2011) estimate the impact of firms’ cash
flow realizations, financial constraints, and market conditions on the capital structure
adjustments of over-levered and under-levered firms. They find that adjustment costs
are significant in adjustments, generating asymmetry in the speed of adjustment of firms
toward the target leverage ratio. Estimating the modified form of the standard partial-
adjustment model, they show that when firms’ cash flow realizations are near to zero,
while under-levered firms eliminate about 23% their deviations from the target leverage
per year, over-levered firms do so about 26%. However, they estimate a much faster
speed of adjustment toward the target when firms have excess cash flows relative to their
leverage deviations: 51.5% per year for under-levered firms and 69.3% per year for over-
levered firms. Cook and Tang (2010) examine the effect of macroeconomic conditions on
firm leverage adjustments for listed US firms. They find that firms’ leverage converges to
its target with a speed of 46.1% (43.7%) in a year when the economy is in an expansionary
(a recessionary) phase. Likewise, in a working paper, Halling, Yu, and Zechner (2011)
also relate speeds of adjustments with business cycle using a firm-level panel data from 18
countries. They show that firms adjust their capital structure toward their targets more
rapidly during economic expansions than they do during recessions.47
Huang and Ritter (2009) estimate the speed of adjustment using long differencing
estimator. They find that firms adjust their capital structure with a moderate speed of
adjustment: the book leverage with a speed of 17% per year, while the market leverage
with a speed of 23.2% per year. In a recent working paper, Elsas and Florysiak (2010)
estimate the speed of adjustment taking into account the fractional nature of the dependent
variable (debt ratios) and find that firms adjust their leverage with a speed of about 26%
in a year. Chang and Dasgupta (2009) estimate the speed of adjustment at around 37.8%
per year for publicly traded US firms.
Byoun (2008) estimates speeds of adjustment in a financing needs-adjustment frame-
work and finds that the adjustment speed is around 33% per year for firms which have a
financial surplus with debt above-target level. He also reports that the adjustment speed
47Recently, DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Whited (2011) propose a dynamic capital structure model to
examine the role of transitory debt in capital structure adjustments. Specifically, in their model, they
allow firms to have target capital structure and to issue transitory debt that enables them to fund their
financing needs associated with anticipated investment shocks. As well, firms can economize the cost of
equity issuance and of maintaining their cash balances. They predict that despite firms temporarily depart
from their leverage targets, all proactive financing decisions move them toward their targets. But the speed
of this move is relatively slow, however.
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is about 20% per year for firms which face a financial deficit with debt below-target level.
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) find that firms adjust their book leverage around
25% per year. Similarly, Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008) also estimate a relatively
rapid speed of adjustment of 32.2%, implying a half-life of 1.8 years. Chen and Zhao (2007)
and Frank and Goyal (2008) provide evidence that the leverage ratio of firms reverts to its
mean over time regardless of whether firms have a target leverage or not. Flannery and
Hankins (2007) relate leverage adjustments of publicly traded US firms with rebalancing
benefits and costs. They find that firms rebalance their capital structure relatively quickly,
making adjustment toward their target by a speed of around 22% per year.
On the other hand, Fama and French (2002) estimating a partial adjustment model of
capital structure find that firms that do not pay dividends adjust their leverage toward
target debt ratios with a speed of between 15 and 18% per year, while firms that pay
dividends do so with a speed of between 7 and 10% per year. Thus, they conclude that
firms adjust their capital structure toward their targets at “a snail’s pace”.48 Graham and
Harvey (2001b) conduct a survey of U.S. CFOs and find that about 44% of the sample
firms have a tight target capital structure, about 34% of the firms have a flexible target
debt ratio, while only 19% of the firms responded that they do not have target capital
structure.49
3.3.1.2 Market Timing and Capital Structure Adjustments
Another strand of literature focuses on how equity market timing affects the corporate
capital structure adjustment process. Baker and Wurgler (2002) show that the impact
of market timing is very persistent and it exists even beyond 10 years. They find that
the historical market valuations–the “external finance weighted-average” market-to-book
ratio–of firms have a significant and negative impact on firms’ leverage. They also find
the market-to-book value ratio affects the change in leverage negatively in the short run,
mainly through its impact on new equity financing. They conclude that firms that raised
external financing when their historical equity market valuations were high tend to be low-
levered, while conversely firms that raised external financing when their historical equity
market valuations were low tend to be high-levered. Huang and Ritter (2009) examine the
effects of the cost of equity financing on securities issuance for listed US firms. Consistent
with the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2002), they find that the past values of the cost of
equity financing influencing the historical financing decisions of a firm have a long-lasting
impact on the firm capital structure.
48Xu (2007) also reports that the speed of adjustment toward target leverage is between 15 and 18% per
year.
49To see variations in speed-of-adjustment estimates (henceforth AOS-estimates) across firms, estimated
estimates of the speed of adjustment in recent empirical studies are given in Table 3-A, Appendix A.
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Recently, the papers by Elsas and Florysiak (2011), Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins,
and Smith (2011), and Warr, Elliott, Koe¨ter-Kant, and O¨ztekin (2011) have also been
focused to explore the effects of market timing on the speed of adjustment toward a lever-
age target. Elsas and Florysiak (2011) find that the market-to-book value is positively
related to leverage adjustments, suggesting that firms with high market-to-book value
ratios rapidly adjust toward their capital structure. Likewise, Faulkender, Flannery, Han-
kins, and Smith (2011) provide evidence of a significant role of market timing in firms’
decisions of making capital structure adjustments. Specifically, they find that while higher
equity valuations measured by average industry market-to-book value increase the speed
of adjustment of over-leveraged firms, under-leveraged firms adjust less quickly when their
equity valuations are high. Warr, Elliott, Koe¨ter-Kant, and O¨ztekin (2011) analyze how
equity mispricing affects firms’ capital structure adjustment costs. They show that firms
with high leverage ratios relative to their target are likely to make fast adjustment in
their leverage when their shares are over-valued than when their shares are under-valued.
Conversely, they show that firms that are below-target leverage adjust more quickly when
their equity is under-valued than they do so when their equity is over-valued.50
Kayhan and Titman (2007) carry out a comprehensive analysis to show how changes in
stock price and firms’ financial position (a financing deficit or surplus) relates to changes in
the capital structure of firms and find that firms eventually adjust their capital structure
to achieve their leverage targets. In addition, they show that while stock price changes
and firms’ financial positions are significantly related to capital structure, their impacts
are partially reversed over long horizons.51 However, Alti (2006) and Leary and Roberts
(2005) find that the impact of equity financing totally dissipates within two to four years,
indicating a rapid convergence toward target leverage. Similarly, the studies by Butler,
Cornaggia, Grullon, and Weston (2011) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) have questioned
the long-term persistence and the economic significance of the effects of market timing on
firms’ financing decisions.
3.3.1.3 Risk and Leverage Adjustments: Hypotheses Development
Given the state of the literature, we know that managers do not commit to an instanta-
neous adjustment of firms’ capital structure but prefer to have gradual adjustments. It
appears that managers take into account various firm-specific factors as well as the imbal-
50An early study by Jalilvand and Harris (1984) analyzes the adjustment behavior of firms by examining
US firms’ security issuance decisions and documents that stock valuations have a significant impact on the
rate at which firms adjust their capital structure toward the target. As well, they show that firm size and
interest rates are important in explaining variations in speeds of adjustments across companies.
51Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) find that more profitable firms, although having low leverage,
on average, have a tendency to issue debt rather than equity and have a tendency to repurchase equity
instead of retire debt to adjust their capital structure toward an optimum level.
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ances in cash flows (financial deficits or surpluses), the state of firms’ debt with respect to
the target (above or below) and the state of the environment within which firms operate
while pursuing the target debt levels. However, studies on the adjustment speed of capital
structure have largely ignored the role of risk on the adjustment speed of capital structure.
Thus, to the best of our knowledge, the effects of risk on the rate at which firms adjust
their capital structure toward their target have not been articulated in the literature so
far. The extent and the type of risk affect the costs of adjustments, such as the relative
costs of external financing, equity valuations, and financial constraints, and benefits of
making leverage adjustments, such as the expected value of tax shields, the probability of
default, and the potential costs of distress, which in turn affect the speed of adjustment.
Given that, the question whether risk increases or reduces the speed of adjustment as
the firm’s actual leverage deviates from its target and as its financial state changes is an
important issue without which one cannot have a good understanding of the adjustment
process.
We hypothesize that whether risk accelerates or decelerates the speed of adjustment
of firms toward the target leverage depends on whether firms have positive or negative
financial deficits and whether firms’ actual leverage ratios are above or below their targets.
In principle, the adjustment of capital structure toward the target of firms that have
financing surpluses with above-target leverage calls for retiring debt. Since higher debt
levels make firms more exposed to risk, in particulate macroeconomic risk, these firms
are more likely to pay off their outstanding debts when risk is relatively high, making a
rapid adjustment toward the target. These firms may find it easy to do so when they are
relatively more certain about their potential earnings. In this context, it is likely that these
firms do a relatively rapid adjustment in their capital structure to attain their leverage
targets when macroeconomic risk is high but firm-specific risk is low relatively.
The adjustment of firms that have financing deficits with above-target leverage requires
equity issuance. We conjecture the speed of adjustment of these firms to be higher when
firm-specific risk is high and when macroeconomic risk is low. We predict this, because high
firm-specific risk increasing risk premiums and the probability of bankruptcy and stable
macroeconomic conditions increasing firms’ equity values make debt borrowing expensive
relative to equity financing. In such circumstances, firms prefer equity financing over debt
issues when financing their deficits, decreasing their leverage ratios quickly toward their
targets.
In case new borrowing is needed to adjust the capital structure of the firm, we expect
that the speed of adjustment toward the target would be higher when both firm-specific
and macroeconomic risk are low than when both types of risk are high. For instance,
a firms having financing deficits with below-target leverage will simultaneously adjust
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its leverage toward the target and finance its financing needs by issuing debt. The cost
of adjustments (issuing debt) for this firm would very likely to be less when the firm
is relatively less uncertain about its expected earnings (cash flow streams) and when
macroeconomic conditions are good. This can be explained as follows. Since firms are
less cautious about bankruptcy costs and the fixed cost of debt when variations in their
earnings are less. Further, banks are less reluctant to channel funds to firms with relatively
stable earnings. Thus, firms are more likely to finance their financial deficits by issuing
debt in periods when risk about their own business activity is low. On the other hand,
relative stable macroeconomic conditions decreasing risk premia raise the discounted values
of tax benefits, which, in turn, induce firms to increase their outstanding amounts of debt.
Thus, firms with a financial deficit and below-target leverage are expected to adjust their
leverage toward the target rapidly when both firm-specific and macroeconomic risks are
relatively low.
Finally, for those firms that have a financial surplus with below-target leverage, we
predict relatively slow and insignificant adjustments toward leverage targets. In essence,
the adjustment of such firms’ leverage would require either issuing new debt or repurchas-
ing existing equity. However, these firms may find it favorable—perhaps to increase their
financial flexibility—to reduce their debt obligations rather than equity finance in periods
when their projections indicate the relative stability of earnings and when macroeconomic
prospects are good. We therefore expect to observe that the speed of adjustment of these
firms would be either slower or negative when both types of risks are low. A more detailed
discussion of the role of risk in firms’ financing decisions is presented below.
3.3.2 Financing Decisions and the Impact of Risk
3.3.2.1 The Role of Business Risk
Several researchers have explored how business risk influences the change in a firm’s capi-
tal structure. For instance, using the tax shelter-bankruptcy cost model, Castanias (1983)
establishes an inverse relationship between business risk and a firm’s leverage. He shows
that with a given marginal tax rate and marginal default cost function, higher business
risk results in a decline in the debt level of firms. He further shows that if risk is normally
distributed, the relaxation of some of the assumptions would not affect the inverse rela-
tionship between leverage and risk. In line with bankruptcy cost theory, Bradley, Jarrell,
and Kim (1984) present a single period corporate capital structure model and show the
presence of an inverse relation of a firm’s optimal level of debt with its earnings volatility.
When we search the empirical literature, we come across a long list of studies which pro-
vide evidence consistent with the above theoretical predictions. For instance, Caglayan
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and Rashid (2010) show that uncertainty exerts negative and significant effects on the
leverage of UK public and non-public firms. Bokpin, Aboagye, and Osei (2010) present
evidence that firms’ external financing is significantly negatively related to both business
risk and financial risk. Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009) report a significant and neg-
ative impact of idiosyncratic risk on the optimal short-term leverage for US non-financial
firms. Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) report a negative effect of cash flow volatility
measured by the standard deviations of historical operating income on both the book and
market leverage. Wald (1999) investigates how earnings volatility affects the optimal firm
leverage by examining the determinants of capital structure in France, Germany, Japan,
USA, and the United Kingdom. He finds a significant negative effect of firm-level risk on
the debt-to-assets ratio for the United States and Germany. Brealey and Myers (1981) ar-
gue that financial distress is costly regardless of the presence or the absence of bankruptcy
so that risky firms use less debt in their capital structure to avoid expensive bankruptcy
procedures. Furthermore, given that an increase in business risk would cause an increase
in the probability of bankruptcy one should observe less debt in firms’ capital structure.
There are several earlier studies which express similar views. For instance, MacKie-Mason
(1990), Titman and Wessels (1988), Ferri and Jones (1979), and Baxter (1967) document
that firm-level risk exerts a significant and negative impact on leverage.
In contrast, Myers (1977) suggests that there is a positive relationship between firms’
debt and risk. He argues that large business risk may tend to reduce debt-related agency
costs which as a result induces firms to use more debt in their capital structure. Consistent
with the Myers’ views, Chu, Wu, and Chiou (1992), Auerbach (1985), and Kim and
Sorensen (1986) provide evidence of a positive relationship between firms’ debt levels and
business risk. We should also note that an earlier study by Toy, Stonehill, Remmers, and
Wright (1974) which investigates the determinants of optimal firm debt for manufacturing
firms in Japan, Norway, and the United States, too, reports a significant and positive
effect of earnings volatility on the debt ratio.
3.3.2.2 The Role of Macroeconomic Risk
When we turn to explore the effects of macroeconomic risks on corporate debt structure
we come across a handful of studies in the literature that examine this aspect. Gertler
and Hubbard (1993) argue that firms take into account both firm-level risk and aggregate
risk while making their production and financing decisions. They further explain that
while firms can manipulate the firm-level risk, to extenuate the costs of financial distress,
firms should share the aggregate risk with outside lenders by issuing equity. Hence, the
optimal capital structure is a mixture of debt and equity rather than of pure debt. In
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this context, the relation of firms’ debt levels with macroeconomic risk is expected to be
negative. However, if there is a tax bias against equity financing and if the cost of new
equity is greater than the costs of exposure to macroeconomic risk, then firms may prefer
debt financing (Myers and Majluf (1984)). As a consequence, the association between
macroeconomic risk and leverage depends on the firm-managers’ perceptions regarding
the state of the economy and to what level the tax bias against equity finance exists.
Recent theoretical studies relate firms’ financing decisions to business cycle risks, too.
For instance, Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) propose a contingent claims model in
which the cash flows of firms are conditional on both idiosyncratic risk and macroeconomic
conditions. Their model suggests that firms’ borrowing capacity exhibits pro-cyclicity and
that both the pace and the size of capital structure changes depend on macroeconomic
conditions. Levy and Hennessy (2007) examine firms’ financing choices in a general equilib-
rium framework. They predict that firms issue equity pro-cyclically. They also document
that firms are more likely to reduce their outstanding debt in periods of poor macroe-
conomic conditions. More recently, Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010) and Chen
(2010) develop a dynamic capital structure model to examine how corporate financing
policy responds to macroeconomic fluctuations. They predict that unpredictable varia-
tions in macroeconomic conditions significantly affect firms’ financing policies. Caglayan
and Rashid (2010) examine a large panel of UK public and non-public manufacturing firms
and show that macroeconomic volatility has a significant and negative impact on leverage.
Furthermore, they argue that the negative impact of macroeconomic risk on leverage is
stronger when firms’ cash holdings are low. Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009) also
report a negative association between macroeconomic risk and firms’ optimal short-term
leverage for US manufacturing firms.
This quick review of the literature shows that researchers so far have not exam-
ined to what extent firms adjust their leverage when leverage deviates from targets as
macroeconomic/firm-specific risk varies. However, since the extent of risk affects the costs
and benefits of adjustment which in turn affects the speed of adjustment, the question
whether risk increases or reduces the speed of adjustment as the firm’s actual leverage
deviates from its target and as its financial state changes is an important issue without
which one cannot have a good understanding of the adjustment process. In this study, we
address the importance of risk on the capital structure adjustment process of a firm as
we consider both the actual state of the firm’s leverage with respect to its target and the
financial state of the firm.
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3.3.3 Financing Decisions and Firm-Specific Factors
Several studies in the literature have focused to empirically examine the role of firm-
specific factors in determining an optimal capital structure. These studies have identified
a large number of factors that have significant influences on firms’ financing decisions.
These factors include the profitability of firms, the tangibility of assets, firms’ capital
expenditures, firm size, non-debt tax shields, the market-to-book value ratio, stock returns,
selling expense, cash flows, and so on. Table 3-E of Appendix E presents the summary of
the theoretical predictions and empirical findings on the relation of capital structure with
firm-specific factors identified in the existing literature.
Although the focus of this study is to examine how risks about firms’ own business
activity and macroeconomic conditions affect firms’ capital structure rebalancing decisions,
it is important to control for firm-specific effects. Therefore, we include several firm-specific
variables in our empirical analysis while examining the impact of risk on firms’ financing
decisions. We discuss the definitions of these variables in detail later in the data section of
the chapter. However, in what follows below, we provide a brief discussion on how these
variables theoretically relate to capital structure. We also present the empirical evidence
in support of these predictions. We find that different theoretical models predict different
relations of leverage with firm-specific factors. These differences are mainly attributed to
the underlying assumptions. We also find that on empirical grounds, results differ based
on the sample and the definition of variables used in the empirical analysis.
A. Profitability
The free cash flow theory predicts a significant positive impact of firms’ profitability on
debt ratios. Jensen (1986) describes that free cash flow-related agency costs increase with
an increase in free cash flow. This implies that high-free-cash-flow firms are more likely to
incur the agency cost of free cash flow. This is because firm managers are expected to invest
this cash in low-return investments rather than pay it out to equityholders. However, debt
serving as bonding or discipline instrument reduces such types of agency costs. The use of
debt assures that firms’ managers are well-disciplined, select most profitable investments,
and do not quest for their own interests as debt adds bankruptcy risk (Harris and Raviv
(1990)). Further, higher debt ratio serves as a devise for signal quality. Finally, the
Jensen’s (1986) model suggests that more profitable firms are more likely to takeover and
hence, they in turn increase their leverage. Thus, profitable firms tend to use more debt in
their capital structure. An alternative channel to explain the positive relation of leverage
with profitability is that it is very likely that financial distress costs for profitable firms
are low and interest tax shields are more available for them. Thus, the higher interest
75
tax shield and lower bankruptcy risk motivate them to use more debt.52 Alti (2006),
Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004), Hovakimian (2004), and Jensen (1986)
find a positive impact of profitability on leverage.
Alternatively, according to the pecking order model of Myers and Majluf (1984), there
is a negative relationship between firms’ profitability and leverage. Myers (1984) and
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the problem of asymmetric information and adverse
selection costs cause firms to prefer the use of internal funds (retained earnings) to finance
new investment over external financing. Thus, firms with high profitability have ten-
dency to use less debt in their capital structure. Several empirical studies such as Huang
and Ritter (2009), Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008), Kayhan and Titman (2007),
Hovakimian (2006), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Ozkan (2001), and Titman and Wessels
(1988) find a negative relationship between firms’ profitability and leverage and support
the pecking order theory’s prediction.
B. Tangibility
The pecking order theory suggests a negative association between tangibility and firms’
debt financing. Since compared to intangible (non-monetary) assets, such as goodwill,
trademarks, and patents, tangible assets, such as property, plant, and equipment, are
easy to value for outsiders, they low information asymmetries between firms’ management
and outside lenders. This low tangible assets-related information asymmetry reduces the
cost of issuance of new equity. Therefore, the higher tangibility inclines firms to issue
more equity, and thus the leverage ratio will be lower.53 The study by Huang and Ritter
(2009), Feidakis (2007), Leary and Roberts (2005), and Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and
Tehranian (2004) confirm the prediction of pecking theory by reporting a negative impact
of tangibility on firm debt ratio.
In contrast, the trade-off theory predict a positive impact of tangibility on debt bor-
rowing. Firms with higher tangibility are well-collateralized and risk of lending to them
is lower, and thus they can do easily debt financing. In addition, tangibility reduces the
chance for shareholders to engage in substitution of high-risk assets with low-risky ones
and hence results in lower agency costs. Lower debt-related agency costs prompt firms to
borrow more, suggesting a positive relation of leverage with the tangibility of assets. The
findings of Frank and Goyal (2009), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), Hovakimian
(2006), Alti (2006), Flannery and Rangan (2006), and Titman and Wessels (1988) are in
line with the trade-off theory.
52The trade-off theory also predict a positive relationship between profitability and leverage (Frank and
Goyal (2003)).
53If adverse selection costs associated with assets exist, then firms with higher tangibility face higher
adverse selection costs, and thus do more debt financing.
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C. Firm Size
The trade-off theory of capital structure postulates a positive relationship between leverage
and firm size. The rationale behind this predictions is that large firms are more diversified
and are likely to have a low likelihood of being bankrupt. In addition, large and relatively
older firms having good reputation in debt markets are most likely to face lower debt-
related agency costs and are in position to negotiate for borrowing at favorable interest
rates. Lower default risks, less agency costs associated with debt financing, and negotiation
power allow large firms to increase the use of debt in their capital structure.
Several empirical studies including Sibilkov (2009), Chang and Dasgupta (2009), Brav
(2009), Frank and Goyal (2009), Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008), Flannery and
Rangan (2006), and Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004) lend strong support
for the trade-off theory by proving evidence of the positive impact of firm size on firms’
leverage ratios.54 On the contrary, a negative relation of leverage with firm size is pre-
dicted by the pecking order theory. Since big firms face relatively less severe information
asymmetric problem and have more opportunities to retain earnings, they opt internal
funds over external borrowing and thus borrow less. Alternatively, since equity issues is
less costly for large firms than for small firms, large firms are likely to be less levered
(Smith (1977)). The findings of the studies such as Johnson (1998), Titman and Wessels
(1988) and Kester (1986) are in line with the pecking order theory’s prediction.
D. Stock Returns
The pecking order theory states that firms are likely to issue net equity when their share
are overvalued (Myers (1984)). Under pecking order model of corporate capital structure,
the existing of informational asymmetric conflicts between firms’ managers and outside
investors push managers to sell new equity at discounted price. Such discount can be
offered without any real loss in existing shareholders’ wealth when shares are overvalued.
Thus, managers prefer to issue new equity after increased stock prices as run-ups in stock
prices outweigh the cost of discount. This idea is reincarnated and received anew surge
of popularity in the empirical literature of corporate finance by the Graham and Harvey’s
(2001b) survey of corporate managers. They report that most of the CFOs believe that
they can issue new equity under favorable conditions when their shares price is higher.
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) also report similar observations that firms
tend to repurchase their shares when share prices are low and tend to issue new shares
when there are increases in their share prices. Welch (2004) argues that firms do not
quickly re-equilibrium (alter) their capital structure to outweigh the impact of stock price
54Ferri and Jones (1979), Friend and Lang (1988), Chung (1993), Ozkan (2001), and Mao (2003) are
among the early studies, who also report the positive impact of firm size on firms’ leverage decisions.
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fluctuations and therefore the role of stock returns is substantially significant in explaining
debt ratios. This suggests that there is an inverse relationship between leverage and stock
returns. On the empirical side, Chang and Dasgupta (2009), Bokpin (2009), Antoniou,
Guney, and Paudyal (2008), Kayhan and Titman (2007), Hovakimian (2006), Kahle and
Shastri (2005), Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004), and Korajczyk and Levy
(2003) find a significant effect of stock returns on capital structure.
E. Non-debt Tax Shields
The trade-off theory predicts a positive association between debt borrowing and tax rates.
The interest tax benefits of debt financing increase with the rate of tax. Therefore, to
acquire a higher interest tax shield, firms borrow more when the rate of tax is higher.55
However, under the model proposed by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), non-debt tax shield
proxies such as the ratio of depreciation expense to book value of total assets, investment
tax credit, and net operating loss carryforwards are considered as substitutes for the tax-
related benefits of debt financing. As a result, firms with large amounts of non-debt tax
shield relative to their cash flow are less likely to include debt in their capital structure.56
With regard to empirical evidence, several researchers Frank and Goyal (2009), Anto-
niou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008), Mao (2003), MacKie-Mason (1990), and Titman and
Wessels (1988) prove a positive relationship between debt financing and the amount of
non-debt tax shields proxied by depreciation expense to total assets ratio. In contrast,
the findings of the studies Leary and Roberts (2005), DeMiguel and Pindado (2001), and
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) confirm the negative impact of non-debt tax shield on lever-
age.
F. Market-to-Book Value
According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, the growth opportunities of firms
(the market-to-book value) are inversely related to leverage. This is because growth low-
ering free cash flow problems and increasing debt-related agency costs and the costs of
financial distress forces firms to reduce their use of debt in their capital structures. In
addition, growing firms’ stocks are overvalued and thus firms with high growth are more
likely to issue equity instead of debt, reducing their leverage ratios. Several empirical
studies including Frank and Goyal (2009), Sibilkov (2009), Chang and Dasgupta (2009),
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008), Kayhan and
Titman (2007), Alti (2006), Miao (2005), Hovakimian (2004), Mao (2003), and Rajan and
55However, one should note that in practice, tax implications for firms financing decisions are crucially
subject to the tax policy objectives. This is whether the tax system is designed to encourage dividend
payout against the retention of retained earnings or vice versa.
56However, it is important to note that a proxy such as depreciation expense to total assets ratio may
also serve as a proxy for other things than only non-debt tax shields (Titman and Wessels (1988)).
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Zingales (1995) find a negative effect of the market-to-book value on leverage supporting
trade-off theory.57
However, a positive relation of leverage with growth opportunities is expected under
the pecking order theory. The growing firms may not have enough internal recourses to
finance their all positive net present value (NPV) investments. Thus, firms may require
external financing. In the pecking order model, firms first prefer to issue debt than equity
while raising external capital. In this context, the leverage of firms increases with their
growth (see, for example, Jensen (1986), Myers (1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984)).
G. Financial Deficits
Under Myers’s (1984) and Myers-Majluf’s (1984) pecking order models, firms do not have
target debt ratios. Rather, information asymmetries and signaling problems related with
external financing force firms to use first internal funds to finance new investment. How-
ever, firms strictly prefer debt borrowing over equity issues when doing external financing
and hence this results in high debt ratios. Firms do, only as a last resort, equity financ-
ing. This suggests that leverage positively relates to financial deficits. Shyam-Sunder and
Myers (1999) construct financial deficit variable and test the pecking order hypothesis.
Consistent with the the Myers-Majluf’s model, they find that firms are likely to increase
their debt ratios by raising more external capital when they face higher financial deficit.
Analogously, Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Byoun (2008) also find that financial deficits
have a positive and robust impact on leverage. However, the findings of Frank and Goyal
(2003) are inconsistent with the Myers-Majluf’s prediction.
H. Leverage Deviations
The simple version of the target adjustment model predicts that deviations of firms’ actual
(observed) leverage ratio from the target play a significant role in explaining changes in
debt ratio. Indeed, under the assumption of symmetric cost for both leverage-decreasing
adjustments and leverage-increasing adjustments, firms have tendency to increase (de-
crease) their debt ratios when their current ratios are below (above) their target leverage.
Byoun (2008), Kayhan and Titman (2007), and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) examine
how firms’ debt ratios relate to leverage deviations from the target, where target leverage
is estimated leverage from the regression of observed leverage on the firm-specific factors.
57As in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), the investment spending of firms, which is also considered as
a proxy for firms’ growth, directly increases the financing deficit of firms, and thus it is positively related
to debt ratios according to the pecking order theory’s prediction. Besides the market-to-book value, we
include firms’ investment spending as an explanatory variable in our empirical analysis to control for the
investment opportunity sets. So that our market-to-book value proxy fully represents to the market timing
(Baker and Wurgler (2002)).
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They show that leverage deviations have a significant influence on capital structure.58
3.4 Data
In this section, we provide information on our dataset and discuss how we generate the
firm-specific and macroeconomic risk measures. Detailed information on all variables are
given in Table 3-B of Appendix B.
3.4.1 The Sample
In our investigation, we use a firm-level unbalanced annual panel dataset for the United
Kingdom. The data are obtained from the WorldScope database via DataStream and
cover the period between 1981–2009. The analysis is carried out for manufacturing firms
and each firm in the dataset contributes at least five years of observations.59,60 As in Baker
and Wurgler (2002) and Kayhan and Titman (2007), we drop firm-year observations if the
ratio of book leverage is negative or exceeds one. All remaining firm-specific variables
are scaled by total assets and are winzorised at the first and ninety-ninth percentile to
eliminate the adverse effects of outliers and misreported data.61
Following earlier empirical studies, including Baker and Wurgler (2002), Alti (2006),
and Kayhan and Titman (2007), we define book equity as total assets minus total liabilities
and preferred stock plus deferred taxes and convertible debt. Book debt is defined as total
assets less the book value of equity. Book leverage is then defined as the ratio of book debt
to total assets. Our choice of the book leverage is due to the observation that since market
leverage is very sensitive to the market value of equity and it can change substantially due
to movements in equity markets, even if firms do not alter their actual borrowing.62 In
addition, firm managers are more concerned about the book value of debt ratio because
banks and other financial institutions utilize the book value of debt in ascertaining the
creditworthiness of a firm. Similarly, credit-rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s,
58Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) and Fama and French (2002) construct the leverage deficit
with same fashion and show that firms’ debt-equity choice is significantly associated with firms’ actual
leverage deviations from the target.
59Allowing for both entry and exit in the sample, we extenuate potential sample selection and survivor
bias.
60We restrict our attention to those firms which contribute at least 5 years of observations to generate
meaningful measures of risk at the firm level and to properly instrument the endogenous variables in our
model when we implement the two-step system-GMM method.
61The data screening we implement here is commonly applied in the literature; e.g., see, including others,
Brav (2009), Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009), Kayhan and Titman (2007), and Baker and Wurgler
(2002).
62Using leverage measure based on book value is not a serious limitation because several studies in
the literature using both the book and market leverage measures have shown that both of the measures
primarily behave in similar manner. See, for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and French (2002),
and Leary and Roberts (2005). Further, recently, DeAngelo and Roll (2011) finding high correlation
between the book and market leverage conclude “that there not all that much incremental informational
in the market series”.
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Moody’s, and A.M. Best also consider the book value of debt in determining a firm’s credit
rating.63
Firm size is defined as the logarithm of net sales deflated by the GDP deflator.64 Asset
tangibility is equal to the ratio of net plant, property, and equipment to the book value of
total assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation
to the book value of total assets (Titman and Wessels (1988)). The 2-year stock return
is defined as the difference between share prices at time t and share prices at time t − 2.
The market-to-book value ratio is defined as the book value of total assets less the book
value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets
(Kayhan and Titman (2007)). Market equity is common shares outstanding multiplied by
the market price of each share. The non-debt tax shield is defined as total depreciation
expense divided by the book value of total assets.
To investigate the impact of risk on firms’ financial decisions we consider two types of
risk: firm-specific risk which is derived from firms’ sales to total asset ratio, and macroe-
conomic risk which is computed using real gross domestic product (GDP). Seasonally
adjusted quarterly data spanning 1975Q1-2009Q4 on UK real GDP are taken from the
Office for National Statistics (ONS) database (Pn: A2: ABMI: Gross Domestic Product:
chained volume measure).
3.4.2 Measuring Firm-Specific Risk
Researchers have utilized various approaches to generate measures of firm-specific risk.
Some researchers simply compute the moving standard deviation of a variable as a proxy
for risk, while others use state space models, ARCH/GARCH models, stochastic volatility
models, the intra-annual variation approach, and survey-based methods.
In this study, we estimate an autoregressive (AR) model of order one for firms’ annual
sales normalized by the book value of total assets to generate firm-specific risk based on the
residuals of the model as suggested in Bo (2002).65 Specifically, we estimate the following
model for each underlying firm:
Salesi,t = µi + ϕSalesi,t−1 + ζi,t (3.1)
where Salesi,t is the ratio of sales to book value of total assets for firm i at time t, µi is
the constant for firm i, ϕ is the autoregressive parameter, ζi,t is the error term with zero
mean and finite variance. We next obtain the residuals from the above AR(1) process for
each firm and compute the cumulative variance of the obtained residuals. Ultimately, the
63See Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) along these lines.
64Our measure of firm size is in line with Titman and Wessels (1988), Whited (1992), Rajan and Zingales
(1995), Ozkan (2001), De Jong, Kabir, and Nguyen (2008), and Huang and Ritter (2009).
65We scale sales by the book value of total assets to mitigate the problem of heterogeneity across firms.
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square root of the estimated cumulative variance, denoted by Rfirmi,t , is used as a proxy for
firm-specific risk in the empirical investigation. Given each firm is contributing at least 5
years of observations, the measure above uses a minimum of four observations to generate
the risk measure.
3.4.3 Measuring Macroeconomic Risk
To generate a proxy for macroeconomic risk, we estimate an ARCH model on quarterly
real GDP over 1975-2009. We allow an ARMA term in the mean equation of our ARCH
specification and estimate the following model:
∆GDPt = ω + η(L)∆GDPt + δ(L)t + t (3.2)
σ2t = α+ β(L)
2
t (3.3)
where ω is a constant term, η and δ are the autoregressive and moving average parameters,
respectively, and L is the polynomial lag operator. The estimated conditional variance,
σˆ2t , is the one-period-ahead forecast variance based on prior information. α is the constant
and |∆GDPt−1 ∼ N(0, σ2t−1) is the innovation in real GDP.
The model is estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The estimated con-
ditional variance, σˆ2t , is used as a measure of risk surrounding the one-quarter change in
the real GDP between time t− 1 and t. The obtained conditional variance series is then
annualized by averaging over 4-quarter periods to match the frequency of the firm level
data. The generated series is denoted by Rmacrot and used as a proxy for macroeconomic
risk.
Panel A of Table 3-C in Appendix C presents the estimated coefficients for ourARCH(1)
specification. The ARCH coefficient (β = 0.781) is less than one and is statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level of significance. Panel B of the table reports the diagnostic test
statistics. The LM and Q statistics provide evidence that the mean and variance equations
are correctly specified and there are no remaining ARCH effects left in the standardized
residuals.
3.4.4 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 provides the basic summary statistics of the firm-specific variables for the full
sample as well as three sub-periods. We observe that the book leverage, which has a mean
of 0.574 for the full sample, has increased over time suggesting that firms, on average,
were less levered and were not actively involved in altering their leverage in the 1980s in
comparison to the later years of the sample period.
The average fixed capital expenditures (investment) to the book value of total assets
ratio is 0.059 for the entire sample period. In contrast to the leverage, it appears that the
82
investment rate has declined over the sample period. Similar patterns can be observed for
firms’ profitability. On average, firms were more profitable during the first ten years of the
sample period. Reductions in average profitability during the last nine years of the sample
could be one of the reasons why firms’ fixed capital investment, on average, declined.
The average 2-year stock return is 0.098 for the full sample period, yet, it is negative,
on average, with a value of -0.134 but with a high standard deviation during the last nine
years of the sample period. The 1990s happens to be a period when firms’ share prices have
risen as the average stock returns are positive and higher than the other two sub-periods.
The mean values of tangibility and firm size, measured by the log of total net sales, are
0.287 and 11.141, respectively, for the whole sample period. Inspecting the behavior of
both variables, we see that while the means of both series monotonically declined, their
volatility increased over time. Finally, we observe that the average non-debt tax shield for
the full sample is 0.052, yet, it exhibits increasing trends over the years.
Overall, the summary statistics across the three sub-periods show that firms are rela-
tively more-leveraged, earn less returns on their assets, have less fixed investment expen-
ditures, and have declining trends in their share values in the later years of the sample,
particularly over the 2001-09 period than the earlier sub-periods.
Table 3.2 provides the summary statistics of our risk measures for the full and the
sub-samples. The table shows that firm-specific risk has consistently increased over time.
Specifically, the average firm-specific risk during the 1980s and 1990s was considerably
less than that of the 2001-09 period. We also observe that firm-specific risk was more
volatile during the last nine years of the sample as its standard deviation is higher in these
years compared to the 1980s and the 1990s. This implies that firms experienced greater
risks associated with their sales in the latter years of the sample. Similar to the case of
firm-specific risk, the macroeconomic risk also appears to be on the rise throughout the
period of investigation. Further, the estimates of the standard deviations provide evidence
that the overall macroeconomic environment is more volatile over the 2001-2009 period as
compared to earlier years. That is, in the last 9-year period, the average macroeconomic
risk was not only high but it was also very volatile.
In summary, both macroeconomic risk and firm-specific risk have increased markedly
and became more volatile over the recent years. This observation makes sense as the
financial crisis toward the end of the data took its toll on businesses and the economy. One
last question that we must clarify is that to what extent firm-specific and macroeconomic
risks carry similar information. The answer is not much as we find little correlation between
the two series (0.002) which is statistically insignificant. Low correlation implies that each
measure covers a different aspect of risk associated with the business and macroeconomic
environment that firms face in their operations.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Firm-Specific Factors
The second, third and fourth columns of Table 3.1 report the firm-year observations (N), mean
and standard deviation (S.D) of the firm-specific variables, respectively. The last three columns
of the table report the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the firm-specific variables. The variables
are defined as follows. Book leverage is the ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value
of total assets. The market-to-book value ratio is defined as the book value of total assets less
the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets.
Investment is the ratio of total expenditures to purchase fixed tangible assets to the total book
assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to the total
book assets. Tangibility is defined as the ratio of net plant, property, and equipment to the total
book assets. The 2-year stock return is the difference between share prices at time t and share
prices at time t−2. Firm size is defined as the logarithm of net sales deflated by the GDP deflator.
The non-debt tax shield is defined as total depreciation expense divided by the book value of total
assets. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange
at any point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope database via
DataStream.
Variables N Mean S.D P25 Median P75
Book Leverage
1981-90 1546 0.506 0.176 0.401 0.504 0.608
1991-00 4387 0.556 0.317 0.379 0.522 0.661
2001-09 7841 0.598 0.568 0.332 0.509 0.689
1981-2009 13774 0.574 0.469 0.358 0.513 0.669
Market-to-Book Value
1981-90 1434 1.491 0.773 1.005 1.279 1.722
1991-00 4171 2.241 2.691 1.095 1.528 2.242
2001-09 7120 1.987 1.807 1.033 1.424 2.178
1981-2009 12725 2.014 2.077 1.047 1.437 2.136
Investment
1981-90 1917 0.084 0.062 0.042 0.066 0.107
1991-00 4456 0.066 0.059 0.028 0.051 0.083
2001-09 7766 0.049 0.062 0.012 0.029 0.059
1981-2009 14139 0.059 0.063 0.018 0.041 0.076
Profitability
1981-90 1904 0.166 0.087 0.117 0.161 0.211
1991-00 4425 0.096 0.257 0.073 0.137 0.197
2001-09 7852 0.001 0.399 -0.007 0.097 0.164
1981-2009 14181 0.053 0.337 0.049 0.121 0.184
2-year Stock Returns
1981-90 1421 0.283 1.187 -0.442 0.288 0.873
1991-00 3932 0.427 1.351 -0.439 0.438 1.236
2001-09 6715 -0.134 1.722 -1.171 0.113 1.072
1981-2009 12068 0.098 1.575 -0.789 0.249 1.098
Tangibility
1981-90 1922 0.362 0.196 0.229 0.324 0.468
1991-00 4460 0.348 0.228 0.176 0.311 0.459
2001-09 7907 0.235 0.234 0.050 0.152 0.348
1981-2009 14289 0.287 0.235 0.090 0.243 0.417
Firm Size
1981-90 1931 11.761 1.986 10.321 11.600 13.267
1991-00 4465 11.229 2.210 9.737 11.019 12.653
2001-09 7932 10.941 2.381 9.155 10.805 12.485
1981-2009 14328 11.141 2.295 9.486 11.003 12.654
Non-debt Tax Shields
1981-90 1904 0.036 0.026 0.022 0.032 0.044
1991-00 4425 0.046 0.121 0.025 0.038 0.054
2001-09 7852 0.052 0.095 0.022 0.038 0.059
1981-2009 14181 0.048 0.098 0.023 0.037 0.055
84
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Risk Measures
The second and third columns of Table 3.2 report the mean and standard deviation (S.D) of firm-
specific and macroeconomic risk, respectively. The last three columns of the table report the 25th,
50th, and 75th percentiles of the risk measures. Firm-specific risk is constructed using data on
firms’ sales estimating the following model for each underlying firm:
Salesi,t = µi + ϕ(L)Salesi,t + ζi,t
where Salesi,t denotes the ratio of sales to the book value of total assets for firm i at time t, µi is
the constant for firm i, ϕ is the autoregressive parameter, L is the polynomial lag operator, ζi,t
is the error term with zero mean and finite variance. Residuals obtained from this regression are
then used to calculate the cumulative variance for each firm. The square root of the cumulative
variance is used as a proxy for firm-specific risk.
Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the pe-
riod under investigation. In order to generate the conditional variance, we estimate the following
ARCH model:
∆GDPt = ω + η(L)∆GDPt + δ(L)t + t
σ2t = α+ β(L)
2
t
where ω is a constant term, η and δ are the autoregressive and moving average parameters,
respectively, and L is the polynomial lag operator. The estimated conditional variance, σ̂2t ,
is the one-period-ahead forecast variance based on prior information. α is the constant and
|∆GDPt−1 ∼ N(0, σ2t−1) is the innovation in real GDP. In the variance equation, the weights
are (1-α, β) and the long-run average variance is
√
α/(1− β), where α > 0 and 0 < β < 1. The
sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point
over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope database via DataStream.
Quarterly data spanning 1975Q1-2009Q4 on seasonally adjusted UK real GDP are taken from the
Office for National Statistics (ONS) database (Pn: A2: ABMI: Gross Domestic Product: chained
volume measure).
Variables Mean S.D P25 Median P75
Firm-Specific Risk
1981-90 0.241 0.287 0.093 0.161 0.289
1991-00 0.262 0.249 0.118 0.192 0.319
2001-09 0.349 0.503 0.135 0.232 0.399
1981-2009 0.309 0.418 0.124 0.212 0.359
Macroeconomic Risk
1981-90 1.133 0.916 1.455 1.221 1.458
1991-00 1.328 0.385 1.013 1.323 1.411
2001-09 1.884 1.403 1.189 1.556 2.172
1981-2009 1.779 1.002 1.172 1.440 1.958
3.5 Empirical Models
In this section, we first present a standard augmented leverage model which incorporates
firm-specific and macroeconomic risk measures that we use to compute the target leverage
of firms. We then describe the standard partial-adjustment model and a specific form of
the target adjustment model with full (100%) adjustment speed that we use to estimate
the speed of adjustment toward a target while we take into account the effects of risk. We
finally present an extended version of the adjustment model which allows us to investigate
the asymmetric effects of risk in conjunction with firms’ financial imbalances and deviations
85
of firms’ actual leverage from the target on the adjustment of firms’ capital structure.
3.5.1 The Impact of Risk on Adjustment Speed
We start our examination estimating a standard leverage model augmented by firm-specific
and macroeconomic risk measures to compute the firm-specific target debt ratio, LTit. We
then use this information to quantify the effects of risk on the adjustment process following
earlier work including that of Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Fama and French
(2002), Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon, Roberts,
and Zender (2008), Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008), Brav (2009), Frank and Goyal
(2009), Huang and Ritter (2009), and Goyal, Nova, and Zanetti (2011). Specifically, we
estimate the following model to compute the target leverage:
LTi,t = β1Xi,t−1 + β2R
firm
i,t−1 + β3R
macro
t−1 + υi + εi,t (3.4)
where Xit is a vector of firm-specific variables that includes the market-book-value ratio,
profitability, tangibility, capital investment expenditures-to-total assets ratio, the 2-year
stock returns, non-debt tax shields, the log of firms’ sales as a proxy for firm size, and
the lagged dependent variable. Rfirmi,t and R
macro
t depict time-varying firm-specific and
macroeconomic risks, respectively. The term υi captures time-invariant unobservable firm-
specific fixed effects. The term εi,t is the error term. The subscripts i and t denote firm
and time, respectively.
A Partial-Adjustment Model of Capital Structure
Once we obtain the firm-specific target leverage it is possible to investigate the adjust-
ment process of leverage toward the target using equation (3.5) below.66 This equation
captures the effects of transactions costs which prevent firms from carrying out frequent
adjustments in their leverage through the adjustment coefficient, φ, as follows:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = φ(LTi,t − Li,t−1) (3.5)
where Li,t is the observed (actual) leverage of firm i in year t. If there exists some positive
costs of adjustment then the adjustment coefficient, φ, should strictly lie between zero
and one. However, if the adjustment costs are significantly higher than the cost of being
off the target, the adjustment coefficient would not be statistically different from zero.
Substituting equation (3.4) into equation (3.5) and rearranging, we obtain the following
66Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) estimate a target adjustment model to similar one presented in
equation (3.5.)
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reduced-form partial adjustment model:67
Li,t = λLi,t−1 + φβ1Xi,t−1 + φβ2R
firm
i,t−1 + φβ3R
macro
t−1 + φυi + φεi,t (3.6)
where λ = 1− φ. Thus, the speed of adjustment (SOA) is given by φ = 1− λˆ, where λˆ is
the estimated coefficeint. The coefficient on the lagged leverage (λ) measures how quickly
firms adjust their capital structure to attain their target leverage and it is expected to be
less than 1. If the cost of staying away from the target is higher (lower) than the cost of
adjustment, the value of the coefficient on the lagged leverage would be smaller (larger)
and hence the speed of adjustment will be faster (slower).
To test for possibility that risk affects the speed of capital adjustment process, we
augment equation (3.6) by including an interaction variable between both measures of
risk and one-period lagged leverage (the lagged dependent variable).68 The model now
takes the following form:
Li,t = λLi,t−1 + λLi,t−1 ×Rfirmi,t−1 + λLi,t−1 ×Rmacrot−1 + φβ1Xi,t−1
+ φβ2R
firm
i,t−1 + φβ3R
macro
t−1 + φυi + φεi,t (3.7)
Given the modification in the standard model, we can compute the speed of adjustment
at various (high, median, and low) levels of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk where
these levels are based on the quartiles of each risk measure for our sample period.
3.5.2 Risk and the Speed of Adjustment: Controlling for Deviations from the
Target Leverage
A Modified Standard Adjustment Model of Capital Structure
If a firm’s actual leverage happens to be above its target, the firm should either reduce its
use of debt or issue new equity to move toward its target. Whereas, if a firm’s leverage
is below its target, the firm can repurchase equity or issue more debt to move toward
its target leverage. However, the speed with which firms adjust their capital structure
depends on whether firms are above or below their target leverage ratio along with the
risk structure of the environment. Indeed, firms are expected to adjust their leverage
asymmetrically as the risk structure of the environment within which firms operate will
render firm to give different weights to positive and negative deviations of actual leverage
from the target. Hence, we modify equation (3.5) by interacting our risk measures with
indicators that capture the state of current leverage with respect to target leverage.69 The
67Several prior empirical papers estimate the reduced-form partial adjustment model to examine firms’
adjustment speed. Examples of these papers include studies by Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon,
Roberts, and Zender (2008), Frank and Goyal (2009), Huang and Ritter (2009), Cook and Tang (2010),
and Elsas and Florysiak (2011).
68See, for example, Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) who study the effects of size and growth on the
speed of adjustment within a similar structure to ours.
69Byoun (2008) specifies a target-adjustment model in a similar manner to analyze asymmetry in capital
structure adjustments conditional on firm characteristics.
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results model takes the following form:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dabovi,t + β2Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t + (β3Dabovi,t + β4Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t ×Rfirmi,t−1
+ (β5D
abov
i,t + β6D
belo
i,t )DV Ti,t ×Rmacrot−1 + υi + εi,t (3.8)
where DV Ti,t = L
T
i,t − Li,t−1 denotes the deviation of the firm’s actual leverage from the
target leverage at time t, where LT is computed from equation (3.4) above. Dabovi,t is a
dummy variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is above the target and zero otherwise
for firm i at time t. Similarly, Dbeloi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if leverage is below
the target and zero otherwise.
This model allows one to investigate the speed of adjustment as firms go through
periods of higher or lower risk when leverage exceeds or falls short of the target. In
general, we know that if the adjustment of equity is costlier than debt and if firm leverage
is above target, then the firm adjusts its capital structure to attain its target debt ratio
by retiring debt. However, the risk structure of the environment within which the firm
operates affects the costs and benefits of adjusting a firm’s leverage toward a target, which
in turn affects the speed of adjustment.
3.5.3 Risk and the Speed of Adjustment: Controlling for Deviations from the
Target Leverage and Financial Deficits/Surpluses
According to the Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order model, there is a hierarchy in
firms’ financing decisions. Several researchers, among others Leary and Roberts (2005) and
Strebulaev (2007) empirically show that firms prefer to use internally generated funds (e.g.,
retained earnings) over external financing and debt over equity. Analogously, Hovakimian,
Opler, and Titman (2001), and Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004) provide
empirical evidence that firms prefer to use internal funds over external funds even when
they have a target leverage. Frank and Goyal (2003) document that an imbalance in cash
flows plays a central role in the pecking order.
Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Byoun (2008) empirically examine the role of financial
deficits in changes in the debt ratio and the speed of adjustment, respectively. Specifically,
Kayhan and Titman (2007) report that financial deficits have a strong influence on capital
structure which are partly reversed over long horizons. Furthermore, they report that
the effect of financial status on capital structure is relatively more substantial when firms
raise capital (i.e., firms have financial deficits) than when firms retire external capital
(i.e., firms have financial surpluses). Byoun (2008) proposes a financial needs-induced
adjustment framework to investigate how firms adjust their capital structure toward target
debt levels. He finds that firms adjust their leverage faster when their leverage is above the
target as they experience a financial surplus, or when their leverage is below the target
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while they experience a financial deficit. Given the empirical evidence, it appears that
firms are more likely to adjust their capital structure toward their target debt levels when
they face imbalances in their cash flows (financial deficits or surpluses). However, none
of the earlier work allows for risk to exert an impact on the adjustment process as firms
experience changes in their financial state and actual leverage with respect to a target.
To test the effects of risk on the capital adjustment process as firms experience changes
in their financial sate, we follow Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Byoun (2008) and cal-
culate the imbalances in cash flows (financial deficits/surpluses) utilizing the cash flow
identity below:
CFi,t − CAPEi,t −∆WCi,t ≡ DIVi,t −∆di,t −∆ei,t (3.9)
where CFi,t is the operating cash flow after interest and taxes, CAPEi,t denotes capital
expenditures, ∆WCi,t denotes changes in working capital, DIVi,t denotes payments of div-
idends, ∆di,t is equal to net debt issues and ∆ei,t denotes net equity issues.
70 Rearranging
equation (3.9), it is possible to define a firm’s financial deficit (FDi,t) as below:
FDi,t = CAPEi,t + ∆WCi,t +DIVi,t − CFi,t ≡ ∆di,t + ∆ei,t (3.10)
A negative value of FDi,t implies a financial surplus (i.e., the firm invests less than
the internally generated cash). A positive FDi,t implies a financial deficit (i.e., the firm
invests more than the internally generated cash). In order to examine how risk affects
the impact of financial deficits and surpluses on the speed of adjustment, we augment
equation (3.8) by incorporating an interaction term between our measures of risk, above-
and below-target leverage indicators, and the financial status of the firm as given in the
following equation:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dsuri,t Dabovi,t + β2Ddefi,t Dabovi,t + β3Dsuri,t Dbeloi,t + β4Ddefi,t Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t
+ (β5D
sur
i,t D
abov
i,t + β6D
def
i,t D
abov
i,t + β7D
sur
i,t D
belo
i,t + β8D
def
i,t D
belo
i,t )DV Ti,t ×Rfirmi,t
+ (β9D
sur
i,t D
abov
i,t + β10D
def
i,t D
abov
i,t + β11D
sur
i,t D
belo
i,t + β12D
def
i,t D
belo
i,t )DV Ti,t ×Rmacroi,t
+ (β13D
sur
i,t + β14D
def
i,t ) + υi + εi,t (3.11)
As defined earlier, DV Ti,t = L
T
i,t−Li,t−1, where LTi,t is the estimated target leverage ratio
for firm i at time t. Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the actual leverage ratio
is above the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time t. Dbeloi,t is a dummy variable
equal to one if the leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time
70Net equity issues are defined as the ratio of the change in book equity minus the change in retained
earnings to total assets. Newly retained earnings are the change in balance sheet retained earnings during
an accounting year period divided by the book value of total assets. Net debt issues are then defined as
the ratio of the change in total assets to total assets less the sum of net equity issues and newly retained
earnings.
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t. Dsuri,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial surplus at time
t and zero otherwise, and Ddefi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the ith firm has a
financial deficit at time t and zero otherwise. Rfirmi,t is a measure of time-varying firm-
specific risk and Rmacrot is a measure of time-varying macroeconomic risk. The term υi
captures firm-specific fixed effects and the term εi,t represents the time-varying residuals.
3.6 Estimation
Several researcher have earlier used OLS methodology to estimate speed of the adjust-
ment toward target capital structure. However, a model which incorporates the lagged
dependent variable as an explanatory variable requires the use of an instrumental variable
technique because the error term will not be orthogonal to the lagged dependent variable.
In this instance, the use of OLS approach would yield biased results.71 Specifically, be-
cause the OLS coefficient of the lagged dependent variable will be biased upward, the speed
of adjustment toward the target capital structure will be underestimated. Also, when a
model contains the lagged dependent variable as a regressor, the use of fixed-effects esti-
mator would not be recommended as this approach yields a downward bias on the estimate
of the lagged dependent variable leading to overestimating the speed of adjustment.72
In our case, similar to Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008) and Lemmon, Roberts,
and Zender (2008), and others, we apply the the system GMM estimator to estimate the
reduced-form partial adjustment model of capital structure. The system-GMM technique
removes the time-invariant unobservable firm-specific effects by taking the first difference of
each underlying variable effectively controlling for the correlation between the regressors
and the residuals. In addition, using the system GMM method, one can mitigate the
possibility of endogeneity by instrumenting differenced equations with lagged levels of the
variables and equations in levels with the lags of the first-differences of the variables.
However, in the context of GMM estimation the use of deeper lags may not provide
enough additional information, and the use of extra instruments may lead to the problem
of “many instruments” relative to the sample size, which weakens the power of the overi-
dentification test (Roodman (2009a)). Here, we confirm the validity of the instruments
by implementing the J test of Hansen (1982). We also apply the Arellano-Bond test,
AR(2), to examine the presence of second-order serial correlation in the residuals. These
diagnostic test statistics along with the number of firms and the firm-year observations are
reported in Panel B of each table that we present below. The J statistics show that the
instruments used for the system-GMM estimator are valid and satisfy the orthogonality
71Hsiao (2003) presents the derivation of the bias due to the use of an OLS estimator in the presence of
the lagged dependent variable.
72See Nickell (1981), Bond (2002), and Judson and Owen (1999) for more on related issues.
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conditions. The serial correlation tests provide evidence for the absence of second-order
serial correlation in the residuals. Thus, we claim that the instruments we use in the
estimation are valid for each underlying model. For the sake of consistency and brevity,
we, therefore, do not comment further on these aspects when we discuss our results.73
3.6.1 Risk Effects on Target Leverage
We start our empirical analysis by estimating equation (3.4) which yields the target lever-
age of firms. Table 3.3 shows that the coefficient of lagged leverage is statistically sig-
nificant. That is, firms which currently use debt financing continue to borrow in the
following period as well. Looking at the remaining firm-specific determinants of leverage,
we find that leverage is positively affected by an increase in investment expenditures, the
profitability of firms, firm size, and the non-debt tax shield. We also observe that stock
returns, tangibility, and the market-to-book value of the firm have a negative and signifi-
cant effect on leverage. Overall, our results relating to the effects of firm-specific variables,
in terms of both sign and statistical significance, are consistent with the earlier research.74
Hence, we do not expand on these observations.
Table 3.3 shows that firm-specific risk has a negative and significant effect on firms’
leverage. Given positive bankruptcy costs and given that an increase in idiosyncratic risk
leads to an increase in the probability of default, firms reduce their borrowing in times of
heightened idiosyncratic risk. Table 3.3 also provides evidence that macroeconomic risk
exerts a negative impact on leverage confirming the idea that firms reduce their leverage
during periods of high risk to reduce their exposure to macroeconomic risks. During
periods of high macroeconomic risk firms’ cash flows deteriorates and the likelihood of
bankruptcy and financial distress increases inducing firms to use sources of finance other
than debt to mitigate the cost of financial distress. The negative sensitivity of firms’ target
leverage to macroeconomic and idiosyncratic risks is consistent with the earlier literature.
Overall, our results suggest that an increase in firm-specific risk or macroeconomic risk
causes firms to reduce the use of debt. It appears that to avoid financial distress and the
risk of bankruptcy, firms reduce their leverage at times of high risk. In summary, Table
3.3 provides evidence that firms consider both firm-specific risk as well as macroeconomic
73To further ensuring the robustness of the system GMM estimates, we test time-series properties of the
underlying variables. In particular, we test for the presence of unit roots because of two reasons. First,
we use relatively long-span data here, spanning a 29-year period. Using a long span of data increases the
possibility that the series of interest may contain a unit root. Second, despite the system GMM estimator
effectively accounts for persistency in dependent variable, it considers moment conditions valid under
stationary data. Specifically, we apply the Fisher-type panel-data unit-root tests. The results are given in
Table 3-D of Appendix D. The test statistics do not provide any significant evidence of the existence of a
unit root in the underlying series.
74For instance, among others, see Huang and Ritter (2009), Brav (2009), Baum, Stephan, and Talavera
(2009), Brav (2009), Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008), Frank and Goyal (2004), Korajczyk and Levy
(2003), Ozkan (2001), and Titman and Wessels (1988).
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Table 3.3: Robust Two-step System-GMM Estimates for the Determinants of
Leverage
Table 3.3 reports the robust two-step system-GMM estimation results of the impact of risk on leverage for
the following model:
Li,t = β0 + β1Xi,t−1 + β2R
firm
i,t−1 + β3R
macro
i,t−1 + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of the book leverage of firm i in year t. Xi,t is a vector of the firm-specific variables.
Rfirmi,t is a measure of time-varying firm-specific risk. R
macro
t is a measure of time-varying macroeconomic
risk. The term υi captures the effects of time-invariant unobservable firm-specific factors such as reputation
and capital intensity. The term εi,t represents the time-varying residuals. Subscripts i and t denote firm
and time period, respectively. The variables are defined as follows. Book leverage is the ratio of the book
value of total debt to the book value of total assets. The market-to-book value ratio is defined as the book
value of the total book assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the
book value of total assets. Investment is the ratio of total expenditures to purchase fixed tangible assets to
the book value of total assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation
to the total book assets. Tangibility is the ratio of net plant, property, and equipment to the total book
assets. The 2-year stock return is the difference between share prices at time t and share prices at time t−2.
Firm size is defined as the logarithm of net sales deflated by the GDP deflator. The non-debt tax shield is
defined as total depreciation expense divided by the book value of total assets. Firm-specific risk is drawn
from sales of firms. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the
period under investigation. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock
Exchange at any point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope database via
DataStream. Panel B reports the number of firms, the firm-year observations, the J statistics, which is a
test of the over identifying restrictions, the Arellano-Bond test, AR(2), for second-order autocorrelation in
the first-differenced residuals, and firm-year observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation results
Regressors Coefficient Std. Error
Leveragei,t−1 0.688 (0.093)***
Market-to-Booki,t−1 -0.011 (0.005)**
Investmenti,t−1 0.402 (0.128)***
Profitabilityi,t−1 0.251 (0.130)**
Tangibilityi,t−1 -0.429 (0.135)***
Firm Sizei,t−1 0.034 (0.013)***
2-year Stock Returni,t−1 -0.120 (0.016)***
Non-debt Tax Shieldsi,t−1 0.772 (0.388)**
Rfirmi,t−1 -0.101 (0.032)**
Rmacrot−1 -0.006 (0.002)***
Constant -0.245 (0.124)**
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 10,882
Firm 997
AR(2) -0.890
p-value 0.373
J-statistic 57.620
p-value 0.379
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risk in determination of their capital structure.
3.6.2 The Role of Risk on the Speed of Adjustment in Achieving Target
Leverage
In this section, we examine the effects of risk on the speed of adjustment toward target
leverage using an extended reduced-form partial adjustment model, as shown in equation
(3.7). This model incorporates the interaction terms between risk measures and the lagged
dependent variable into the standard adjustment model of leverage and enables us to
calculate the speed of adjustment toward the target leverage at different levels of risk.
Table 3.4 presents the estimates of the speed of adjustment toward target capital
structure at low, median, and high levels of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk. The
fourth column of the table reports the standard errors and the last column gives the half-
life, the time required for a deviation from target leverage ratio to be halved. We compute
half life as ln(0.5)/ln(1 − φ), where φ is the estimate of the speed of adjustment toward
the target.
This table shows that an increase in any type of risk leads to a slow down in the capital
structure adjustments. That is, as a firm experiences higher risk, regardless of its source,
the speed of adjustment toward the target will be slower. In particular, we find that firms
tend to adjust their capital structure faster toward their target leverage (with a speed of
45.2% per year) in periods when both types of risk are set to zero. This finding suggests
that it will take a firm about 1.15 years to adjust half of the deviation from its target once
perturbed by a shock when there is no firm-specific and macroeconomic risk. In contrast,
the adjustment in leverage is relatively slower (35.7% per year) when both types of risk
are high.75
The table shows that for a given level of firm specific risk, an increase in macroeconomic
risk slows down the capital adjustment process. For instance, when the firm-specific risk is
at its medium level, the half life of deviations will be between 1.37 to 1.46 years to correct
the misalignment of target capital structure caused by a shock depending on the extent of
macroeconomic risk: the higher the macroeconomic risk the slower the adjustment. In the
case of high levels of firm-specific risk, the half life of deviations further slows down and
spans the range between 1.47 to 1.57 years depending on the level of macroeconomic risk.
This implies that although firms have a target capital structure, revisions to the target
are delayed when either type of risk is on the rise.
This observation suggests that those firms that are relatively uncertain about their
75At both ends of the range, the speed of adjustment is slightly slower than that estimated by Cook and
Tang (2010) for US manufacturing firms in good and bad times of the economy. However, this difference
may be due to the fact that Cook and Tang (2010) use a fixed effects mean difference estimator to calculate
the speed of adjustment, which biases the estimated speed of adjustment coefficient upward and hence the
half life downwards.
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sales figures are likely to stay away from their targets because the cost of adjusting toward
the target leverage tends to exceed the adjustment benefits. In contrast, for those firms
that are relatively more certain about their own business activities, it is a priority to adjust
their capital structure toward the target.
The estimates suggest that given the firm-specific risk, firms revert relatively faster to
the target leverage in periods when macroeconomic risk is relatively low. Faster adjust-
ment in times of low macroeconomic risk makes sense as firms find it easier to alter their
capital structure by either issuing external capital (new equity and debt issues) or retiring
external capital over periods of stable economic environment. In other words, firms align
their capital structure to the desired capital structure at a higher pace in states of low
macroeconomic risk rather than in states of high macroeconomic risk, timing issuance of
equity. Panel A in Figure 3.1 illustrates these patterns.
The estimates of the speed of adjustment suggest that both the trade-off model and the
market timing model have a significant role to play in explaining the dynamics of capital
structure. In periods of low risk, the observation of fast adjustment supports the trade-off
models in that firms quickly shake-off the effects of a shock to trace back to their target
capital structure. In periods of high risk, however, low speed of adjustment to targets
provides evidence that firms do not immediately adjust their capital structure toward the
target, supporting the predictions of the market timing theory of capital structure. In
other words, firms time both equity and debt markets as firms are more likely to issue or
retire their financial securities during periods of stable economic environment.76
Although the results shown in Table 3.4 provide evidence that risk impacts the capital
structure adjustment mechanism, they do not allow us to comment on whether the speed
of adjustment is more sensitive to risk when firm leverage is below or above the target
leverage. That is, firms with above-target leverage could adjust at a different speed than
those with below-target leverage as firms in each categories have different adjustment
costs and benefits, implying the presence of asymmetric adjustment speeds. Therefore,
we next estimate the extended version of adjustment model of capital structure enabling
us to examine the impacts of risk on the speed of adjustment for firms with above- and
below-target leverage while we allow for asymmetric adjustment.
76Flannery and Rangan (2006) estimating a relatively high speed of adjustment provide support for
the trade-off models, whereas, Fama and French (2002) find low speed of adjustment toward the target
and support the pecking order theory. However, Huang and Ritter (2009) argue that the slow speed of
adjustment is attributed to the market timing theory.
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Table 3.4: Effects of Risk on the Speed of Adjustment (SOA)
Table 3.4 reports the estimates of the speed of adjustment. To estimate the adjustment speeds,
we calculate the total derivatives at low (25th percentile), median (50th percentile), and high (75th
percentile) levels of risk for the following model estimated by the robust two-step system-GMM
estimator:
Li,t = (1− φ)Li,t−1 + (1− φ)Li,t−1.Rfirmi,t−1 + (1− φ)Li,t−1.Rmacrot−1 + φβ1Xi,t−1
+ φβ2R
firm
i,t−1 + φβ3R
macro
t−1 + φυi + φεi,t
where Li,t is a measure of the book leverage of firm i in year t. Xi,t is a vector of the firm-specific
variables. Rfirmi,t is a measure of time-varying firm-specific risk. R
macro
t is a measure of time-varying
macroeconomic risk. The term υi captures the effects of time-invariant unobservable firm-specific
factors such as reputation and capital intensity. The term εi,t represents the time-varying residuals.
Subscripts i and t denote firm and time period, respectively. The half-life, the time required for
a deviation from the target leverage ratio to be halved, is computed as ln(0.5)/ln(1 − φ), where
φ is the estimate of the speed of adjustment toward target leverage. The variables are defined as
follows. Book leverage is the ratio of book value of total debt to the book value of total assets.
The market-to-book value ratio is defined as the total book assets less the book value of equity
plus the market value of equity divided by the total book assets. Investment is the ratio of total
expenditures to purchase fixed tangible assets to the total book assets. Profitability is the ratio of
earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to the book value of total assets. Tangibility is
the ratio of net plant, property, and equipment to the book value of total assets. The 2-year stock
return is the difference between share prices at time t and share prices at time t − 2. Firm size
is defined as the logarithm of net sales deflated by the GDP deflator. The non-debt tax shields is
defined as total depreciation expense divided by the total book assets. Firm-specific risk is drawn
from sales of firms. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP
over the period under investigation. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on
the London Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from
the WorldScope database via DataStream. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Firm-Specific Macroeconomic SOA Estimated Half-Life
Risk (Rfirmi,t ) Risk (R
macro
t ) (%) Std. Error Years
High High 35.7 (0.037)*** 1.57
High Median 36.9 (0.039)*** 1.51
High Low 37.5 (0.040)*** 1.47
Median High 37.7 (0.047)*** 1.46
Median Median 37.5 (0.049)*** 1.41
Median Low 39.9 (0.050)*** 1.37
Low High 39.8 (0.055)*** 1.37
Low Median 40.2 (0.056)*** 1.35
Low Low 40.7 (0.057)*** 1.33
Zero Zero 45.2 (0.072)*** 1.15
3.6.3 Effects of Risk on the Speed of Adjustment: Controlling for Deviations
from the Target Leverage
The main focus of this subsection is to address the following two issues. i) Do firms
weigh/consider deviations of actual leverage from their targets differently in times of risk?
ii) Does risk have differential effects for firms with above-target leverage and firms with
below-target leverage? To answer these questions, we estimate an augmented version of
the adjustment model of capital structure as given in equation (3.8), where deviations
from the target as well as risk measures are interacted with the above-target (Dabovi,t ) and
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the below-target (Dbeloi,t ) dummies.
77
In general, if a firm’s actual leverage exceeds its target, then the firm can adjust its
capital structure to reach the target debt ratio by retiring debt or by issuing new equity.
In contrast, if a firm’s leverage is below its target, then we would expect that the firm can
restructure its capital structure by issuing more new debt or repurchasing equity. One
can suggest that the best time to adjust the capital structure of the firm is when both
business and macroeconomic risks are at their lowest. However, given firms experience
different levels of macroeconomic and business risks at any point in time, managers must
weigh deviations from the target leverage differently as either type of risk varies.
3.6.3.1 Marginal Effects of Risk
Table 3.5 presents the results for equation (3.8). In estimating equation (3.8), we first set
both risk measures to zero to obtain a benchmark. Results for this set are given in Model 1.
The benchmark results show that firms with above-target leverage (DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t ) adjust
their capital structure faster than the firms with below-target leverage (DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t ).
These findings for the firms in UK are in line with those of Byoun (2008), who concentrates
on the US manufacturing firms.
Model 2 incorporates the effect of risk into the baseline specification and shows that
firm-specific and macroeconomic risk have asymmetric effects on the speed of adjustment,
depending on whether the actual leverage exceeds or falls short of the target leverage.
Specifically, we observe that the impact of firm-specific risk interacted with the below-
target indicator (DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1) is negative and statistically significant. This im-
plies that heightened firm-level risk deters firms from adjusting their capital structure
toward their targets. In contrast, the impact of firm-specific risk when actual leverage is
above-target (DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1) is positive, but not statistically significant. This result
suggests that firm-specific risk decelerates the capital structure adjustment process only
when the actual leverage of firms lies below the target.
When we turn to inspect the role of macroeconomic risk, we observe that it has a signif-
icant role in firm leverage adjustment decisions regardless of whether the actual leverage
is above or below the target. We find that macroeconomic risk has a negative impact
on the adjustment speed of firms with above-target leverage (DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
macro
t−1 < 0),
whereas it has a positive effect on the adjustment process of firms with below-target lever-
age (DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
macro
t−1 > 0). These results suggest that firms having actual leverage
above (below) the target are likely to adjust their leverage slowly (quickly) toward the
77Recall that the above-target (Dabovi,t ) dummy is set to one if the firm’s observed leverage ratio is above
its estimated target leverage and zero otherwise. The below-target (Dbeloi,t ) dummy is set to one if the firm’s
observed leverage ratio is below its estimated target leverage and zero otherwise.
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target in periods when macroeconomic risk is high.
3.6.3.2 The Speed of Adjustment
Table 3.5 shows that the capital structure adjustment process is asymmetric and it is re-
lated to both risk and the level of the actual leverage of firms in comparison to their
leverage targets. Given the estimates in Table 3.5, we next compute the speed of adjust-
ment when risk takes high, medium, and low levels for firms with above- and below-target
leverage, and report these values in Table 3.6. Note that the adjustment speeds are sta-
tistically different from zero for each firm category and vary as both types of risk change
when firms’ actual leverage is above or below the target leverage.
Inspecting Table 3.6, we see that the speed of adjustment for the benchmark model
with above target leverage is greater (yielding a lower half-life) than the remaining cases
when risk is introduced. In fact, the table presents an interesting ordering of the speed
of adjustment estimates as risk about firms’ own business activity and macroeconomic
conditions takes different levels. Specifically, it turns out that in the presence of both
types of risk, the speed of adjustment is highest (lowest half-life) when macroeconomic
risk is low and that there is a monotonic increase as firm specific risk is increased from
low to medium and high levels within each level of macroeconomic risk. That is, when
macroeconomic risk is low, the highest speed of adjustment is recorded when firm specific
risk is high and the lowest value is recorded when firm-specific risk is low. Hence, as
illustrated in Panel B of Figure 3.1, it seems that firms with above-target leverage adjust
their capital structure faster in times of low macroeconomic risk and high firm-specific
risk.78
Also note that as firm-specific risk gets higher, the speed of adjustment gets faster
because firms adjust their capital structure quicker possibly by retiring their debt as their
leverage is already above target. When we look at the evidence as we sort out results with
respect to the level of firm-specific risk, for each level of firm-specific risk, we observe that
an increase in macroeconomic risk slows the capital adjustment process. This observation
accords with intuition. As macroeconomic risk increases, a firm will find it harder to
adjust its capital structure because retiring debt will be costlier in such circumstances due
to increased asymmetric information problems. In particular, looking at these results, we
can say that the cost of reducing leverage for firms with above-target leverage should be
less in periods of low macroeconomic risk than in periods of high macroeconomic risk.
This finding supports that of Korajczyk and Levy (2003), who show that firms are more
78Part of the explanation for higher adjustment speeds at low macroeconomic risks is that an overall
relatively stable macroeconomic environment leads to an increase in share prices which makes equity
issues an attractive source of financing, and thus, firms’ managers are likely to use equity issuance as a
leverage-decreasing transaction.
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Table 3.5: Effects of Risk on the Speed of Adjustment while Controlling for
Deviations from the Target Leverage
Table 3.5 reports the robust two-step system-GMM estimation results of the impact of risk on
the marginal effects of deviations from the target leverage ratio on the adjustment speed for the
following model:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dabovi,t + β2Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t + (β3Dabovi,t + β4Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t.Rfirmi,t−1
+ (β5D
abov
i,t + β6D
belo
i,t )DV Ti,t.R
macro
t−1 + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of leverage for firm i in year t. DV Ti,t is the deviation of observed (actual)
leverage from the target leverage ratio for firm i at time t, Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one
if the leverage ratio is above the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time t, Dbeloi,t is a dummy
variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time
t, Rfirmi,t is a measure of time-varying firm-specific risk and R
macro
t is a measure of time-varying
macroeconomic risk. Firm-specific risk is drawn from the sales of firms. Macroeconomic risk is
proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under investigation. Model
1, a modified standard adjustment model of capital structure, reflects our baseline specifications
where the firm capital structure adjustments are interacted with above- and below-target leverage
indicators. Model 2 reflects the interactions among the firm’s capital structure adjustments, above-
and below-target leverage indicators, and our measures of risk. The sample consists of all UK
manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981-
2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope database via DataStream. Panel B of the table
reports the number of firms, the firm-year observations, the J statistics, which is a test of the over
identifying restrictions, the Arellano-Bond test, AR(2), for second-order autocorrelation in the
first-differenced residuals, and firm-year observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation Results; Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t 0.295 (0.055)*** 0.322 (0.127)***
DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t 0.255 (0.033)*** 0.247 (0.054)***
DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 0.036 (0.059)
DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 -0.252 (0.140)**
DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
macro
t−1 -0.059 (0.029)**
DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
macro
t−1 0.041 (0.170)***
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 10,943 9,782
Firm 999 963
AR(2) 0.950 1.230
p-value 0.341 0.217
J-statistic 10.290 23.940
p-value 0.740 0.775
likely to issue equity when macroeconomic prospects are good.
When we turn our attention to the estimated speed of adjustment for firms with
below target leverage, we see that it is around 24.7% per year for the benchmark model.
Comparing this value with other cases when we allow uncertainty in the model, we do not
observe a clear-cut ranking, although there is a tendency that the adjustment is faster
when firm-specific risk is lower than when it is higher (Panel C of Figure 3.1). Given the
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Table 3.6: The Speed of Adjustment (SOA) for Firms with Above and Below
the Target Leverage at Different Risk Levels
Table 3.6 reports the estimates of the SOA for firms above and below the target leverage ratio
at different risk levels. To calculate the SOA we estimate the model below by using the robust
two-step system-GMM estimator (results are given in Table 3.5) and then we calculate the total
derivatives at low (25th percentile), median (50th percentile), and high (75th percentile) levels of
risk.
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dabovi,t + β2Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t + (β3Dabovi,t + β4Dbeloi,t )DV Ti,t.Rfirmi,t−1
+ (β5D
abov
i,t + β6D
belo
i,t )DV Ti,t.R
macro
t−1 + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of leverage for firm i in year t. DV Ti,t is the deviation of observed (actual)
leverage from the target leverage ratio for firm i at time t, Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one
if the leverage ratio is above the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time t, Dbeloi,t is a dummy
variable equal to one if the leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time
t, Rfirmi,t is a measure of time-varying firm-specific risk and R
macro
t is a measure of time-varying
macroeconomic risk. Firm-specific risk is drawn from the sales of firms. Macroeconomic risk is
proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under investigation. The half-
life, the time required for a deviation from the target leverage ratio to be halved, is computed as
ln(0.5)/ln(1− φ), where φ is the estimate of the speed of adjustment toward target leverage. The
sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point
over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope database via DataStream.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Risk Firms Above Target Firms Below Target
Firm Macro SOA Estimated Half-Life SOA Estimated Half-Life
(Rfirmi,t ) (R
macro
t ) (%) Std.Error Years (%) Std.Error Years
High High 22.1 (0.901)*** 2.78 23.5 (0.034)*** 2.59
High Median 25.3 (0.098)*** 2.38 21.3 (0.032)*** 2.89
High Low 26.7 (0.103)*** 2.23 20.5 (0.145)** 3.02
Median High 21.5 (0.091)** 2.86 27.2 (0.301)*** 2.18
Median Median 24.7 (0.099)*** 2.44 25.0 (0.029)** 2.41
Median Low 26.2 (0.103)*** 2.28 24.0 (0.300)*** 2.53
Low High 21.2 (0.091)** 2.91 29.5 (0.035)*** 1.98
Low Median 24.5 (0.099)** 2.47 27.3 (0.034)*** 2.17
Low Low 25.9 (0.103)*** 2.31 26.0 (0.103)** 2.30
Zero Zero 32.2 (0.128)** 1.78 24.7 (0.054)*** 2.44
results in Table 3.6, it seems that the managers substantially consider firm-specific and
macroeconomic risks before adjusting firms’ capital structure when the actual leverage of
firms is also below the target so that the firm will be less susceptible to adverse selection
problems and bankruptcy.
On the whole, the estimates given in Table 3.6 show that firms adjust their actual
leverage toward their targets at different speeds as they face different levels of risk when
the actual leverage is above or below the target. That is, firms consider the levels of
firm-specific and macroeconomic risk as well as positive and negative deviations of actual
leverage from the target when adjusting their capital structure.
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3.6.4 Effects of Risk on the Speed of Adjustment: Controlling for Deviations
from the Target Leverage and Financial Deficits/Surpluses
In this section, we incorporate the role of financial imbalances along with deviations of
leverage from the target on the adjustment of capital structure and examine the asym-
metry in the adjustment process as shown in equation (3.11). The empirical model shows
whether adjustments in capital structure are more sensitive to risk when firms have finan-
cial surpluses or when they have financial deficits with leverage ratios above or below the
targets.
3.6.4.1 Marginal Effects of Risk
Table 3.7 provides results for two models. Both of these models are based on equation
(11): Model 1 is the benchmark and it does not incorporate risk. Model 2 includes both
types of risk.
Model 1: The Benchmark
The benchmark model provides evidence that, on average, publicly traded UK manufac-
turing firms increase their leverage regardless of the fact that the firm has a financial
deficit or surplus as the coefficients of Dsuri,t and D
def
i,t are both positive. This is in line
with the statistics provided in Table 3.1 which shows that firm leverage in the UK has
been increasing over the period of investigation. It is also useful to note that according to
the benchmark model, firms with financial surpluses tend to increase their leverage more
than those that experience a financial deficit. This observation is in contrast to that of
Byoun (2008) which shows that US firms with a financial surplus reduce their leverage.
An inspection of the data shows that the increase in leverage in the UK is due to issuance
of new debt instruments rather than equity repurchases.
Next, we examine the coefficient estimates of the interaction terms between firms’ finan-
cial status (financial surpluses/deficits) and above- and below-target leverage indicators.
We find that the coefficient estimates for Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t and that of D
def
i,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t
are both positive and statistically significant, where the former is significantly larger. This
implies that firms whose actual leverage is above the target adjust their capital structure
toward the target relatively faster when they have a financial surplus than when they
face financial deficits. The estimate of the coefficient on the interaction between firms’ fi-
nancial deficit and below-target indicator (Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t ) is positive and statistically
significant but smaller in magnitude than that of the above-target leverage regardless
of the financial status of the firm. This finding suggests that firms that have financial
deficits with below-target leverage change their leverage but at a lower speed than those
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Table 3.7: Effects of Risk on the Speed of Adjustment while Controlling for
Deviations from the Target Leverage and Financial Imbalances
Table 3.7 reports the robust two-step system-GMM estimation results of the impact of risk on the marginal
effects of deviations from the target leverage ratio and financial imbalances on the speed of adjustment
(SOA) for the following model:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dsuri,t + β2Ddefi,t ) + (β3Dsuri,t + β4Ddefi,t )DV Ti,t.Dabovi,t + (β5Dsuri,t + β6Ddefi,t )DV Ti,t.Dbeloi,t
+ (β7D
sur
i,t + β8D
def
i,t )DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .Ui,t + (β9D
sur
i,t + β10D
def
i,t )DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .Ui,t + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of leverage for firm i in year t. DV Ti,t is the deviation of observed (actual) leverage
from the target leverage ratio for firm i at time t, Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage
ratio is above the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time t, Dbeloi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the
leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time t. Dsuri,t is a dummy variable equal
to one if the ith firm has a financial surplus at time t and zero otherwise, and Ddefi,t is a dummy variable
equal to one if the ith firm has a financial deficit at time t and zero otherwise. Ui,t is a vector of one-period
lagged time-varying firm-specific (Rfirmi,t ) and macroeconomic risk (R
macro
t ). Financial deficit is the ratio
of the change in working capital plus investment expenditure plus dividends less net cash flows to the book
value of total assets. Firm-specific risk is drawn from the sales of firms. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by
the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under investigation. Model 1 reflects our baseline
specifications where the firm capital structure adjustments are interacted with its financial status and
above- and below-target leverage indicators. Model 2 reflects the interactions among the firm’s financial
status, above- and below-target leverage indicators, our measures of risk, and the firm’s capital structure
adjustments. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at
any point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope database via DataStream.
Panel B of the table reports the number of firms, the firm-year observations, the J statistics, which is a
test of the over identifying restrictions, the Arellano-Bond test, AR(2), for second-order autocorrelation in
the first-differenced residuals and firm-year observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation Results; Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Dsuri,t 0.215 (0.081)*** 0.194 (0.078)***
Ddefi,t 0.094 (0.027)*** 0.069 (0.028)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t 0.588 (0.197)*** 0.312 (0.126)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t 0.357 (0.069)*** 0.588 (0.129)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t -0.437 (0.216)** -0.667 (0.301)**
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t 0.148 (0.033)*** 0.284 (0.109)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 -0.082 (0.039)**
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 0.256 (0.128)**
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 0.207 (0.118)*
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 -0.102 (0.134)
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
macro
t−1 0.169 (0.065)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
macro
t−1 -0.269 (0.058)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
macro
t−1 0.095 (0.046)**
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
macro
t−1 -0.037 (0.018)**
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 9,751 9,751
Firm 970 970
AR(2) -0.600 -0.310
p-value 0.552 0.760
J-statistic 45.980 47.980
p-value 0.205 0.252
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with above-target leverage. Interestingly, we also find that firms with a financial surplus
do not strive to revert back to the target when their actual leverage ratio is below the
target. Rather, these firms further deviate from the targets as the coefficient estimate
on the financial surplus with below-target interaction (Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t ) is negative and
statistically significant.
Overall, the results from our benchmark model provide evidence that capital structure
adjustments are asymmetric and significantly related to both firms’ cash flow imbalances
and the stance of the actual leverage of firms with respect to their target leverage. Our
these findings are consistent with evidence in Byoun (2008), Elsas and Florysiak (2011),
and Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith (2011), which indicates heterogeneity in
the speed of adjustment across firms.
Model 2: The Asymmetric Impact of Firm-specific Risk
Model 2 incorporates both types of risk into the benchmark model. In what follows
below, we squarely emphasize the role of the interaction terms with risk measures on the
adjustment process.
We first observe that the effect of firm-specific risk on the rebalancing behavior of
firms with a financial surplus and above-target leverage (Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
above
i,t .R
firm
t−1 ) is
negative. This observation indicates that firms that have a financial surplus with above-
target leverage slow down their capital adjustment when firm-specific risk is high. Hence,
we expect that firms with above-target leverage and financial surplus use their surplus to
reduce their outstanding debt when these firms are certain about their expected future
cash flow streams. In contrast, the effect of firm-specific risk on firms that have financial
deficits with above-target leverage (Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
above
i,t .R
firm
t−1 ) is positive. This implies
that firms with above target leverage experiencing a financial deficit are more likely to
issue equity to finance their financial deficits when they go through periods of high firm-
specific risk to move toward their targets. A possible reason for doing so is that since
debt becomes relatively expensive for risky firms as banks and other financial institutions
charge them higher risk premiums, these firms prefer equity over debt financing.
When we turn to the case of firms with financial surpluses and below-target leverage,
we find that the variable, Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
t−1 , takes a positive coefficient, implying
that an increase in firm-level risk leads to an increase in the speed of adjustment toward
the target leverage. This suggests that below-target firms with financial surpluses tend to
repurchase their equities in periods when they experience high firm-specific risk. Hence,
these firms move their leverage toward the target by reducing their outstanding external
financing.
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We next observe that the effect of firm-specific risk on the capital structure adjustment
decisions of firms with a financial deficit and below-target leverage (Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
t−1 )
is negative. Hence, firms that have financial deficits with below-target leverage slow down
their capital adjustment process when firm-specific risk is high. That is, firms that have
financial deficits with below-target leverage are more likely to plug their financial deficits
and attain their target leverage by issuing debt when firm-specific risk is low. Firms do
so because they face less debt-related problems, such as the likelihood of bankruptcy, in
periods of low firm-specific risk.
These estimates suggest that the effects of firm-specific risk on leverage depends on
the state of firms’ actual leverage (above or below the target) and firms’ financing state
(financial deficits or surpluses).
Model 2: The Asymmetric Impact of Macroeconomic Risk
We next turn to examine the impact of macroeconomic risk on the adjustment process.
We observe that the impact of macroeconomic risk on the change in leverage when firms
experience financial deficits with above-target leverage (Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
above
i,t .R
macro
t−1 ) and
that for firms with financial deficits and below-target (Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
macro
t−1 ) are both
negative and statistically significant. In other words, firms in these two groups adjust their
leverage toward their targets faster in periods when macroeconomic risks are low. These
results suggest that firms facing financial deficits with above-target (below-target) leverage
are more likely to finance their financial deficits and adjust their leverage to the target by
issuing equity (debt) when macroeconomic risks are low. These observations also suggest
that firms with financial deficits, regardless of whether their observed leverage is below
or above the target, may face low adjustment costs when macroeconomic conditions are
stable and certain, therefore, they are more likely to make adjustments in their capital
structure.
In case when firms have a financial surplus along with above-target leverage, the effect
of macroeconomic risk on the change in leverage (Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
above
i,t .R
macro
t−1 ) is positive
and statistically significant. Hence, this class of firms adjust their leverage toward their
target relatively faster in periods of higher macroeconomic risk. This finding is in line
with the fact that high levels of outstanding debt tend to expose firms to macro-level
risk and, as a result, firms are more likely to reduce their use of debt during volatile
states of the economy. Last, but not least, we find that the effect of macroeconomic risk
on the change in leverage when firms have a financial surplus with below-target leverage
(Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
macro
t−1 ) is positive, suggesting that such firms are more likely to use
their financial surpluses to repurchase existing equity in order to reduce the overall external
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financing when macroeconomic risks are high.
Overall, the results given in Table 3.7 provide evidence that asymmetric speeds of
adjustment are related to risk as well as to deviations of leverage from the target and the
financial state of the firm. Further, both firm-specific risk and macroeconomic risk affect
the adjustment speed differently. These differences suggest that firms not only take into
account the imbalances in their cash flows and the deviation of their leverage ratio from
the target but also carefully consider both firm-specific and macroeconomic risks.
3.6.4.2 The Speed of Adjustment with Financial Imbalances and Deviations
from the Target Leverage
In this section, we compute the speed of adjustment toward the target allowing the risk to
vary across low-medium-high levels. To present full evidence, we compute the adjustment
speed and the corresponding half-life in four-way interactions with respect to financial
imbalances of the firm (financing deficits/surpluses) and the positive or negative deviation
of actual leverage from the target. For all sub-panels, we also compute the adjustment
speed and the corresponding half-life when both types of risks are set to zero. We ob-
serve several interesting patterns in speed-of-adjustment estimates across firms and across
different levels of risk. Specifically, the results given in Table 3.8 show that the speed of
adjustment toward the target leverage significantly varies as the level of risk changes. As
well, the estimates of the speed of adjustment clearly reveal that heterogeneities in speeds
of adjustments across risk levels are conditional on whether firms have financing deficits
or surpluses and whether firms are over- or under-levered. Figure 3.2 plots the adjustment
speeds that are given in Table 3.8.
The table shows that when there is no risk, firms that have a financial surplus with
above-target leverage attain the lowest speed of adjustment coefficient in contrast to the
cases when there is risk. Sorting out the adjustment speeds according the categories of
firms, we can see that firms with a financial surplus and above-target leverage adjust their
capital structure faster when macroeconomic risk is high; the speed of adjustment declines
with a decline in macroeconomic risk. In contrast, firm-specific risk exerts a negative effect
on the adjustment process, yet, its impact is minor compared to that of macroeconomic
risk. For instance, when macroeconomic uncertainty is high and firm-specific uncertainty
is low, the speed of adjustment is 82.5% per year. The speed of adjustment drops to 67.4%
per year if macroeconomic risk is low and firm-specific risk is high. That is, firms that
hold a financial surplus with above-target leverage reduce their outstanding debt faster as
macroeconomic risk heightens the cost of holding more leverage. Further, given the level
of macroeconomic risk, firms also prefer to lower their debt in periods when firm-specific
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Table 3.8: The Speed of Adjustment (SOA) for Firms having Above/Below-
Target Debt with a Financial Surplus/Deficit at Different Risk Levels
Table 3.8 reports the estimates of the SOA for firms having above- or below-target leverage ratio with a
financial deficit or surplus. To calculate the SOA we estimate the model below by using the robust two-step
system-GMM estimator (results are given in Table 3.7) and we then calculate the total derivatives at low
(25th percentile), median (50th percentile) and high (75th percentile) risk levels.
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dsuri,t + β2Ddefi,t ) + (β3Dsuri,t + β4Ddefi,t )DV Ti,t.Dabovi,t + (β5Dsuri,t + β6Ddefi,t )DV Ti,t.Dbeloi,t
+ (β7D
sur
i,t + β8D
def
i,t )DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .Ui,t + (β9D
sur
i,t + β10D
def
i,t )DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .Ui,t + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of leverage for firm i in year t. DV Ti,t is the deviation of observed (actual) leverage
from the target leverage ratio for firm i at time t, Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage
ratio is above the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time t, Dbeloi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if
the leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time t. Dsuri,t is a dummy variable
equal to one if the ith firm has a financial surplus at time t and zero otherwise, and Ddefi,t is a dummy
variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial deficit at time t and zero otherwise. Financial deficit is
the ratio of the change in working capital plus investment expenditure plus dividends less net cash flows
to the book value of total assets. Ui,t is a vector of one-period lagged time-varying firm-specific (R
firm
i,t )
and macroeconomic risk (Rmacrot ). Firm-specific risk is drawn from sales of firms. Macroeconomic risk is
proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under investigation. The half-life, the
time required for a deviation from the target leverage ratio to be halved, is computed as ln(0.5)/ln(1−φ),
where φ is the estimate of the speed of adjustment toward target leverage. The sample consists of all
UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981-2009.
The data are drawn from the WorldScope database via DataStream. ***, **, and * denote statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Risk Firms Above Target Firms Below Target
Firm Macro SOA Estimated Half-Life SOA Estimated Half-Life
(Rfirmi,t ) (R
macro
t ) (%) Std.Error Years (%) Std.Error Years
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l
S
u
rp
lu
s High High 80.6 (0.269)*** 0.42 -21.2 (0.172) -3.61
High Median 71.4 (0.282)** 0.55 -26.4 (0.168) -2.96
High Low 67.4 (0.289)** 0.62 -28.7 (0.167)* -2.75
Median High 81.8 (0.270)*** 0.40 -24.2 (0.192) -3.20
Median Median 72.6 (0.283)** 0.54 -29.4 (0.189) -2.69
Median Low 68.6 (0.289)** 0.60 -31.7 (0.188)* -2.52
Low High 82.5 (0.279)*** 0.39 -26.1 (0.206) -2.99
Low Median 77.6 (0.284)*** 0.46 -35.1 (0.219) -2.30
Low Low 69.3 (0.290)** 0.59 -33.5 (0.202)* -2.40
Zero Zero 50.6 (0.331)** 0.98 -47.3 (0.227)** -1.79
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l
D
e
fi
c
it
High High 22.4 (0.132) 2.73 24.4 (0.041)*** 2.48
High Median 37.1 (0.119)*** 1.50 26.4 (0.045)*** 2.26
High Low 43.5 (0.116)*** 1.21 27.3 (0.061)*** 2.17
Median High 18.7 (0.145) 3.35 25.8 (0.056)*** 2.32
Median Median 33.3 (0.132)** 1.71 28.0 (0.061)*** 2.11
Median Low 39.8 (0.145)*** 1.37 28.8 (0.062)*** 2.04
Low High 16.4 (0.153) 3.87 26.8 (0.066)*** 2.22
Low Median 31.1 (0.140)** 1.86 28.8 (0.071)*** 2.04
Low Low 37.5 (0.136)*** 1.47 29.7 (0.072)*** 1.97
Zero Zero 65.7 (0.146)*** 0.65 35.3 (0.099)*** 1.59
risk is low as they are sure of their cash inflow.
When we compute the speed of adjustment for those firms with financial surpluses and
below-target leverage, we come across with an interesting phenomena that these firms do
not significantly adjust their capital structure when they experience risk. In general, the
adjustment speeds for these firms are negative but they are not statistically different from
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zero. However, in some cases of this category, the negative speed of adjustment becomes
statistically significant at the 5% or 10% level of significance, indicating that these firms
deviate even further from their targets by retiring their debts. This finding suggests
that those firms that have financial surpluses and are below-target leverage appear to use
their surpluses to retire their outstanding debts rather than to repurchase equity issues.
As a results, they further move away from their target capital structure. One potential
explanation of such behaviour of these firms is that perhaps to increase financial flexibility
these firms prefer to reduce their debt financing instead of equity issues when retiring their
external capital. Another possible explanation is that as it is well accepted in the literature,
the cost of being under-levered is relatively less than being over-levered, and thus, under-
levered firms with financial surpluses may not endeavour to increase their leverage by
repurchasing equity issues. Rather, these firms appear to retire their debt borrowing and
as a result, they even further deviate from their leverage targets. The evidence of negative
speeds of adjustment is an interesting observation and warrants further investigation.79
We next turn to understand the capital structure adjustment of those firms that have
financial deficits with above-target leverage. We see that these firms are likely to make
the most significant adjustments toward the target capital structure when we set both
types of risk to zero. Once we incorporate the effects of risk in our computations, we
find that these firms adjust fastest when macroeconomic risk is low and when firm-specific
risk is high. The slowest adjustment will occur when macroeconomic risk is high and
firm-specific risk is low. A potential explanation behind this observation is that since
the adjustment toward the target leverage for these firms requires issuing equity as firms
have financial deficits, reducing outstanding debt is a hard task for these firms. To this
end, firms find it easier to issue equity to meet their financial obligations and to adjust
their leverage toward their target when macroeconomic risks are lower than when they
are higher.80 These results are in contrast with the prediction of the simple pecking order
model that firm managers prefer to raise funds by issuing debt when they do external
financing. However, our observations firmly support the market timing theory, which
predicts that firms managers are opportunist and they time equity issues.
The last possibility is the case when firms have financial deficits with below-target
leverage. These firms adjust their capital structure most quickly when there is no risk.
When we allow for risk it appears that such firms adjust the quickest when both firm-
specific and macroeconomic risk are low where the speed of adjustment is about 30% per
year. We also find that the slowest adjustment takes place when both types of risk are
79For further discussion on negative speeds of adjustments, see Hovakimian and Li (2010b), Iliev and
Welch (2010), and Baker and Wurgler (2002), who also report a negative speed of adjustment.
80Unpredictable variations in macroeconomic conditions may cause sudden variations in the market value
of firms rendering the issuance of equity an unattractive source of finance for managers.
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high as the speed of adjustment falls to around 24% per year. As the adjustment of capital
structure toward the target for this category of firms requires issuance of debt, these firms
are more likely to issue debt when they are relatively less uncertain about their potential
cash flow stream and when macroeconomic prospects are good. This is in line with the fact
that firms are less cautious about the cost of financial distress and bankruptcy in periods
of low risk, and they thus tend to increase their use of debt in their capital structure.
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Figure 3.1: The Speeds of Adjustment (SOA) across Different Levels of Risk
from the Modified Partial-Adjustment Model of Capital Structure
Panel A plots the estimates of the speed of adjustment from the modified reduced-form partial
adjustment model of capital structure. Panel B and C plot the estimates of the speed of adjustment
across different levels of risk for firms with above-target leverage and for firms with below-target
leverage, respectively. Firm-specific risk is drawn from sales of firms scaled by the book value of
total assets. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the
period under investigation. Low risk is measured at the 25th percentile, median risk is at the 50th
percentile, and high risk is measured at the 75th percentile.
Overall, the results in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 provide evidence that the adjustment speeds
are affected asymmetrically with respect to either type of risk while we control for firms’
financial imbalances and deviations from the target leverage. In particular, these two
tables show that the capital structure adjustments of different categories of firms exhibit
differential patterns in responding to risk: risk accelerates the speed of adjustment for firms
with a financial surplus and above-target leverage and decelerates the speed of adjustment
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Figure 3.2: The Speeds of Adjustment (SOA) from the Modified Partial-
Adjustment Model of Capital Structure across Different Levels of Risk while
Controlling for Deviations from the Target and Financial Surpluses/Deficits
as Shown in Equation (3.11)
Panel A plots the estimates of the speed of adjustment for firms when they have a financial surplus
with above-target leverage. Panel B plots the estimates of the speed of adjustment for firms when
they have a financial surplus with below-target leverage. Panel C plots the estimates of the speed of
adjustment for below-target firms when they have a financial surplus. Panel D plots the estimates
of the speed of adjustment for below-target firms when they have a financial deficit. Firm-specific
risk is drawn from sales of firms scaled by the book value of total assets. Macroeconomic risk is
proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under investigation. Low risk
is measured at the 25th percentile, median risk is at the 50th percentile, and high risk is measured
at the 75th percentile.
for firms with a financial deficit and below-target leverage.
These observations are of interest because they suggest that the differences in the
adjustment speeds are not fully explained by the imbalances of firms’ cash nor by the
deviations of firms’ actual leverage from the target leverage but also they relate to the
levels of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk. In that sense, our findings are useful to
interpret earlier research which discusses why firms are not always responsive to changes
in the market value of their equity (Welch (2004)) or gains and losses in their earnings
(Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004)), and why they significantly time the
debt and equity market conditions while financing external capital (Baker and Wurgler
(2002) and Antoniou, Zhao, and Zhou (2009)). Our study also provides new insights on
the interlinkages between the state of risk and the costs and benefits of adjusting toward
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the target capital structure.
3.7 Robustness Check
To guard ourselves from the possibility that the results are driven by the specific measures
of risk we used, we examine the robustness of the findings by using alternative measures
of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk. We also check the robustness of our findings by
using the historical mean of the firm leverage as a proxy for the firm’s target leverage
ratio in our estimation. Regarding firm-specific risk we use cash flow volatility (the cumu-
lative standard deviation of cash flows). This measure is earlier used in the literature by
Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), and Leary
and Roberts (2005). We used quarterly Consumer Price Index (CPI) to generate macroe-
conomic risk. Using these new measures of risk and alternative targets, we re-estimated
equation (3.11) and report the results in columns labeled “Model 1” and “Model 2” re-
spectively of Table 3.10. The results from this exercise, presented in Table 3.10, suggest
that our earlier findings are robust and confirm that the effects of risks on capital structure
adjustments are not driven by the specific measure of risk or the specific estimate of firms’
leverage targets.
We also examine the robustness of our results using an alternative definition of leverage.
Specifically, we quantify the impact of risks on both the target level of firms’ leverage and
the speed of adjustment toward the target by re-estimating the models with the total debt
(short-term debt + long-term debt) to total assets ratio. We consider this measure of
leverage because most of the previous studies in the empirical capital structure literature
have utilized the ratio of total debt to total assets ratio rather than a broader measure of
leverage that includes both financial debt and non-financial liabilities.
Table 3.11 presents the results from regressions of total debt to total assets ratio on
both firm-specific and macroeconomic risks as well as several firm characteristics. Specifi-
cally, we re-run two models. For Model 1, the specifications are similar to those reported
in Table 3.3 except that the dependent variable in this model is the ratio of the total debt
(short-term debt + long-term debt) to total assets ratio. The specification of Model 2 is
similar to those in Model 1 except that Model 2 does not include investment variable as
it appears statistically significant only at margin (10%). In general, both regressions yield
similar results to those reported in Table 3.3. The coefficient estimates of both types of
risk are negative and statistically significant. This suggests that firms appear to reduce
their leverage targets when either firm-specific risk increases or when the overall macroe-
conomic conditions become more volatile. The target level of firms’ leverage increases with
the profitability of firms, the size of firms, and non-debt tax shields, whereas, it decreases
with the market-to-book value, the tangibility of assets, and stock returns.
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To examine the robustness of the results of the effects of risks on the capital structure
adjustments of firms using an alternative definition of leverage, we re-estimate the regres-
sion shown in equation (3.11) with the total debt (short-term debt + long-term debt) to
total assets ratio. The rest of the specification are similar to those given in Table 3.7. The
results from this exercise are presented in Table 3.12. Overall, the the results reported
in Table 3.12 are similar to those presented in Table 3.7. Firms appear to increase their
leverage ratio regardless of whether they have financial surpluses or deficits. However,
firms that have a financial surpluses are likely to increase their leverage ratio more as
compared to those firms that have a financial deficits. The results on the interactions
of leverage deviations with firm financial status indicators and above- and below-target
indicators are similar to those findings that we presented earlier. Over-levered firms do
relatively quick adjustments in their capital structure toward their leverage targets when
they raise capital (i.e., firms have financial deficits) than when they retire their existing
external capital (i.e., firms have financing surpluses). These findings are consistent with
the findings of Kayhan and Titman (2007).
The coefficient estimate on the interaction between firms’ financial deficit and below-
target leverage indicator is positive and statistically significant but it is smaller in mag-
nitude than that of the above-target leverage. This implies that under-leveraged firms
with a financial deficit are less likely to adjust their leverage ratio than over-levered firms
regardless of their financial status. The coefficient estimate for the below-target leverage
with financial surpluses is negative and statistically significant. This implies that firms
move further away from their leverage target when they are under-levered have a financial
surplus. This finding suggests that those firms that have financial surpluses and are below-
target leverage ratio appear to use their surpluses to retire their outstanding debts rather
than to repurchase equity issues. As a results, they further turn away from their target
capital structure. One potential explanation of this behaviour of firms is that perhaps
to increase financial flexibility firms prefer to reduce their debts instead of equity when
retiring their external capital.
The results reported in Table 3.12 on risks are also similar to our earlier findings that
we present in Table 3.7. The coefficient estimates provide evidence of the asymmetric
impacts of both types of risk on firms’ rebalancing behavior depending on whether firms
have financial deficits or surpluses and whether firms’ actual leverage ratios are below or
above their targets. Firm-specific risk affects firm leverage adjustments negatively when
firms have a financial surplus with above-target leverage and when they have a financial
deficits with below-target leverage. In contrast, the impacts of firm-specific risk on capital
structure adjustments are positive for those firms that have a financial surplus with below-
target leverage and for those firms that have a financial deficits with below-target leverage.
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Turning to the effects of macroeconomic risk on leverage adjustments we observe that
the capital structure adjustments of firms that experience financial surpluses regardless
of whether they are over-levered or under-levered are positively affected by increases in
the volatility of macroeconomic conditions. Conversely, the coefficient estimates suggest
that firms that face financial deficits regardless of the level of their actual leverage with
respect to the target are less likely to do adjustments in their capital structure when
macroeconomic conditions are move volatile. These findings are consistent with those
reported in Table 3.7. Thus, our findings that risks are important in adjusting leverage
toward the target and the impacts of risks on adjustments are asymmetric, depending on
both firms’ cash flow imbalances and deviations of firms’ actual leverage from the target
are robust to alternative measures of leverage.
3.8 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we hypothesize that if the optimal debt level varies by firm, the risk struc-
ture of the environment within which the firm operates should affect the cost of adjusting
firm’s leverage and in return the speed of adjustment. To investigate this hypothesis,
we examine the role of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk on firms’ capital structure
adjustments considering the recent literature which allows for asymmetric adjustment. In
our investigation, we use a dynamic model and employ a panel of UK manufacturing firms
over the 1981-2009 period.
We first estimate a standard leverage model augmented by both firm-specific and
macroeconomic risk measures to compute the target leverage of each firm. The model
provides evidence that firms’ target leverage is negatively (and significantly) related to
both types of risk. Next, we estimate a reduced-form partial adjustment model of capital
structure to quantify the effects of risk on the speed of adjustment toward the target. We
show that while both firm-specific and macroeconomic risk have robust effects on firms’
capital structure adjustments, the speed of adjustment is more sensitive to firm-specific
risk. Firms adjust their leverage faster toward the target when firm-specific risk is low
than when the risk is high. This is perhaps because firms face lower costs of adjustment
when both firm-specific and macroeconomic risks are low.
When we explore the possibility that the adjustment process may be asymmetric with
respect to the level of risk, we find that firms with financial surpluses and above-target
leverage adjust their leverage toward their targets much more quickly when firm-specific
risk is low and macroeconomic risk is high. Since excess debt makes firms more exposed to
aggregate risk, firms with actual leverage exceeding their target choose to reduce leverage
when firm-specific risk is low. Results for those firms with financial deficit and above-
target leverage show that these firms make adjustments in capital structure quicker when
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macroeconomic risk is low regardless of the level of firm-specific risk. This observation
supports the market timing hypothesis and suggests that firms are more likely to issue
equity when macroeconomic conditions are stable.
In contrast, firms with financial deficits and below-target leverage adjust their leverage
toward their targets more rapidly in periods when both firm-specific and macroeconomic
risk are low than in periods when both types of risk are high. This finding provides
evidence that firms with financial deficits and below-target leverage require stability to
raise funds. Last but not least, firms that have a financial surplus with below-target
leverage do not appear to adjust their leverage.
Overall, our investigation provides evidence that different levels and different types of
risk exert asymmetric effects on the capital adjustment process even when we control for
the firms’ financial state and the deviations of firm leverage from the target. Our results
can also be useful to understand why firms would not aggressively act to offset the effects
of changes in the market value of equity or gains and losses in earnings as it is clear that
managers have to carefully consider both the overall state of the economy and the solvency
of their own business activities.
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Table 3.9: Robustness: Target Leverage with Alternative Measures of Risk
Table 3.9 reports the robust two-step system-GMM estimation results of the impact of risk on firms’ target
leverage ratio from estimating the following model for alternative measures of risk:
Li,t = β0 + β1Xi,t−1 + β2R
firm
i,t−1 + β3R
macro
i,t−1 + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of the book leverage of firm i in year t. Xi,t is a vector of the firm-specific variables.
Rfirmi,t is a measure of time-varying firm-specific risk. R
macro
t is a measure of time-varying macroeconomic
risk. The term υi captures the effects of time-invariant unobservable firm-specific factors such as reputation
and capital intensity. The term εi,t represents the time-varying residuals. Subscripts i and t denote firm
and time period, respectively. The variables are defined as follows. Book leverage is the ratio of the book
value of total debt to the book value of total assets. The market-to-book value ratio is defined as the book
value of the total book assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the
book value of total assets. Investment is the ratio of total expenditures to purchase fixed tangible assets to
the book value of total assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation
to the total book assets. Tangibility is the ratio of net plant, property, and equipment to the total book
assets. The 2-year stock return is the difference between share prices at time t and share prices at time t−2.
Firm size is defined as the logarithm of net sales deflated by the GDP deflator. The non-debt tax shield is
defined as total depreciation expense divided by the book value of total assets. Firm-specific risk is drawn
from firms’ cash flow realizations. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of Consumer
Price Index (CPI) over the period under investigation. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms
listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the
WorldScope database via DataStream. Panel B reports the number of firms, the firm-year observations,
the J statistics, which is a test of the over identifying restrictions, the Arellano-Bond test, AR(2), for
second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, and firm-year observations. ***, **, and *
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation results
Regressors Coefficient Std. Error
Leveragei,t−1 0.723 (0.059)***
Market-to-Booki,t−1 -0.039 (0.018)**
Investmenti,t−1 0.524 (0.144)***
Profitabilityi,t−1 0.187 (0.089)**
Tangibilityi,t−1 -0.145 (0.060)**
Firm Sizei,t−1 0.036 (0.011)***
2-year Stock Returni,t−1 -0.054 (0.019)***
Non-debt Tax Shieldsi,t−1 0.600 (0.369)*
Rfirmi,t−1 -0.012 (0.003)**
Rmacrot−1 -0.252 (0.072)***
Constant -0.263 (0.148)*
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 10,947
Firm 996
AR(2) -0.920
p-value 0.360
J-statistic 91.610
p-value 0.218
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Table 3.10: Robustness: Alternative Measures of Risk and the Alternative
Estimate of Firms’ Target Leverage
Table 3.10 reports results from estimating the following model for alternative measures of risk and the
alternative measure of the firm target leverage levels:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dsuri,t + β2Ddefi,t ) + (β3Dsuri,t + β4Ddefi,t )DV Ti,t.Dabovi,t + (β5Dsuri,t + β6Ddefi,t )DV Ti,t.Dbeloi,t
+ (β7D
sur
i,t + β8D
def
i,t )DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .Ui,t + (β9D
sur
i,t + β10D
def
i,t )DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .Ui,t + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of leverage for firm i in year t. DV Ti,t is the deviation of observed (actual) leverage
from the target leverage ratio for firm i at time t, Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage
ratio is above the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time t, Dbeloi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the
leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time t. Dsuri,t is a dummy variable equal
to one if the ith firm has a financial surplus at time t and zero otherwise, and Ddefi,t is a dummy variable
equal to one if the ith firm has a financial deficit at time t and zero otherwise. Ui,t is a vector of one-period
lagged time-varying firm-specific (Rfirmi,t ) and macroeconomic risk (R
macro
t ). Firm-specific risk is drawn
from firms’ cash flow realizations. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of Consumer
Price Index (CPI) over the period under investigation. Financial deficit is the ratio of the change in working
capital plus investment expenditure plus dividends less net cash flows to the book value of total assets.
Model 1 estimates the effect of our alternative measures of risk on adjustments, while Model 2 quantifies
the effect of risk on adjustments when the firm target leverage is proxied by the historical mean of the
firm leverage. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at
any point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope database via DataStream.
Panel B of the table reports the number of firms, the firm-year observations, the J statistics, which is a
test of the over identifying restrictions, the Arellano-Bond test, AR(2), for second-order autocorrelation in
the first-differenced residuals, and firm-year observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation Results; Dependent Variable: ∆Leverage
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Dsuri,t 0.197 (0.081)*** 0.164 (0.041)***
Ddefi,t 0.081 (0.027)*** 0.064 (0.016)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t 0.433 (0.197)*** 0.372 (0.123)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t 0.610 (0.069)*** 0.568 (0.075)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t -0.866 (0.216)** -0.609 (0.167)**
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t 0.225 (0.033)*** 0.474 (0.054)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 -0.210 (0.018)*** -0.087 (0.025)**
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 0.019 (0.001)*** 0.215 (0.088)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 0.063 (0.003)*** 0.258 (0.031)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 -0.001 (0.001) -0.111 (0.018)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
macro
t−1 0.659 (0.256)*** 0.141 (0.036)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
macro
t−1 -2.146 (0.442)*** -0.221 (0.035)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
macro
t−1 1.627 (0.518)*** 0.061 (0.025)**
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
macro
t−1 -0.298 (0.097)*** -0.046 (0.013)***
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 9,751 9,751
Firm 970 970
AR(2) -0.790 0.310
p-value 0.428 0.757
J-statistic 34.240 74.770
p-value 0.159 0.241
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Table 3.11: Robustness: An Alternative Measure of Leverage
Table 3.11 reports the robust two-step system-GMM estimation results of the impact of risk on firms’
target leverage ratio from estimating the following model for alternative measures of leverage:
Li,t = β0 + β1Xi,t−1 + β2R
firm
i,t−1 + β3R
macro
i,t−1 + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of the book leverage of firm i in year t. Xi,t is a vector of the firm-specific
variables. Rfirmi,t is a measure of time-varying firm-specific risk. R
macro
t is a measure of time-varying
macroeconomic risk. The term υi captures the effects of time-invariant unobservable firm-specific factors
such as reputation and capital intensity. The term εi,t represents the time-varying residuals. Subscripts
i and t denote firm and time period, respectively. The variables are defined as follows. Book leverage is
the ratio of the book value of total debt (short-term + long-term debt) to the book value of total assets.
The market-to-book value ratio is defined as the book value of the total book assets less the book value of
equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. Investment is the ratio of
total expenditures to purchase fixed tangible assets to the book value of total assets. Profitability is the
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to the total book assets. Tangibility is the ratio
of net plant, property, and equipment to the total book assets. The 2-year stock return is the difference
between share prices at time t and share prices at time t − 2. Firm size is defined as the logarithm of
net sales deflated by the GDP deflator. The non-debt tax shield is defined as total depreciation expense
divided by the book value of total assets. Firm-specific risk is drawn from firms’ cash flow realizations.
Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the period
under investigation. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock
Exchange at any point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope database via
DataStream. Panel B reports the number of firms, the firm-year observations, the J statistics, which is a
test of the over identifying restrictions, the Arellano-Bond test, AR(2), for second-order autocorrelation in
the first-differenced residuals, and firm-year observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation Results; Dependent Variable: Leverage
Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Leveragei,t−1 0.912 (0.044)*** 0.932 (0.042)***
Market-to-Booki,t−1 -0.018 (0.006)*** -0.014 (0.006)**
Investmenti,t−1 0.225 (0.133)* —— ——
Profitabilityi,t−1 0.085 (0.035)*** 0.092 (0.032)***
Tangibilityi,t−1 -0.164 (0.046)*** -0.129 (0.042)***
Firm Sizei,t−1 0.012 (0.003)*** 0.011 (0.003)***
2-year Stock Returni,t−1 -0.031 (0.005)*** -0.032 (0.005)***
Non-debt Tax Shieldsi,t−1 0.440 (0.166)*** 0.498 (0.162)***
Rfirmi,t−1 -0.050 (0.012)*** -0.049 (0.011)***
Rmacrot−1 -0.006 (0.001)*** -0.005 (0.001)***
Constant -0.029 (0.052)*** 0.141 (0.036)***
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 10,882 10,882
Firm 970 970
AR(2) -0.560 -0.620
p-value 0.577 0.536
J-statistic 88.320 81.680
p-value 0.158 0.181
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Table 3.12: Robustness: An Alternative Measure of Leverage and the Impacts
of Risks on Adjustment Speeds
Table 3.12 reports results from estimating the following model for an alternative measure of leverage:
Li,t − Li,t−1 = (β1Dsuri,t + β2Ddefi,t ) + (β3Dsuri,t + β4Ddefi,t )DV Ti,t.Dabovi,t + (β5Dsuri,t + β6Ddefi,t )DV Ti,t.Dbeloi,t
+ (β7D
sur
i,t + β8D
def
i,t )DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .Ui,t + (β9D
sur
i,t + β10D
def
i,t )DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .Ui,t + υi + εi,t
where Li,t is a measure of leverage for firm i in year t. DV Ti,t is the deviation of observed (actual) leverage
from the target leverage ratio for firm i at time t, Dabovi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the leverage
ratio is above the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time t, Dbeloi,t is a dummy variable equal to one if
the leverage ratio is below the target and zero otherwise for firm i at time t. Dsuri,t is a dummy variable
equal to one if the ith firm has a financial surplus at time t and zero otherwise, and Ddefi,t is a dummy
variable equal to one if the ith firm has a financial deficit at time t and zero otherwise. Ui,t is a vector
of one-period lagged time-varying firm-specific (Rfirmi,t ) and macroeconomic risk (R
macro
t ). Firm-specific
risk is drawn from firms’ cash flow realizations. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance
of Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the period under investigation. Financial deficit is the ratio of the
change in working capital plus investment expenditure plus dividends less net cash flows to the book value
of total assets. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at
any point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope database via DataStream.
Panel B of the table reports the number of firms, the firm-year observations, the J statistics, which is a
test of the over identifying restrictions, the Arellano-Bond test, AR(2), for second-order autocorrelation in
the first-differenced residuals, and firm-year observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation results
Regressors Coefficient Std. Error
Dsuri,t 0.074 (0.015)***
Ddefi,t 0.049 (0.006)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t 0.703 (0.130)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t 0.810 (0.057)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t -0.556 (0.175)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t 0.464 (0.129)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 -0.282 (0.105)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 0.297 (0.054)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 0.538 (0.210)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
firm
i,t−1 -0.554 (0.124)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
macro
t−1 0.214 (0.058)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
abov
i,t .R
macro
t−1 -0.051 (0.020)***
Dsuri,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
macro
t−1 0.182 (0.066)***
Ddefi,t .DV Ti,t.D
belo
i,t .R
macro
t−1 -0.123 (0.053)**
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 9,718
Firm 962
AR(2) -1.370
p-value 0.169
J-statistic 62.370
p-value 0.231
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Appendix A: A Summary of the SOA in Prior Studies
Table 3-A: Estimated Capital Structure Adjustment Speeds in Prior Empirical
Studies
The second and third columns of Table 3-A report the estimated annual capital structure adjust-
ment speeds toward capital structure and half-life, the time required for a deviation from the target
capital structure to be halved, respectively. The half-life is computed as ln(0.5)/ln(1− φ), where
φ is the estimate of the speed of adjustment toward target leverage. All reported estimates of
the speed of adjustments are based on book leverage expect Flannery and Rangan (2006), who
have used the market leverage in their study. The speed of adjustment from Kayhan and Titman
(2007) is an annualized rate based on five-year rate reported in their paper, Table 2. The estimated
annual speed of adjustment from Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008) is for UK and US firms in
their Table 5.
Article Sample Period Country SOA Half-Life
Jalilvand and Harris (1984) 1966-1978 USA 56.1%a, 10.9%b 0.8, 6.0 years
Ozkan (2001) 1984-1996 UK 56.9% 0.8 years
Fama and French (2002) 1965-1999 USA 10.0%c, 18.0%d 6.6, 3.5 years
Flannery and Rangan (2006) 1965-2001 USA 34.0% 1.7 years
Kayhan and Titman (2007) 1960-2003 USA 10.0% 6.6 years
Flannery and Hankins (2007) 1968-2004 USA 22.0% 2.8 years
Xu (2007) 1970-2004 USA 18.0% 3.5 years
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) 1963-2003 USA 25.0% 2.4 years
Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008) 1987-2000 UK, USA 32.0%e, 32.2%f 1.8, 1.8 years
Byoun (2008) 1971-2003 USA 33.0%g, 20.0%h 1.7, 3.1 years
Brav (2009) 1997-2003 UK 10.2%j , 22.5%k 6.4, 2.7 years
Huang and Ritter (2009) 1963-2001 USA 17.0% 3.7 years
Chang and Dasgupta (2009) 1971-2004 USA 37.8% 1.4 years
Elsas and Florysiak (2010) 1965-2009 USA 26.0% 2.3 years
Cook and Tang (2010) 1977-2006 USA 46.1%m, 43.7%n 1.1, 1.2 years
Elsas and Florysiak (2011) 1965-2009 USA 50.5%0, 45.0%p 1.0, 1.1 years
Faulkender et al. (2011) 1965-2006 USA 22.9%q, 69.3%r 2.6, 0.6 years
aFor debt financing.
bFor equity financing.
cFirms that pay dividends.
dFirms that do not pay dividends.
eUK firms.
fUS firms.
gFirms that are above target leverage and have a financial surplus.
hFirms that are above target leverage and have a financial deficit.
jPublic firms.
kPrivate firms.
mWhen the economy in an expansionary phase.
nWhen the economy in a recessionary phase.
0Highly over-levered firms.
pHighly under-levered firms.
qUnder-levered firms with near-zero cash flow realization.
rOver-levered firms with excess cash flow realization.
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions
Table 3-B: Variables Definitions
Variables Definition
Dependent
Book leverage The ratio of book debt to the book value of total assets.
Explanatory
Book debt Total assets less the book value of equity.
Book equity Total assets minus total liabilities and preferred stock plus
deferred taxes and convertible debt.
Market-to-book
value
The book value of total assets minus the book value of equity
plus the market value of equity divided by the book value
of total assets.
Profitability The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation
to the book value of total assets.
Firm size Natural logarithm of net sales deflated by the GDP deflator.
Non-debt tax shield Ratio of total depreciation expense to the book value of total
assets.
Tangibility The ratio of net plant, property, and equipment to the book
value of assets.
Investment The ratio of total capital expenditures to the book value of
total assets.
2-year stock returns Difference between share prices at time t and share prices at
time t− 2.
Financial deficit The ratio of the change in working capital plus investment
plus dividends less net cash flow to the book value of total
assets.
Target leverage Estimated from the regression of observed leverage on the
firm-specific variables and risk measures.
Leverage deviation Deviations of current leverage from the target leverage ratio.
Firm-specific risk Drawn from the net sales of firms scaled by the book value
of total assets.
Macroeconomic risk Proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP ob-
tained from the ARCH model.
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Appendix C: Generating Macroeconomic Risk
Table 3-C: ARCH Model Estimates for Macroeconomic Risk
Panel A of Table B reports the estimates obtained by estimating the ARCH(1) model for real gross domestic
(GDP) over the period 1975Q1-2009Q4. Specifically, allowing an ARMA term in the mean equation, we
estimate the following mean and variance equations simultaneously:
∆GDPt = ω + η(L)∆GDPt + δ(L)t + t
σ2t = α+ β(L)
2
t
where ω is a constant term, η and δ are the autoregressive and moving average parameters, respectively,
and L is the polynomial lag operator. The conditional variance, σ2t , is the one-period-ahead forecast
variance based on prior information. α is a constant term and |∆GDPt−1 ∼ N(0, σ2t−1) is the innova-
tion in real GDP. In the variance equation, the weights are (1-α, β) and the long-run average variance is√
α/(1− β), where α > 0 and 0 < β < 1. The figures given in parentheses are standard errors. The
estimates of the log-likelihood, Lagrange multiplier (ARCH LM) test, and Q-statistics to test for the
remaining ARCH effects in the model are given in Panel B of the table. We average the conditional
variance across four quarters to obtain a yearly measure of the risk of macroeconomic conditions. Sea-
sonally adjusted quarterly data spanning 1975Q1-2009Q4 on UK real GDP are taken from the Office for
National Statistics (ONS) database (Pn: A2: ABMI: Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measure).
Statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level is indicated by three and two asterisks, correspondingly.
Panel A: ARCH(1) Estimates
Regressors
∆GDP
Coefficients Std.Error
∆GDP t−1 0.777 (8.450)***
Constant 0.415 (0.159)***
AR(1) -0.808 (0.059)***
MA(1) 0.346 (0.153)**
MA(2) -0.532 (0.140)***
ARCH(1) 0.781 (0.234)***
Constant 0.813 (0.161)***
Panel B: Tests for remaining ARCH effects
Log-likelihood -233.961
Observations 139.000
LM-test(4) 0.610
P-value 0.962
LM-test(8) 1.050
P-value 0.994
Q(4) 1.128
P-value 0.889
Q(8) 2.527
P-value 0.960
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Appendix D: Testing for Unit Roots in Variables
Table 3-D: Fisher-Type Panel-Data Unit Root Tests
Table 3-D reports unit-root tests for firm-specific variables and risk series. Fisher-type panel-data unit-root
tests are based on the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regressions that include a constant, or a constant
and time trend. Specifically, these tests first conduct unit-root tests for each panel individually included
in the dataset. And then the p-values from these individually conducted unit root tests are combined
to produce an overall test. Z and L∗ Statistics combine p-values using inverse normal and inverse logit
transformations, respectively. The figures given in parentheses are p-value to test the null hypothesis
that all panels contain unit roots against an alternative hypothesis that at least one panel is stationary
for the underlying series. The number of lags used in the test is two. For macroeconomic risk series, the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test is contact including a constant, or a constant and linear time trend
in the regressions. The null hypothesis for the ADF test is that the series contains a unit root, and the
alternative is that the series does not has unit roots. The optimal number of lags for the ADF unit-root
test is determined by the “general to specific” method proposed by Perron and Campbell (1991). Book
leverage is the ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of total assets. Market leverage is
defined as the book value of total debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the market value
of equity. Net equity issues are defined as the ratio of change in book equity minus the change in retained
earnings to total assets. Newly retained earnings are the change in balance sheet retained earnings during
an accounting year period divided by the book value of total assets. Net debt issues are then defined as
the change in total assets to total assets less the sum of net equity issues and newly retained earnings.
The market-to-book value ratio is defined as the book value of total assets less the book value of equity
plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. Investment is the ratio of total
expenditures to purchase fixed tangible assets to the total book assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings
before interest, taxes, and depreciation to the total book assets. Tangibility is defined as the ratio of net
plant, property, and equipment to the total book assets. The 2-year stock return is the difference between
share prices at time t and share prices at time t − 2. Firm size is defined as the logarithm of net sales
deflated by the GDP deflator. The non-debt tax shield is defined as total depreciation expense divided by
the book value of total assets. Firm-specific risk is drawn from firms’ sales. Macroeconomic risk is proxied
by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under investigation.The sample consists of
all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981-2009.
The data are drawn from the WorldScope database via DataStream.
Variable
Constant Constant & Trend
Z Statistic L∗ Statistic Z Statistic L∗ Statistic
Book Leverage -8.756 -22.903 -3.427 -15.308
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Market Leverage -5.703 -8.101 -3.836 -8.011
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net Equity Issues -21.081 -32.455 -13.238 -21.553
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Newly Retained Earnings -17.208 -23.664 -11.470 -20.598
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Net Debt Issues -21.186 -27.266 -13.164 -20.294
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt-Equity Ratio -16.267 -35.982 -2.750 -10.915
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Market-to-Book Value -18.557 -31.535 -13.107 -25.936
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Investment -20.637 -34.035 -16.790 -26.660
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Portability -9.470 -17.363 -4.379 -9.529
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tangibility -5.768 -19.680 -2.828 -10.744
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Firm Size -7.426 -4.893 -3.430 -1.992
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023)
2-year Stock Returns -2.851 -7.495 -3.089 -1.510
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.065)
Non-debt Tax Shields -6.707 -14.689 -1.263 -7.566
(0.002) (0.000) (0.103) (0.065)
Firm-Specific Risk -24.693 -43.985 -13.796 -28.306
(0.002) (0.000) (0.103) (0.065)
Macroeconomic Risk -3.695 -4.956
(0.004) (0.000)
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Chapter 4
Macroeconomic Dynamics, Idiosyncratic Risk, and Firms’
Security Issuance Decisions: An Empirical Investigation of
UK Manufacturing Firms
4.1 Key Findings
In this chapter, we empirically analyze how firms make financing decisions under risk
using a large panel of UK manufacturing firms. Our results suggest that while incremental
changes in debt are significantly negatively related to idiosyncratic risk, both the issuance
of equity and the use of retained earnings are positively related to idiosyncratic risk. Our
results also suggest that firms in periods of high macroeconomic risk are not only likely to
reduce debt and equity financing but they are also likely to reduce their use of internally
generated funds (i.e., retained earnings). We also find that changes in firms’ target leverage
are significantly negatively linked with these two types of risk. The results from the debt-
equity choice regression suggest that firms are likely to reduce their debt-equity ratio in
periods when they experience either type of risk.
4.2 Introduction
Capital structure theories offer a number of predictions relating to the effect of variation
in firms’ own business activities and macroeconomic conditions on corporate financing
decisions. The trade-off theory postulates a negative relationship between idiosyncratic
risk and the target level of firms’ leverage. It is commonly believed that higher business
risk, as measured by variations in firms’ net earnings, increases the chance of bankruptcy.
Hence, given the positive costs of bankruptcy, firms tend to reduce the level of debt in
their capital structure when they face a large variation in their expected cash flow stream.
However, according to the agency costs theory, firms’ borrowing decisions are positively
related to business risk. A potential explanation behind this is that higher idiosyncratic
risk may decrease the agency cost of debt and firms therefore are likely to increase their
debt borrowing (Myers (1977)).
Referring to the market timing theory of capital structure, one can predict a negative
association between macroeconomic risks and firms’ capital structure. The market timing
theory suggests that firms significantly time their issues. In particular, firms are likely
to issue equity when their shares are overvalued and repurchase equity when shares are
undervalued.81 Since the heightening of macroeconomic risks can lead to a sharp reduction
81See Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2002), and Korajczyk and Levy
(2003).
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in the market value of equity, we would expect that firms are less likely to issue equity in
times of macroeconomic risk. The effect of macroeconomic risk on new debt issuance is
also expected to be negative. Since high debt increases the cost of financial distress and
exposes firms to macroeconomic risk, firms are likely to reduce the level of debt in their
capital structure as macroeconomic risk increases.82
On empirical grounds, several studies have successfully established the effects of risk
on corporate capital structure (see, for example, Hatzinikolaou, Katsimbris, and Noulas
(2002), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2008),
Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009), and Caglayan and Rashid (2010), among many
others).83 These studies have generally found that risk has a significant and negative
impact on firms’ capital structure. However, these studies mainly emphasize how risk
affects the target leverage rather than the effects of risk on the change in leverage or firms’
ability to use internally generated funds (i.e., retained earnings), debt borrowing, and
equity financing.
In this chapter, we investigate the effects of risks relating to firms’ own business activity
and macroeconomic conditions on the corporate capital structure in three ways. First,
in contrast to most prior studies, we examine how idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk
affect the annual change in leverage rather than the target level of leverage. This approach
enables us to relate the dynamics of firms’ leverage ratios to unpredictable variations in
firms’ own business activities as well as the overall macroeconomic environment.
Second, we decompose the aggregate change in leverage into three components relating
to the change in debt financing, the change in equity financing, and the change in retained
earnings, and we analyze how each component responds to uncertainty.84 By doing so,
we not only document the role of risk in the external financing decisions of firms (debt
borrowing and equity financing) but we also provide evidence on how risk about firms’ own
business activity and macroeconomic conditions affects firms’ use of internally generated
funds (the newly retained earnings). This approach also enables us to determine whether
risk affects leverage through a reduction in debt financing, as predicted by the bankruptcy
82See Gertler and Hubbard (1993) and Levy and Hennessy (2007). In particular, Levy and Hennessy
(2007) examine firms’ financing choices in a general equilibrium framework. They predict that firms issue
equity pro-cyclically. They also document that financially constrained firms are likely to reduce their
outstanding debt in periods of poor macroeconomic conditions.
83Titman and Wessels (1988) and MacKie-Mason (1990) are among the early studies that have provided
evidence on the existence of the negative relationship between firms’ leverage and idiosyncratic risk. How-
ever, we should note that prior studies estimating the effect of risk have largely focused on relating the
target leverage to risk. Rather, the focus of this chapter is to examine how risk affects changes in leverage
and the components of a change in leverage.
84Since firms’ observed leverage reflects the history of firms’ financing decisions, the historical tendencies
of many firm-specific factors, such as profitability, stock returns, and the financing deficit, can significantly
affect debt to assets ratios (Baker and Wurgler (2002), Welch (2004), and Kayhan and Titman (2007)).
This could bias the estimates on the effect of risk on book leverage. By studying whether risk concerning
firms’ own business activity and the overall state of the economic has an effect on the issuance of financial
instruments, we would be able to more effectively isolate the effect of risk on the capital structure of firms.
126
theory, or through other channels (equity financing, for example).85 Furthermore, this
investigation also provides us an opportunity to examine whether both idiosyncratic and
macroeconomic risk have differential effects on the components of the change in leverage.
Finally, we study how risk affects the choice of firms between issuing debt and issuing
equity. Examining the effect of risk on firms’ debt-equity choice, we are likely to infer
more explicitly whether firms prefer debt or equity financing in periods when firm-specific
and macroeconomic risks are high.
We argue that firms in periods of heightened idiosyncratic risk are likely to reduce their
outstanding debt as they become more cautious about bankruptcy costs. Furthermore,
banks and other lending institutions might be reluctant to lend to risky firms or, at least,
they would be inclined to lend such firms at a higher risk premium. Hence, risky firms are
likely to either use more internally generated funds or issue new equity due to increased
cost of financing. On the other hand, during periods of high macroeconomic volatility,
firms not only reduce the level of existing debt but also are less likely to issue equity as
the market value of firms sharply varies.
In order to test our claims, we focus on UK manufacturing firms and utilize an annual
unbalanced panel dataset obtained from the WorldScope database via DataStream. The
study covers the period 1981-2009. Given that our empirical models have a dynamic panel
data context, we use the two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimator augmented by
Blundell and Bond (1998). In our empirical investigation we use a set of firm-specific
factors, which includes lagged leverage, the market-to-book value ratio, the 2-year stock
return, the tangibility of assets, firm profitability, investment expenditures, firm size, and
non-debt tax shields, to control for firm-specific effects.
Our results show that firms are likely to reduce their leverage when they operate in
periods of heightened risk. These results are robust for both idiosyncratic and macroeco-
nomic risk. The negative sensitivity of leverage to idiosyncratic risk is consistent with the
notion that, given a positive cost of bankruptcy, risky firms reduce their use of debt due to
the heightened likelihood of bankruptcy. The inverse relationship between macroeconomic
risk and leverage also in line with the view that in periods of heightened risk, firms tend to
reduce the level of debt in their capital structure as high debt makes firms more exposed
to business-cycle risk.
Next, we examine the impact of risks on the components that affect the change in
leverage. Following Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Chen and Zhao (2007), we decompose
the aggregate annual change in leverage into the change in debt, the change in equity,
85Recent theoretical models such as Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006), Chen (2010), and Bhamra,
Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010) predict that macroeconomic risk also affects firms’ leverage via its effects
on equity issuance.
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and the change in retained earnings. We then investigate the effects of both idiosyncratic
and macroeconomic risk on these components. We find that idiosyncratic risk affects the
incremental changes in debt negatively, while the effects of idiosyncratic risk on both the
issuance of equity and the use of retained earnings are positive. This implies that the
negative sensitivity of the change in leverage to idiosyncratic risk arises not only because
of a reduction in debt but also due to a rise in net equity financing and newly retained
earnings.
When we turn to the effects of macroeconomic risk, we find that macroeconomic risk
affects negatively all three sources of financing: debt issues, retained earnings, and equity
issues. In particular, we find that during times of heightened macroeconomic risk, not only
external debt and equity issues fall but also firms’ use of internally generated funds declines
significantly. The negative sensitivity of both the issuance of debt and equity to variations
in macroeconomic conditions suggests that firms time their equity and debt issues. In
other words, firms are less likely to issue securities when macroeconomic prospects are
not favorable. These observations are consistent with the findings of Korajczyk and Levy
(2003) which indicate that macroeconomic conditions are of significance for securities
issuance. Further, our results on the effects of macroeconomic risk are in line with the
predictions of Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006).86
Two implications emerging from results related macroeconomic risks are worth noting.
First, it turns out that the negative effects of macroeconomic risk on changes in leverage are
purely the result of a reduction in debt financing. Second, firms in times when the overall
macroeconomic environment is uncertain and unstable are likely to design their investment
and financing policies propassively. To that end, we argue that during uncertain states of
the economy, even cash-rich firms may prefer to hold cash in hand rather than investing
it as buffer cash holdings safeguard them against financial distress.
The results, from the regression of the firms’ debt-equity choice, confirm our findings
on the effects of risk on leverage components and suggest that the effect of both firm-
specific and macroeconomic risk is negative and significant statistically. Specifically, we
find that firms tend to issue equity rather than debt when firm-specific risk is high. The
same holds true for macroeconomic risk, suggesting that firms lower their debt-equity
ratios when macroeconomic risk is high. However, this finding along with the evidence
of the negative impact of macroeconomic risk on the issuance of both debt and equity
suggests that although firms reduce their use of external financing (debt and equity) in
periods of volatile macroeconomic conditions, they do a reduction in debt borrowing by a
86Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) proposed a contingent claims model in which the cash flows of
firms are conditional on both idiosyncratic risk and macroeconomic conditions. They predict that firms’
borrowing capacity exhibits pro-cyclicity and that both the pace and the size of capital structure changes
depend on macroeconomic conditions.
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larger amount than they do in equity financing.
Our remaining results suggest that firm characteristics are also important in the deter-
mination of the components of the change in leverage. Specifically, we find that the effects
of firm-specific variables are asymmetric across all three components. Firms’ profitability
is negatively related to the issuance of equity, while it is positively associated with the
issuance of debt. On the other hand, firms having more tangible assets relative to their
total assets are more likely to issue equity and less likely to use debt in their capital struc-
ture. Firms with high levels of non-debt tax shields are more likely to issue debt but tend
to decrease the use of internal funds to finance their capital needs. We also find that the
market-to-book value ratio is significantly positively linked with all three components of
the change in leverage. Further, we find that large firms are less likely to issue equity but
are more likely to issue debt. However, high-return firms have a large propensity to issue
equity rather than debt. In contrast, firms that incur more investment expenditures are
more likely to issue debt. We find that the effects of these traditional determinants of cap-
ital structure are generally similar to those reported in earlier research (see, for example,
Baker and Wurgler (2002), Alti (2006), Chen and Zhao (2007), Lemmon, Roberts, and
Zender (2008), and Chang and Dasgupta (2009)).
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss in detail how risks
concerning firms’ own business activities as well as macroeconomic conditions influence
firms’ financing decisions. Section 3 discusses the data, variable construction, and the
generation of proxies for risk. Section 4 presents summary statistics and correlations.
Section 5 describes the empirical framework. Section 6 presents and discusses the empirical
findings. Section 7 concludes the chapter.
4.3 Firms’ Financing Decisions in the Presence of Risk
4.3.1 Idiosyncratic Risk Effects
According to the trade-off theory of capital structure, an increase in firm-level risk mea-
sured by vulnerability of the net earnings of the firm tends to heighten the likelihood of
bankruptcy. Hence, the firm is likely to reduce its existing level of debt financing when the
firm experiences a greater variation in net earnings. This idea is explained in Castanias
(1983), who shows that with a given marginal tax rate and marginal default cost function,
higher business risk results in a decline in the debt level of firms.
In line with bankruptcy cost theory, Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) present a single
period corporate capital structure model and show the presence of an inverse relation
between a firm’s optimal level of debt and its earning volatility. It is also argued that
financial distress is costly regardless of the presence or the absence of bankruptcy (Brealey
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and Myers (1981)). Firms therefore generally have a tendency to repress the probability
of distress, hence, risky firms use less debt in their capital structure than the others.
Banks and other lending institutions also avoid the channeling of funds toward risky
firms or they require a higher risk premium making debt costly to borrow. As a result,
risky firms reduce their use of debt financing, while they are more likely to opt for raising
funds from the equity markets. In this sense, the impact of idiosyncratic risk on firms’
target leverage is negative as the likelihood of raising new debt relative to equity declines
during periods of heightened idiosyncratic risk. In other words, firms tend to reduce the
level of existing debt but issue equity in periods of internal unrest.
In contrast, Myers (1977) suggests that there is a positive relationship between the
optimal level of firms’ debt and idiosyncratic risk. It is argued that a large amount of
risk associated with the firms’ own business activities may tend to reduce the debt-related
agency costs and these lower agency costs tend to induce firms to use more debt in their
capital structure. Jaffe and Westerfield (1987) present a simple model, which incorporates
both corporate taxes and bankruptcy costs to forge the link between firms’ debt and the
risk under which they operate. They show that neither the value of debt nor the ratio
of debt to equity are negatively affected by the firms’ earnings variability. Indeed, they
predict a positive relationship between the two variables. Kale, Noe, and Ramirez (1991)
predict a U-shaped relationship between idiosyncratic risk and the level of firm debt.
They argue that an increase in firm-level risk initially causes firms to reduce the amount
of debt outstanding. This relationship is, however, totally reversed as the debt level of
a firm exceeds a threshold-level, implying a positive relationship between firm debt and
idiosyncratic risk.
4.3.2 Macroeconomic Risk Effects
As argued by Gertler and Hubbard (1993), firms take into account both firm-specific risk
and macroeconomic risk while making their production and financing decisions. However,
firms can only manipulate the firm-level risk. Therefore, to extenuate the costs of financial
distress, firms should share the risk with outside lenders by issuing equity. Hence, the
optimal capital structure is comprised of a mix of debt and equity rather than of pure
debt or equity. It is also argued that a high level of debt makes firms to heavily exposed
to business-cycle risks (Gertler and Hubbard (1993)). Hence, one can predict a negative
association between macroeconomic risks and the use of debt in firms’ capital structure.
According to the market timing hypothesis, firms time their equity issues. In par-
ticular, firms are likely to issue equity when their shares are overvalued and repurchase
equity when shares are undervalued (Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) and Baker
and Wurgler (2002)). However, because an increase in risks relating to overall macroe-
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conomic environment reduces the market value of equity, firms are less likely to do so
(Korajczyk and Levy (2003)). Thus, macroeconomic risks should have a negative impact
on firms’ propensity to issue equity.
Finally, we also predict a negative impact of macroeconomic risk on the change in firms’
retained earnings. This can be explained as follows. In periods of uncertain macroeconomic
conditions, firms’ managers become more cautious about financial distress costs. As a
result, they might prefer cash in hand rather than investing it as they regard cash holdings
as a buffer against any future insolvency. Thus, firms reduce the use of internally generated
funds in financing their investments.
Recent theoretical studies more systematically relate firms’ financing decisions to
business-cycle risks. For instance, Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) proposed a
contingent claims model in which the cash flows of firms are conditional on both an
idiosyncratic risk and macroeconomic conditions. They predict that firms’ borrowing
capacity exhibits pro-cyclicity and that both the pace and the size of capital structure
changes depend on macroeconomic conditions. Levy and Hennessy (2007) examine firms’
financing choices in a general equilibrium framework. They predict that firms issue equity
pro-cyclically. They also document that firms are more likely to reduce their outstanding
debt in periods of poor macroeconomic conditions.
Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010) and Chen (2010) develop a dynamic capital
structure model to examine how corporate financing policy responds to macroeconomic
fluctuations. They show that unpredictable variations in macroeconomic conditions have
a significant impact on firms’ financing policies. Particularly, Chen (2010) predicts that
higher macroeconomic risks increase discount rates (risk premia) and deteriorate future
cash flows, which lessens the discounted value of expected tax benefits, which lowers the
advantages related to the outstanding stock of debt. Hence, firms are likely to be low
lever by reducing their outstanding amounts of debt in bad times. Bhamra, Kuehn, and
Strebulaev (2010) explain the pro-cyclicality of leverage through state-contingent optimal
coupon payments. In particular, they argue that firms are likely to choose lower optimal
coupons in times of high macroeconomic risk in order to increase their financial flexibility.
This renders firms to be conservative in their use of debt financing in a bad state of the
economy, which leads leverage to be pro-cyclical.
The hypotheses regarding the effects of idiosyncratic risk and macroeconomic vulner-
ability on the source of financing are summarized in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: How Risk Affects Firms’ Financing Decisions: A Summary of the
Hypotheses
Table 4.1 represents the summary of the hypotheses regarding the effects of risk on firms’ financing
resources. Net equity issue is the ratio of change in book equity less the change in retained earnings
to book value of total assets. Newly retained earnings are the ratio of the change in balance sheet
retained earnings during an accounting year period to the book value of total assets. Net debt
issues are defined as the change in total assets to total assets less the sum of net equity issues
and newly retained earnings. Idiosyncratic risk is drawn from firms’ sales. Macroeconomic risk
is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under investigation. The
sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point
over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope file via DataStream.
Risk
Hypothesis
Equity Issuance ∆ Retained Earnings Debt Issuance
Idiosyncratic Risk Positive Positive Negative
Macroeconomic Risk Negative Negative Negative
4.3.3 Prior Empirical Evidence
A number of empirical studies provide evidence that is in accordance with the above pre-
dictions.87 For example, Caglayan and Rashid (2010) find that an increase in uncertainty
(both firm-specific and macroeconomic), proxied by several measures, leads to a decline in
the target leverage for UK public and non-public manufacturing firms. Baum, Stephan,
and Talavera (2009) also report a significant and negative impact of risk relating to firms’
sales and the state of the economy on the optimal short-term leverage for US non-financial
public firms. Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) report a negative effect of the firm’s
cash flow volatility measured by the standard deviations of historical operating income on
both book and market leverage. Similarly, the findings of Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal
(2008) also confirm the negative association between the firm’s earning volatility and its
debt level. Taub (1975), Marsh (1982), Titman and Wessels (1988), and MacKie-Mason
(1990) are among the early studies that have provided evidence on the existence of the
negative relationship between firms’ leverage and idiosyncratic risk.88
4.4 Data Description
In this section, we describe the sample and define our dependent as well as the firm-specific
explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis. In addition, we discuss the approach
which we use to generate our risk proxies.
87However, we should note that prior studies estimating the effect of risk have largely focused on relating
the target leverage to risk. Rather, the focus of this chapter is to examine how risk affects changes in
leverage and the components of a change in leverage.
88See Chapter 2 of the thesis for a comprehensive survey of the literature on the effects of risk on the
target level of firms’ leverage.
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4.4.1 Sample Selection
We use a firm-level unbalanced annual panel manufacturing dataset for the United King-
dom. The data are drawn from the WorldScope file via DataStream and cover the period
from 1981-2009.89 We restrict our sample to include firms that have at least five years
of data.90 All the firm-specific variables are scaled by total assets. The variables in the
ratio form are winzorised at the first and ninety-ninth percentile.91 In order to generate
macroeconomic risk, seasonally adjusted quarterly data spanning 1975Q1-2009Q4 on UK
real GDP are obtained from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) database.
4.4.2 Variable Construction
The variables are defined as follows. Following prior empirical studies, including Baker
and Wurgler (2002), Alti (2006), and Kayhan and Titman (2007), we define book equity as
total assets minus total liabilities and preferred stock plus deferred taxes and convertible
debt. Book debt is defined as total assets less book equity. Book leverage is defined as the
ratio of book debt to total assets. Market equity is defined as common shares outstanding
multiplied by the market price of each share. Market leverage is defined as book debt
divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity. As in Baker
and Wurgler (2002) and Kayhan and Titman (2007), we drop the firm-year observations
where the ratio of market leverage exceeds one or less than zero.
Net equity issues are defined as the ratio of change in book equity minus the change in
retained earnings to total assets. Newly retained earnings are the change in balance sheet
retained earnings during an accounting year period divided by the book value of total
assets. Net debt issues are defined as the change in total assets to total assets less the sum
of net equity issues and newly retained earnings.92 Firm size is defined as the logarithm
of total net sales deflated by the GDP deflator. Asset tangibility is defined as the ratio of
net plant, property, and equipment to the book value of total assets. Profitability is the
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to the book value of total assets.
The 2-year stock return is defined as the difference between share prices at time t and
share prices at time t− 2. The market-to-book value ratio is defined as the book value of
89As we allow both entry and exit in the sample, we arguably partly mitigate potential sample selection
and survivor bias.
90We impose this restriction because at least four observations are needed for each underlying firm to
generate a proxy for idiosyncratic risk using AR(1) and the implementation of the two-step system-GMM
methodology as the system-GMM estimation required the second and higher lags of the variables included
in the model as instruments.
91These data screening methods are quite common in the literature and the implementation of these
methods is aimed at ensuring comparability with earlier studies (Baker and Wurgler (2002), Alti (2006),
Kayhan and Titman (2007), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009),
Brav (2009), and Caglayan and Rashid (2010).
92Our definitions of net equity issues, newly retained earnings, and net debt issues follow Baker and
Wurgler (2002).
133
total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the
book value of total assets.93 The non-debt tax shield is defined as the total depreciation
expense divided by the book value of total assets.
4.4.3 Measuring Risk
Various statistical methods have been used in the literature to generate measures of risk.
These methods generally include moving standard deviations, autoregressive (AR) spec-
ifications, state space models, ARCH/GARCH modelling, stochastic volatility models,
the intra-annual variation approach, and survey-based methods. However, most of these
methods suffer from statistical problems. For instance, a simple moving standard deviation
measure of risk and survey-based measures suffer from the problem of serial correlation
and measurement error, respectively. Specifications based on GARCH and state space
models can be very complicated. Further, these specifications are likely to face a problem
of very weak persistence of shocks in annual data. Time-invariance and measurement error
in a proxy for risk may cause a significant bias in empirical inference. What follows in this
sub-section is our brief discussion on methods that we use to generate risk proxies.
Here we use an autoregressive (AR) process to generate idiosyncratic risk for each
underlying firm. Unlike most of the above-mentioned methods, this method allows us
to generate a risk measures which is appropriate for all types of firms (small and large).
Furthermore, this approach enables us to proxy risk using the unpredictable components
of the movement of the underling variable rather than the variability of the variable per se.
In doing this, we utilize firms’ annual sales normalized by the book value of total assets.
Specifically, the generalized autoregressive AR(L) process is defined as follows:
Γi,t = κi + φ(L)Γi,t + i,t (4.1)
where Γi,t is the ratio of sales to the book value of total assets for firm i at time t, κi is the
constant for firm i, φ is the autoregressive parameter, L is the polynomial lag operator,
and i,t is the error term with zero mean and finite variance.
To generate our measure of idiosyncratic risk, we first estimate an autoregressive (AR)
order one model for each firm over the period under investigation. Next, for each firm,
we obtain one-period-ahead residuals (errors) from the estimated model. Finally, we use
the residuals to calculate the risk proxy by computing the recursive variance using a one-
year window for each firm over the examined period. Specifically, for the year 1982, we
compute the variance of the residuals obtained from the AR(1) model of sales over 1982
and 1981. Similarly, for year 1983, the residuals in 1983, 1982 and 1981 are used. The
93Baker and Wurgler (2002), Hovakimian, Hovakimian, and Tehranian (2004), and Kayhan and Titman
(2007) also define the market-to-book ratio in similar way.
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process is repeated for the remaining years. The square root of the estimated recursive
variance, denoted by Riskidioi,t , is then used as a proxy for idiosyncratic uncertainty.
To generate macroeconomic risk, researchers have generally used three methods, namely
the ARCH/GARCH methodology, moving standard deviations, and survey-based meth-
ods. For example, Caglayan and Rashid (2010) estimate GARCH models for quarterly
GDP and Treasury bill rates and utilize the conditional variance to construct a proxy for
risk associated with the overall macroeconomic environment. Driver, Temple, and Urga
(2005) and Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009) use the conditional variance obtained
from the estimation of GARCH specifications for manufacturing output and the index
of leading macroeconomic indicators, respectively, to gauge macroeconomic uncertainty.
Analogously, Aizenman and Marion (1999) also utilize the conditional variance obtained by
estimating a GARCH model for government expenditure, the nominal money supply and
the real exchange rate to construct a proxy for macroeconomic risk. Ghosal and Loungani
(2000) use the moving standard deviation of the Federal Funds Rate (FFR) and energy
prices as a proxy for macroeconomic risks. Kaufmann, Mehrez, and Schmukler (2005)
and Graham and Harvey (2001a) use survey-based methods based on the dispersion of
forecast to proxy macroeconomic risk. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) utilize two-year equity
market return and two-year aggregate domestic nonfinancial corporate profit growth to
proxy macroeconomic conditions.
We estimate an ARCH model for seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP over the
period 1975-2009 to generate a proxy for macroeconomic risk:
∆GDPt = ω + η(L)∆GDPt + δ(L)t + t (4.2)
σ2t = α+ β(L)
2
t (4.3)
where ω is a constant term, η and δ are autoregressive and moving average parameters,
respectively, and L is the polynomial lag operator. The estimated conditional variance,
σˆ2t , is the one-period-ahead forecast variance based on prior information. α is the constant
and |∆GDPt−1 ∼ N(0, σ2t−1) is the error term.
The quarterly conditional variance obtained from the ARCH estimation is annualized
by taking a 4-quarter average and denoted by Riskmacrot , which we then use as a proxy
for macroeconomic risk in our empirical analysis. The estimate on ARCH (0.781) is less
than one and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. The diagnostic test statistics
indicate that there is no remaining ARCH effects left in the standardized residuals.94’95
94The results for the ARCH estimation are not given because they are already presented in Table 3-C,
Appendix C of Chapter 3.
95To examine the interdependence between the two types of risk measures we estimate the correlation
between both uncertainties. The coefficient of correlation (0.02) is very small and not statistically different
from zero, suggesting that both forms of risk are independent and cover a different aspect of the risk faced
by firms.
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4.5 Summary Statistics and Correlation Estimates
In this section, we present summary statistics for the firms’ financing activities and the
risk measures. We also present correlations of firms’ financing decisions with risk. We
observe that firms’ financial decisions substantially vary across both types of risk as well as
across different extents of risk. The estimates of correlation provide preliminary evidence,
supporting the interlinkage between firms’ financing decisions and our risk measures.
4.5.1 Financing Activities across Different Levels of Risk
Table 4.2 reports the mean and standard deviations of firms’ financing instruments across
low and high levels of both idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk for the whole sample
period as well as the three sub-periods, viz. 1981-1990, 1991-2000, and 2001-2009. The
low level of risk is measured as the risk at or below the 25th percentile and high risk is
defined as the risk at or above the 75th percentile. We observe several notable differences
both across low and high levels of risk and across different time periods. These differences
provide significant evidence that firms during low and high periods of risk do not exhibit
the same patterns of financing activities.
The mean of the ratio of change in total debt to the book value of total assets is 0.004
(0.011) and -0.001 (-0.030) for periods of low and high idiosyncratic (macroeconomic)
uncertainty over the entire sample period, respectively. This suggests that firms are likely
to reduce the use of debt, on average, in their capital structure in response to an increase
in either type of risk. However, the amount of debt declined by firms in periods when
macroeconomic risk is high, on average, is greater than the amount when idiosyncratic
risk is high.
With respect to the financing decisions of firms, we observe that over the whole sample
period, the mean value of the ratio of net equity issues to the book value of total assets is
0.004 for periods of high macroeconomic risk, which is considerably lower than the average
of net equity issues for periods of low macroeconomic risk, which is 0.011. This difference
can also be observed for all three sub-periods, suggesting that firms are likely to issue less
net equity during more uncertain macroeconomic conditions. In contrast to the case of
macroeconomic risk, net equity issues have a higher mean value for the entire firm-year
observations when idiosyncratic risk is relatively high. While the figures for the 1980s and
1990s are in line with this evidence, it is evident from the estimates that firms issue less
net equity, on average, over 2001-09 when they operate under high levels of business risk.
These differences suggest that firms’ decisions to issue or repurchase equity are likely to
relate not only to the extent of risk but also to the source of risk. However, the issuance
of net equity generally seems more volatile in periods of high risk as compared to low risk
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of Financing Activities across High and Low
Risk
Table 4.2 reports the mean and standard deviations (S.D) of the change in the debt ratio, the newly
retained earnings, net debt issues, and equity issues over low and high levels of both idiosyncratic
and macroeconomic risk. Low risk is measured at or below the 25th percentile and high risk is
measured at or above the 75th percentile. The change in debt is the ratio of the change in the book
value of total debt to the book value of total assets. Net equity issue is the ratio of change in book
equity less the change in retained earnings to book value of total assets. Newly retained earnings
are the ratio of the change in balance sheet retained earnings during an accounting year period to
the book value of total assets. Net debt issues are defined as the change in total assets to total
assets less the sum of net equity issues and newly retained earnings. Idiosyncratic risk is drawn
from firms’ sales. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over
the period under investigation. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the
London Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the
WorldScope file via DataStream.
Variables
Idiosyncratic Risk Macroeconomic Risk
Low High Low High
Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
∆Debt/Book Assets
1981-90 0.008 0.071 0.021 0.149 0.005 0.067 0.010 0.096
1991-00 -0.003 0.122 -0.036 0.266 -0.008 0.195 -0.007 0.241
2001-09 0.007 0.197 -0.009 0.424 0.024 0.288 -0.047 0.241
1981-2009 0.004 0.162 -0.001 0.374 0.011 0.250 -0.030 0.211
Net Equity Issues
1981-90 0.013 0.039 0.022 0.062 0.200 0.012 0.016 0.048
1991-00 0.004 0.040 0.015 0.080 0.011 0.052 0.006 0.023
2001-09 0.012 0.117 0.009 0.182 0.012 0.109 0.002 0.124
1981-2009 0.009 0.091 0.011 0.157 0.011 0.090 0.004 0.111
Newly Ret. Earnings
1981-90 0.046 0.093 0.020 0.195 0.100 0.134 0.013 0.141
1991-00 0.028 0.142 0.045 0.272 0.012 0.162 0.010 0.117
2001-09 0.008 0.269 -0.029 0.471 -0.014 0.366 -0.021 0.332
1981-2009 0.019 0.219 -0.007 0.419 -0.003 0.300 -0.013 0.298
Net Debt Issues
1981-90 0.062 0.139 0.120 0.232 0.201 0.112 0.045 0.165
1991-00 0.024 0.121 0.020 0.284 0.028 0.202 -0.006 0.135
2001-09 0.036 0.169 0.033 0.328 0.039 0.233 0.024 0.224
1981-2009 0.034 0.151 0.038 0.314 0.035 0.221 0.023 0.209
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periods regardless of the source of risk.
The newly retained earnings of firms show a monotonic decreasing trend during low
levels of idiosyncratic as well as macroeconomic risk. For periods of low idiosyncratic
(macroeconomic) risk, the mean value of the newly retained earnings has decreased from
0.046 (0.100) in the 1980s to 0.028 (0.012) in the 1990s, and further to 0.008 (-0.014) over
the period 2001-09. Comparing across the low and high levels of risk, one can see that,
on average, the newly retained earnings of firms, on average, have decreased substantially
and even become negative during periods of high risk. This fact is robust across all three
sub-periods as well as across both idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk. The standard
deviations provide evidence that, although the newly retained earnings have higher vari-
ability in later rather than in earlier years, the intensity of fluctuations remains the same
across low and high levels of risk.
The mean value of net debt issues provides evidence that firms facing higher risk issue
significantly less new debt, on average, particulary in the 1990s and the period 2001-
09. For the full sample period, the average of net debt issues is 0.035 in the period
when macroeconomic risk is low, whereas, this figure is only 0.024 for the times of high
macroeconomic risk. This observation implies that firms are likely to be more cautious
about the cost of financial distress and bankruptcy in times of high levels of risk. The
issuance of the new debt displays a higher variation during periods of high than of low
idiosyncratic risk. Yet, such differences are not observed across low and high level of
macroeconomic uncertainty. Table 4.3 presents summary statistics for the risk measures.
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of the Risk Measures
The second and last columns of the table report the mean and standard deviations (S.D) for firm-
specific and macroeconomic risk, respectively. The third, fourth, and fifth columns report the 10th,
50th and 90th percentiles, respectively, for both types of risk. Idiosyncratic risk is drawn from sales
of firms, while macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the
period 1975Q1-2009Q4.
Risk
Percentile
Mean P10 P50 P90 S.D
Idiosyncratic Risk 0.309 0.075 0.213 0.594 0.418
Macroeconomic Risk 1.779 0.995 1.412 5.531 4.631
4.5.2 Correlation between Financing Decisions and Risk
Table 4.4 presents the correlations, along with their p-values, between both measures of
risk and the financing instruments for the sub-periods, in addition to the complete set
of firm-year observations. Specifically, we divide the full sample period 1981-2009 into
three sub-periods. The first two sub-periods cover a 10-year period each (1981-1990 and
1991-2000), while the third one covers the period 2001-2009. This division allows us to
examine the correlation patterns over time.
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The sign, the magnitude, and the significance of the correlations vary substantially
across the sample periods as well as across both measures of risk. For instance, the
correlation between the ratio of the change in total debt to the book value of assets
and idiosyncratic risk is negative and statistically significant for the periods of the 1990s
and 2001-09, while it appears with the opposite sign and statistically insignificant in the
1980s. Similarly, the change in the debt ratio is negatively and significantly correlated
with macroeconomic risk in the 1980s and 2001-09, whereas, in the 1990s, a positive but
statistically insignificant correlation is observed. For the entire set of firm-year obser-
vations, while negative and significant correlations with the change in the debt to book
assets ratio are found for both types of risk, the correlation is relatively more powerful for
firm-specific risk.
Table 4.4: Correlation Estimates between Risk and Financing Instruments
Table 4.4 reports the estimates of the correlation between the measures of risk and the change in
the debt ratio, net equity issues, the newly retained earnings, and net debt issues. The second and
fourth columns of the table report the coefficient of correlation and the third and fifth columns
report the p-value. The change in debt is the ratio of the change in the book value of total debt
to the book value of total assets. Net equity issue is the ratio of the change in book equity less the
change in retained earnings to the book value of total assets. Newly retained earning is the ratio
of the change in balance sheet retained earnings during an accounting year period to the book
value of total assets. Net debt issues are defined as the change in total assets to total assets less
the sum of net equity issues and newly retained earnings. Idiosyncratic risk is drawn from firms’
sales. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period
under investigation. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock
Exchange at any point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope file
via DataStream.
Variables
Idiosyncratic Risk Macroeconomic Risk
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
∆ Debt/Book Assets
1981-90 0.012 0.691 -0.010 0.039
1991-00 -0.087 0.000 0.020 0.195
2001-09 -0.029 0.011 -0.030 0.009
1981-2009 -0.034 0.000 -0.028 0.001
Net Equity Issues
1981-90 0.104 0.008 -0.028 0.477
1991-00 0.067 0.000 -0.038 0.017
2001-09 0.025 0.033 -0.027 0.023
1981-2009 0.029 0.001 -0.026 0.005
Newly Ret. Earnings
1981-90 -0.037 0.340 -0.218 0.000
1991-00 0.069 0.000 -0.019 0.227
2001-09 0.056 0.000 -0.032 0.005
1981-2009 0.046 0.000 -0.044 0.000
Net Debt Issues
1981-90 -0.134 0.000 -0.202 0.000
1991-00 0.027 0.082 -0.036 0.025
2001-09 -0.031 0.008 -0.063 0.000
1981-2009 -0.032 0.000 -0.052 0.000
It is important to note that there are positive and significant correlations between net
equity issues and idiosyncratic risk in each sub-period and for the overall sample period
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as well. In contrast, the issuance of new equity is negatively correlated with macroeco-
nomic risk. This suggests that firms are likely to issue more net equity when either the
macroeconomic conditions are relatively stable or when firms are uncertain about their po-
tential internal cash flow stream. Positive and significant correlations between the newly
retained earnings and idiosyncratic risk are found, suggesting that firms may prefer to
utilize internal funds over external resources when they face higher idiosyncratic risk.
On the other hand, negative and significant correlations for the newly retained earnings
of firms are observed for macroeconomic risk for the whole sample period and in each
sub-period with the exception of the 1990s where the correlation estimate is statistically
insignificant. Regarding net debt issuance, the correlation estimates provide evidence
that firms are likely to issue less new debt when they go through periods of either high
idiosyncratic risk or macroeconomic risk. However, we can observe that an increase in
macroeconomic risk seems to have a more severe effect on the issuance of debt as compared
to idiosyncratic risk, particularly during the last 9-years of the sample period.
While the unconditional correlations reveal some interesting facts, they cannot provide
a complete picture of the dynamic association between risk and firms’ financing activities.
However, it is of great importance to examine the effects of risk in a dynamic framework
when other firm-specific factors are also part of the empirical model. Therefore, we model
the change in leverage and its components as a function of both measures of risk and
several firm-specific factors as described in the following section.
4.6 Empirical Framework
In this section, we present our specifications for analyzing changes in the leverage ratio
and for the composition of the change in the leverage ratio. This section also discusses
the estimation methods.
4.6.1 How Does Risk Affect the Change in Leverage?
We start our empirical analysis by investigating how risk affects the change in the leverage
ratio. To formulate our empirical model, we augment a standard model that examines
the change in leverage by incorporating both idiosyncratic and macroeconomic risk. In
our investigation, we also use a number of variables to control for firm-specific effects.
Specifically, the model can be explained as follows:
∆Leveragei,t = β0 + Zi,t−1β1 + β2Riskidioi,t−1 + β3Risk
macro
t−1 + υi + εi,t (4.4)
In equation (4.4) above, Leveragei,t is a measure of the book (market) leverage of firm i in
year t and ∆ denotes the difference operator. Zi,t is a vector of firm-specific variables that
includes one-period lagged leverage, the market-to book value ratio, capital investment
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expenditures-to-total assets ratio, profitability, tangibility, the 2-year stock return, the
non-debt tax shield, and the log value of firms’ sales as a proxy for firm size. Riskidioi,t is
a measure of time-varying idiosyncratic risk and Riskmacrot is a measure of time-varying
macroeconomic risk. υi captures the effects of time-invariant unobservable firm-specific
factors. εi,t represents the time-varying residuals.
4.6.2 Which Component of the Change in Leverage is more Sensitive to Risk?
After establishing the impact of risk on the aggregate change in the leverage ratio, we
test how risk affects the components of the change in leverage. As in Baker and Wurgler
(2002), Alti (2006), and Chen and Zhao (2007), we decompose the annual change in the
leverage ratio into three components by suing the following accounting identity:
Ai,t = Ai,t−1 + ∆Di,t + ∆Ei,t + ∆REi,t (4.5)
where Ai,t = total assets of firm i in year t, Di,t = total debt of firm i in year t, Ei,t =
total equity of firm i in year t, REi,t = retained earnings of firm i in year t, and ∆ denote
the difference operator.
Multiplying both sides of equation (4.5) by Di,t−1 and dividing by Ai,t(Ai,t−1) yield the
following:
Di,t−1(Ai,t)
Ai,t(Ai,t−1)
=
Di,t−1(Ai,t−1)
Ai,t(Ai,t−1)
+
Di,t−1(∆Di,t)
Ai,t(Ai,t−1)
+
Di,t−1(∆Ei,t)
Ai,t(Ai,t−1)
+
Di,t−1(∆REi,t)
Ai,t(Ai,t−1)
(4.6)
By subtracting
Di,t(Ai,t−1)
Ai,t(Ai,t−1) from both sides of equation (4.6) and multiplying both sides by
-1 we obtain the following:
Di,t(Ai,t−1)
Ai,t(Ai,t−1)
− Di,t−1(Ai,t)
Ai,t(Ai,t−1)
=
Di,t(Ai,t−1)
Ai,t(Ai,t−1)
− Di,t−1(Ai,t−1)
Ai,t(Ai,t−1)
− Di,t−1(∆Di,t)
Ai,t(Ai,t−1)
− Di,t−1(∆Ei,t)
Ai,t(Ai,t−1)
− Di,t−1(∆REi,t)
Ai,t(Ai,t−1)
(4.7)
By simplifying both the left-hand and the right-hand sides of equation (4.7) we get the
following:
Di,t
Ai,t
− Di,t−1
Ai,t−1
=
(
1− Di,t−1
Ai,t−1
)(
∆Di,t
Ai,t
)
+
(
−Di,t−1
Ai,t−1
)(
∆Ei,t
Ai,t
)
+
(
−Di,t−1
Ai,t−1
)(
∆ERi,t
Ai,t
)
(4.8)
Finally, we re-write the above equation as follows:
∆Leveragei,t = β1
(
∆Di,t
Ai,t
)
+ β2
(
∆Ei,t
Ai,t
)
+ β3
(
∆ERi,t
Ai,t
)
(4.9)
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where ∆Leveragei,t =
Di,t
Ai,t
− Di,t−1Ai,t−1 . β1 = (1−
Di,t−1
Ai,t−1 ), β2 = (−
Di,t−1
Ai,t−1 ), and β3 = (−
Di,t−1
Ai,t−1 )
are weights on net debt issuance
∆Di,t
Ai,t
, net equity issuance
∆Ei,t
Ai,t
, and newly retained
earnings
∆REi,t
Ai,t
, respectively.
Equation (4.9) describes how these three components of leverage contribute to the
overall change in leverage ratio. In order to examine their relation to risk, we regress each
of these components on both risk measures and the firm-specific variables. This approach
enables us to identify whether risk affects the leverage ratio through new debt issues, new
equity issues or if its effects come via the newly retained earnings of the firms. Specifically,
we estimate the following model:
Yi,t = β0 + Zi,t−1β1 + β2Riskidioi,t−1 + β3Risk
macro
i,t−1 + υi + εi,t (4.10)
where the dependent variable, Yi,t, is net debt issues, net equity issues, and the newly
retained earnings for firm i in year t. The rest is similar to that in equation (4.4).
4.6.3 Risk and Firms’ Choice between Debt and Equity
To better understand the role of risk in firms’ financing decisions, it is important to know
what the effects of risk on firms’ choice of a debt-equity ratio are. In this section, we
therefore examine the effects of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk on a firm’s choice
between debt and equity financing by estimating the regression of the debt-equity ratio of
the following form:
DERi,t = β0 + Zi,t−1β1 + β2Riskidioi,t−1 + β3Risk
macro
t−1 + υi + εi,t (4.11)
The dependent variable, DERi,t, in equation (4.11) is the debt-equity ratio of firm i in
year t, which is defined as the ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of
total equity. Zi,t is a vector of firm-specific variables used in prior empirical studies of
the choice between debt and equity financing. Riskidioi,t is a measure of time-varying firm-
specific risk. Riskmacrot is a measure of time-varying macroeconomic risk. The term υi
captures the effects of time-invariant unobservable firm-specific factors such as reputation
and capital intensity. The term εi,t represents the time-varying residuals. The subscripts
i and t denote firm and time period, respectively.
The coefficients of interest to us are β2 and β3, the effect of firm-specific and macroe-
conomic risk on firms’ debt-equity ratio, respectively. We predict a negative relation
between firm-specific risk and the choice of firms between issuing debt and issuing equity
(i.e.,
∂DERi,t
∂Riskidioi,t−1
= β2 < 0). We expect this because given that a firm with a low debt-equity
is less likely to be bankrupt, the firm lowers its debt-equity ratio when firm-specific risk
is high. We also expect that the effect of macroeconomic risk on firms’ debt-equity ratio
is negative (i.e.,
∂DERi,t
∂Riskmacrot−1
= β3 < 0). That is, all else equal, a higher level of macroeco-
nomic risk leads firms to lower their debt-equity ratio. Firms may do this by paying off
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their existing debts because the higher the level of debt, the higher the likelihood of being
exposed to aggregate risk.
4.6.4 Estimation Approach
Since in equation (4.4) υi is unobservable and it is likely to be correlated with our regres-
sors in the model, the ordinary least square (OLS) estimates would yield biased results.
Furthermore, the coefficient estimates would be inconsistent because of the correlation of
the lagged value of the dependent variable with υi. Even though an instrumental variable
(IV) approach would yield consistent coefficients in the absence of serial correlation, the
coefficient estimates might be inefficient because of the partial use of available moment
conditions by the IV estimator.
The GMM technique provides a good solution to the problem. It exploits all the linear
moment conditions specified by the model. Another feature of the GMM estimators is
that they are robust with respect to non-normality of the dependent variable (Blundell and
Bond (1998)). Furthermore, the GMM estimator uses additional instruments in estimation
which are obtained by utilizing the existing orthogonal conditions between ∆Leveragei,t−2
and εi,t. Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2006) suggest that if the residuals (εi,t) are not
serially correlated, it is very likely that the first-differenced residuals (∆εi,t) are orthogonal
to the historical values of the dependent variable as well as the explanatory variables, so
that the second and higher lags of the dependent and the explanatory variables can be
used as valid instruments for ∆εi,t.
Although the Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator is superior to many other esti-
mation methods, it suffers with a problem of weak instruments. To overcome this, Arellano
and Bover (1995) suggest the use of the first-differenced instruments for equations in lev-
els and instruments in levels for equations in first differences. However, Blundell and
Bond (1998) point out that the augmented version of the Arellano-Bover GMM estimator,
known as system-GMM, produces more efficient estimates as compared to the difference
GMM estimator. In particular, system-GMM estimators yield more efficiency than the
standard difference GMM estimator for the case where the coefficient of the one-period
lagged dependent variable tends to be closer to unity96 and when the ratio of the vari-
ance of the time-invariant unobservable firm-specific factors (υi) to the variance of the
time-varying residuals (εi,t) has a tendency to increase over time. Furthermore, Blundell
and Bond (1998) suggest that the finite sample bias would be mitigated by including
lagged first-differenced and lagged levels instruments in the instrument set. Although the
system-GMM technique effectively controls for individual heterogeneity, it retains varia-
tions among firms as this technique estimates the model both in levels and first differences
96This implies that the dependent variable is likely to follow either a unit root or near-unit root process.
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and differenced lagged regressors are utilized as instruments for level equations.
Though the system-GMM estimator is ranked above many other estimators, there
are some caveats associated with the system-GMM approach. For instance, in general,
two-step system-GMM estimation yields more efficient estimates as compared to the one-
step estimation. However, one cannot always be sure of the superiority of the two-step
estimators over the one-step. Further, since there is no well-established process to choose
the optimal instrument set, the blind use of instruments may lead to the problem of “many
instruments”. This problem would be even more severe if the sample size has a relatively
short-horizon.
To cope with this problem, we use the J test of overidentifying restrictions to evaluate
the validity of the instruments used in our estimation. However, the validity of instruments
is only assured if the residuals do not exhibit second-order serial correlation. Although,
it is likely that first-order serial correlation is present because the model has a dynamic
context, it is essential to ensure that there is no second-order serial correlation in the
residuals. This can be achieved by applying the test for autocorrelation. Specifically, we
use the Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) to investigate the presence of serial correlation for
each underlying model.
4.7 Empirical Findings
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating the effects of idiosyncratic risk and macroe-
conomic risk on changes in the leverage ratio. Once we establish the effects of these two
types of risk on the change in leverage, we decompose the annual change in leverage into
three components and investigate how each of these components of leverage relates to risk.
4.7.1 The Validity of the Instruments
The validity of the instruments used in system-GMM estimation is confirmed by the
J test of overidentifying restrictions. We also apply the Arellano-Bond AR(2) test to
examine the presence of second-order serial correlation in the residuals. The estimates
from these diagnostic tests, the number of firms, and the firm-year observations in each
model are reported in Panel B of each table presented below. The J statistics reveal that
the instruments used for the system-GMM estimator are valid and satisfy the orthogonality
conditions. The estimates of the serial correlation test provide strong evidence of the
absence of second-order serial correlation in the residuals. This evidence confirms the
validity of the instruments used in the estimation of each model and thus our system-
GMM estimation results are efficient and consistent. For the purpose of brevity and
readability, we do not comment further on these aspects when we discuss our empirical
results below.
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4.7.2 How Does the Change in Leverage Respond to Risk?
We regress both the change in book leverage and market leverage on idiosyncratic risk,
macroeconomic risk, and firm-specific factors used in previous studies that study the
determinants of the change in the leverage ratio. Further, following Hovakimian (2006) and
Baker and Wurgler (2002), one-period lagged leverage is included in the set of explanatory
variables to control for high-leverage and low-leverage effects. Since the leverage ratio is
strictly confined between zero and one, a negative change in the leverage ratio is more
likely to occur for high-leveraged firms, whereas, a positive change in the leverage ratio
for low-leveraged firms is more likely to occur. Controlling for this effect by the inclusion
of the lagged leverage in the regression, we may yield more explicit estimates of the effects
of the other regressors.
Table 4.5 presents the results. Consider first the regression in which the dependent
variable is the change in book leverage. Although our main emphasis is on the effects
of risk, it is useful to briefly discuss how changes in the leverage ratio respond to the
firm-specific variables employed in our models. We find that the change in leverage is sig-
nificantly negatively associated with the market-to-book value, asset tangibility, and firms’
stock returns. In contrast, the effects of investment expenditures, firm size, profitability
and the non-debt tax shield on the change in leverage are significantly positive. These
findings are generally similar to the findings reported in Brav (2009), Chang and Das-
gupta (2009), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), Chen and Zhao (2007), Alti (2006),
Hovakimian (2006), and Baker and Wurgler (2002), who also investigate the change in the
leverage ratio.
The negative effects of the market-to-book value and the firm’s stock returns on the
change in leverage are in line with the idea that firms generally have a tendency to decline
their leverage ratio during the hot-periods of equity markets. The positive coefficient of
firm size is in support of the view that larger firms are more likely to use debt in their
capital structure as they face lower costs of bankruptcy, harvest more benefits of tax offsets
per pound of total assets, and have easy access to borrowing markets (perhaps due to less
asymmetric information problems). The positive response of the change in leverage to
investment spending supports the prediction of the pecking order theory that increases in
expenditures on investment may lead to increase financial deficit directly and thus, firms
prefer debt over equity while borrowing from external resources to fund their financial
deficits (See Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)).
The reduction in leverage in response to an increase in firms’ tangibility indicates that
firms that hold more tangible assets as a percentage of total assets are less reliant on
debt financing. This is because firms with high tangibility are less likely to experience
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Table 4.5: Robust Two-step System-GMM Estimates for the Determinants of
Change in Leverage
Table 4.5 reports the robust two-step system-GMM estimation results of the impact of risk on the change
in leverage for the following model:
∆Leveragei,t = β0 + Zi,t−1β1 + β2Risk
idio
i,t−1 + β3Risk
macro
t−1 + υi + εi,t
where Leveragei,t is the book (market) leverage of firm i in year t and ∆ denotes the difference operator. Zi,t
is a vector of firm-specific variables. Riskidioi,t is a measure of time-varying firm-specific risk. Risk
macro
t
is a measure of time-varying macroeconomic risk. The term υi captures the effects of time-invariant
unobservable firm-specific factors such as reputation and capital intensity. The term εi,t represents the
time-varying residuals. The subscripts i and t denote firm and time period, respectively. Book leverage
is the ratio of the book value of total debt to the book value of total assets. Market leverage is defined
as the book value of total debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of
equity. The market-to-book value ratio is defined as the book value of total assets less the book value of
equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. Investment is the ratio
of total expenditures to purchase fixed tangible assets to the total book assets. Profitability is the ratio
of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of net plant,
property, and equipment to total assets. 2-year stock return is the difference between share prices at time
t and share prices at time t− 2. Firm size is defined as the logarithm of net sales. The non-debt tax shield
is defined as total depreciation expense divided by total assets. One-period lagged leverage is included
in the regression to control for persistent effects (not reported). Idiosyncratic risk is drawn from firms’
sales. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under
investigation. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange
at any point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope file via DataStream.
Panel B reports the number of firms, the firm-year observations, the J statistics, which is a test of the
overidentifying restrictions, the Arellano-Bond test, AR(2), for second-order autocorrelation in the first-
differenced residuals, and firm-year observation. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation results
Regressors
∆Book Leverage ∆Market Leverage
Coeff. Std. Error Coeff. Std. Error
Market-to-Booki,t−1 -0.012 (0.005)** -0.034 (0.012)***
Investmenti,t−1 0.230 (0.110)** 1.269 (0.329)***
Profitabilityi,t−1 0.439 (0.118)*** 0.217 (0.099)**
Tangibilityi,t−1 -0.299 (0.091)*** -0.427 (0.089)***
Firm Sizei,t−1 0.016 (0.007)** 0.019 (0.007)**
2-year Stock Returni,t−1 -0.104 (0.013)*** -0.089 (0.015)***
Non-debt Tax Shieldi,t−1 0.983 (0.281)*** 0.207 (0.091)**
Riskidioi,t−1 -0.095 (0.024)*** -0.453 (0.143)***
Riskmacrot−1 -0.010 (0.001)*** -0.007 (0.003)**
Constant -0.079 (0.065) 0.251 (0.153)
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 10,208 10,943
Firm 989 944
AR(2) -0.810 -1.480
p-value 0.419 0.139
J-statistic 70.140 54.610
p-value 0.198 0.188
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information asymmetric conflicts with outside lenders and thus, the cost of equity issues
is less for them (Myers and Majluf (1984)). Hence, firms having a higher proportion of
tangible assets to total assets are more likely to issue equity when they finance their needs,
which results in a reduction in their leverage ratio. The positive relationship between
firms’ performance (profitability) and changes in leverage is consistent with the idea that
profitable firms have more ability to negotiate borrowing at favorable terms and thus, they
borrow more. Further, banks do not hesitate to rollover the loans of profitable firms as
they consider lending to them is relatively secure.
Our estimates relating to the effects of risk provide strong evidence that both idiosyn-
cratic and macroeconomic risk are significant in explaining the change in leverage. These
findings hold for both book and market leverage. Specifically, we observe that idiosyncratic
risk enters the model with a negative and significant coefficient, implying that firms are
less engaged in changing their leverage ratios when they go through periods of heightened
firm-level risk. This observation implies that risk increases the probability of bankruptcy
and thus, risky firms are less inclined to have debt financing. Another rationale for the
negative sensitivity of the leverage ratio to idiosyncratic risk is that since the greater
variability of firms’ sales limits their ability to meet their obligations, banks and other
financial institutions may be reluctant to lend to those firms who are not certain about
their potential future cash flow stream.
Macroeconomic risk also enters into the model with a negative and significant coeffi-
cient for both book and market leverage, which gives evidence of the pro-cyclical behavior
of leverage. This implies that the greater variability of macroeconomic conditions leads
to firms making less use of debt borrowing in their capital structure. This is consistent
with the fact that firm managers would be more cautious about the costs of financial dis-
tress during periods of high macroeconomic volatility as high debt further exposes firms to
macroeconomic (aggregate) risk. Thus, they are likely to reduce their outstanding stock
of debt.
An alternative rationale for this finding is that during uncertain states of the economy,
firms are likely to share at least some of the macro-level risk with outside lenders. Hence,
they may finance their capital needs and investment opportunities through equity financing
rather than debt financing and reduce their leverage ratio (Gertler and Hubbard (1993)
and Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006)). Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010)
explain the negative relationship between macroeconomic risk and firms’ leverage through
state-dependent optimal coupon payments. In particular, they argue that firms are likely
to choose lower optimal coupons in times of high macroeconomic risk in order to increase
their financial flexibility. This renders firms to be conservative in their use of debt financing
in a bad state of the economy, which leads leverage to be pro-cyclical.
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In sum, the results in Table 4.5 provide strong evidence that both idiosyncratic risk
and macroeconomic risk are significantly and negatively associated with adjustments in
leverage. These results hold for both the book and market value debt ratios. However,
these results are too general and do not enable us to draw inferences on whether the
reduction in firms’ leverage in response to an increase in risk is the result of a decline in debt
borrowing, a rise in equity financing, or/and the use of more internally generated funds
(retained earnings). Yet, an understanding of the response of these financial instruments
to both idiosyncratic risk and macroeconomic volatility is important for understanding
how firms choose their capital structure in periods of risk, as these financing instruments
have quite different implications for firms’ capital structure.
Therefore, we decompose the annual change in the leverage ratio into three components
and run each of the components separately on both measures of risk and a set of firm-
specific factors. This exercise allows us to comment on how changes in firm-specific or
macroeconomic risk affect the choice of financing mix made by firms as we can examine
whether this impact of risk differs across the available financing instruments. The analysis
also helps us to ascertain whether different types of risk affect each financing instrument
differently.
4.7.3 How Do the Components of the Change in Leverage Respond to Risk?
Here, our main focus is to quantify the effects of idiosyncratic risk and macroeconomic risk
on the choice of financing mix. We include several other variables into our models to control
for firm-specific factors of firms’ financing decisions. These firm-specific variables include
the market-to-book value, the investment expenditures of firms, firm size, the profitability
of firms, asset tangibility, the non-debt tax shield, and the 2-year stock return, which
are commonly used in the literature that explores the firm-specific determinants of the
components of the change in firm’s leverage.97
Table 4.6 reports the results obtained from all three models. We observe that firm-
specific variables affect the components of the change in leverage quite differently. Re-
garding risk, the estimates show that the effects of idiosyncratic risk substantially differ
across the components. Yet, the impacts of macroeconomic risk are same for all three
components of the change in leverage. Prior to discussing the impact of risk in detail, it
is interesting to discuss the differential effects of firm-specific variables.
The market-to-book value ratio enters with a positive sign in all three regressions given
in the table, namely the regression of net equity issues, the regression of newly retained
earnings, and the regression of net debt issues. The positive impact on equity issues
is consistent with the view that firm managers use equity financing when their shares
97See, for example, among others, Baker and Wurgler (2002), Alti (2006), and Chen and Zhao (2007).
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Table 4.6: Robust Two-step System-GMM Estimates for the Components of
the Change in Leverage
Table 4.6 reports the robust two-step system-GMM estimation results of the impact of risk on the compo-
nents of the change in leverage for the following model:
Yi,t = β0 + Zi,t−1β1 + β2Risk
idio
i,t−1 + β3Risk
macro
t−1 + υi + εi,t
where Yi,t is net debt issues, net equity issues, and the newly retained earnings for firm i in year t. Zi,t
is a vector of firm-specific variables. Riskidioi,t is a measure of time-varying firm-specific risk. Risk
macro
t
is a measure of time-varying macroeconomic risk. The term υi captures the effects of time-invariant
unobservable firm-specific factors such as reputation and capital intensity. The term εi,t represents the
time-varying residuals. The subscripts i and t denote firm and time period, respectively. Net equity issues
are defined as the ratio of change in book equity minus the change in retained earnings to total assets.
Newly retained earnings are the change in balance sheet retained earnings during an accounting year period
divided by the book value of total assets. Net debt issues are then defined as the change in total assets
to total assets less the sum of net equity issues and newly retained earnings. The market-to-book value
ratio is defined as the book value of total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of
equity divided by the total book assets. Investment is the ratio of total expenditures to purchase fixed
tangible assets to the total book assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and
depreciation to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of net plant, property, and equipment to total assets.
The 2-year stock return is the difference between share prices at time t and share prices at time t − 2.
Firm size is defined as the logarithm of net sales deflated by the GDP deflator. The non-debt tax shield
is defined as total depreciation expense divided by total assets. One-period lagged leverage is included
in the regression to control for persistent effects (not reported). Firm-specific risk is drawn from firms’
sales. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under
investigation. The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange
at any point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope file via DataStream.
Panel B reports the number of firms, the firm-year observations, the J statistics, which is a test of the
overidentifying restrictions, the Arellano-Bond test, AR(2), for second-order autocorrelation in the first-
differenced residuals, and firm-year observations. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation results
Regressors
Net Equity Issues ∆Ret. Earnings Net Debt Issues
Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error Coeff. Std.Error
Market-to-Booki,t−1 0.005 (0.001)*** 0.033 (0.007)*** 0.086 (0.004)***
Investmenti,t−1 -0.029 (0.065) -0.066 (0.148) 0.369 (0.147)***
Profitabilityi,t−1 -0.079 (0.026)*** 0.342 (0.122)*** 0.431 (0.109)***
Tangibilityi,t−1 0.038 (0.022)* 0.336 (0.085)*** -0.336 (0.090)***
Firm Sizei,t−1 -0.003 (0.001)*** 0.019 (0.008)** 0.013 (0.006)**
2-year Stock Returni,t−1 0.009 (0.003)*** 0.035 (0.013)*** -0.079 (0.012)***
Non-debt Tax Shieldi,t−1 -0.094 (0.158) -0.808 (0.274)*** 0.516 (0.235)**
Riskidioi,t−1 0.015 (0.007)** 0.084 (0.029)*** -0.110 (0.027)***
Riskmacrot−1 -0.002 (0.001)*** -0.004 (0.002)** -0.026 (0.004)***
Constant 0.037 (0.017)** -0.167 (0.082)** -0.073 (0.066)
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 8282 10322 9340
Firm 902 988 952
AR(2) 1.290 -1.420 -1.300
p-value 0.196 0.154 0.192
J-statistic 84.090 90.000 80.510
p-value 0.385 0.256 0.183
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are overvalued. This observation is also in line with the findings of Baker and Wurgler
(2002), Alti (2006), Hovakimian (2006), and Chen and Zhao (2007), who show that the
issuance of equity is significantly related to higher market-to-book value ratios. The
positive association of the market-to-book value ratio with firms’ newly retained earnings
suggests that firms with high market-to-book values tend to rely on their internal funds to
finance their investment and other needs. This finding is inconsistent with the results of
Baker and Wurgler (2002), who report a positive but relatively weaker association between
the market-to-book value of the company and its newly retained earnings.
The results from the regression of net debt issues show that the effect of the market-to-
book value ratio on the issuance of new debt is positive and significant. This suggests that
high-growth firms are more likely to issue debt to finance their capital needs. Growing
firms may not have enough internal resources to finance all their positive net present value
(NPV) investments and may require external borrowing. According to the pecking order
theory, firms prefer, first, to issue debt and then turn into equity issuance when external
financing is required. In this context, firms’ debt borrowing increases with their growth
(see, for example, Jensen (1986), Myers (1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984)). Further,
the positive effect of the market-to-book value ratio on the issuance of debt is consistent
with the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Alti (2006) that indicate that the
market-to-book value ratio affects debt issues positively. Overall, the estimates relating to
the effects of the market-book value ratio on firms’ choice of financing instruments support
the view that firms are likely to increase their use of external financing when their market
value is higher relative to their book value.
Firms’ capital expenditures are negatively associated with both net equity issues and
newly retained earnings. However, capital expenditures are positively associated with the
issuance of debt. That is firms that carry out investment expenditures are more likely
to issue debt and repurchase equity. This is consistent with the view of Shyam-Sunder
and Myers (1999), who argue that the investment expenditures of a firm directly cause
a deficit in the firm’s cash balances and the firm prefers debt over equity to finance its
deficit.
Looking at the coefficient associated with firms’ profitability in all three regressions
together, we find that more profitable firms are more likely to repurchase equity and issue
debt. The positive effect of firms’ profitability on debt issues is in line with the prediction
of the free cash flow theory. Firms with high profitability are likely to face more agency
costs. Thus, profitable firms use debt as a device to mitigate the problem of management-
shareholder conflict regarding firm managers’ own interests as debt adding bankruptcy risk
ensures that firm managers select the most efficient investment projects and do not pursue
their personal goals (Jensen (1986)). It is interesting to note that firm profitability has a
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significant and positive effect on the use of internally generated funds (retained earnings).
The positive sensitivity of newly retained earnings to firms’ profitability is in line with
what is argued by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) that firms prefer the use of
internal funds over external financing to mitigate the problem of information asymmetry.
Further, this finding is consistent with the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Alti
(2006) which indicate that there is a positive relationship between firms’ profitability and
the use of internal funds.
Consistent with the findings of Baker and Wurgler (2002), Hovakimian (2006), and
Alti (2006), we find that the large firms have a greater tendency to issue less equity as a
percentage of the book value of their total assets. Further, the estimates show that the
effect of firm size on the issuance of debt is positive and significant, suggesting that larger
firms do more debt financing. The positive impact of firm size on the issuance of new
debt is in accordance with the prediction of the trade-off theory of capital structure. In
particular, the trade-off theory predicts that larger firms are more diversified and likely to
have a low probability of default and thus, they are more inclined to issue debt. Finally,
there is statistically significant evidence that large firms use more internally generated
funds to finance their capital requirements. Given these findings, it turns out that the net
effects of firm size on changes in leverage mainly come through debt financing.
The estimates of the coefficient of the non-debt tax shield show that firms with more
depreciation expense tend to decrease the use of internally generated funds but increase
debt financing. Finally, the results relating to the firm-specific determinants of firms’
choices for the financing mix indicate that returns on firms’ shares play an important role
in explaining the change in leverage. Firms having increasing trends in their share prices
issue more equity and less net debt. These findings are consistent with the evidence in Ho-
vakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) that firm managers prefer to repurchase their equity
when share prices are low and issue new equity when share prices are high. In addition,
these results are in line with Chen and Zhao (2007), who also report a positive associa-
tion between share prices and equity issuance. Our results relating to the relationship of
firm-specific variables with the components of leverage are generally consistent with the
theoretical predictions and prior empirical findings.
Turning to the effects of idiosyncratic risk across different components of the change
in leverage, we observe the following patterns. The decision to issue net debt is negatively
and significantly associated with idiosyncratic risk, which accords with our predictions.
This implies that firms experiencing higher levels of idiosyncratic risk are more likely to
reduce the level of debt in their capital structure. The reduction of debt financing in
response to an increase in risk is indeed another indicator of the negative association of
target leverage with idiosyncratic risk.
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In contrast to net debt issues, there is a positive and statistically significant impact
of firm-specific risk on both newly retained earnings and the issuance of net equity. This
indicates that risky firms are prone to reduce the use of debt in their capital structure,
whereas, they are more likely to add internally generated funds (retained earnings) to
their capital stock. In addition, firms with high variability in their business activities are
inclined to opt for equity financing while they finance their needs from external resources.
These findings suggest that the negative effects of idiosyncratic risk on changes in the
leverage ratio arise not only because of a reduction in the existing level of debt but also
due to a rise in net equity financing and newly retained earnings. These findings provide
further insight to understand the negative relationship between firm-level risk and firms’
target level of leverage.
The effects of idiosyncratic risk on leverage components can be rationalized as follows.
The reduction of debt in response to an increase in idiosyncratic risk is consistent with
the tax shelter-bankruptcy (TS-BC) hypothesis that a rise in the extent of firm risk tends
to decrease the level of firm debt. Another reason why firms are likely to reduce their
outstanding debt when they face more idiosyncratic risk is that banks are generally reluc-
tant to rollover the loans of the firms who are uncertain about their expected cash flow
streams.
The positive relationship between equity issues and idiosyncratic risk can be explained
as follows. Since unpredictable variations in sales and earnings restrict firms’ ability to
meet the fixed charges of debt borrowing, risky firms issuing equity may tend to avoid fixed
interest payments on debt and thus, they can limit their indebtedness. In addition, given a
highly uncertain business environment, firms may find that equity issues are an appropriate
way to maintain their flexibility and preserve their capacity of debt financing for the
future.98 Finally, an increase in newly retained earnings during times of high idiosyncratic
risk is in line with the view that since risk increases the likelihood of bankruptcy, risky
firms have a strong tendency to rely on their internal resources and reduce the use of
external financing, particularly debt financing, to limit the chance of being bankrupt.
In contrast to idiosyncratic risk effects, we observe that macroeconomic risk attains
a significant and negative coefficient for all three components of the change in leverage,
changes in debt, retained earnings, and equity. Yet, the effects of macroeconomic risk
appear more prominent for changes in debt financing than for changes in retained earnings
or equity financing. This negative sensitivity of both equity and debt issues indicates
that during times of high macroeconomic risk, firms significantly decrease their external
98The positive effect of firm-specific risk on equity issues is consistent with the findings of Marsh (1982).
In particular, using data on equity and debt issues by UK firms over the period 1959-1970, Marsh (1982)
shows that firms are more likely to make equity issues rather than debt in periods when firm-specific risk
is high.
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financing. In addition, this reflects the fact that the negative impact of macroeconomic
risk on the change in leverage appears to be largely owing to significant reductions in
a firm’s outstanding debt rather than a rise in new equity financing or newly retained
earnings.
The negative impact of macroeconomic risk on debt issues is consistent with the fol-
lowing arguments. Since variations in macroeconomic conditions increase firm-level risk
and make the expected flow stream of firms more uncertain, macroeconomic risk reduces
the tax shield benefits related with the use of debt. The loss of debt-related tax benefits
lessens the wealth of the firms’ equityholders. As a result, the firms reduce the use of debt
in their capital structure as debt tends to make them more exposed to macroeconomic
risk.
The coefficient of macroeconomic risk in the regression of newly retained earnings has
the expected sign and is highly statistically significant. This implies that during periods of
macroeconomic turmoil firms become more cautious about the cost of financial distress and
they reduce the use of retained earnings in financing their capital needs. This is because
macroeconomic risk makes firms unsure about their potential cash flows and hence, they
prefer to hold cash rather than investing it as firms consider cash holdings as a safeguard
against any financial hinderance.
The negative association between macroeconomic risk and the use of internally gen-
erated funds (retained earnings) as well as external financing sources (equity and debt
financing) suggests that during periods of high macroeconomic risk, firms are likely to
cutback their investment expenditures. Because, a rise in the extent of risk, regardless of
whether the economy is prospering or slumping, leads to a decline in the real payoff from
an investment project by increasing the discount rate at which firms discount their future
cash flows. Thus, the low net present value of a project induces firms to be reluctant
about making investments.
To summarize the results in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 , first, both idiosyncratic risk and vari-
ations in macroeconomic conditions have negative and significant impacts on the annual
change in firms’ target leverage, suggesting that the adjustment in leverage is significantly
related to both types of risk. These results hold for both the book and market leverage.
Further, these findings are robust to controlling conventional capital structure determi-
nants (the market-to-book value, investment expenditures, profitability, tangibility, stock
returns, firm size, and non-debt tax shields).
Second, as expected, we find significant evidence of the differential effects of idiosyn-
cratic risk across different components of the change in leverage. Yet, we do not observe
such differences for the effects of macroeconomic risk on the composition of the change in
leverage. We also find that the effects of firm-specific variables are statistically significant
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and asymmetric across all three components of the change in leverage.
4.7.4 How Does Risk Affect Firms’ Debt-Equity Ratio?
The results presented so far show decisively that risk about firms’ own business activ-
ity and macroeconomic conditions affects the change in leverage negatively and that the
components of the change in leverage, namely net debt issues, new equity issues, and the
change in retained earnings, are affected by risk quite differently. However, it is also of
significance to examine the role of risk in determining firms’ references for equity finance
and debt borrowing. Examining the effect of risk on the choice between debt and equity
would enhance our understanding of how firms choose their optimal financial structure
when they experience high risks in their operations. We therefore estimate the regres-
sion of the debt-equity choice depicted in equation (4.11) to explore how firm-specific and
macroeconomic risk influence firms’ debt-equity ratio. In particular, we are interested
in this section to examine whether firms tend to reduce the debt-equity ratio when they
face higher risk in their own business activity or when they go through periods of high
macroeconomic risk.
Given that firms with a higher level of debt are more likely to experience bankruptcy,
firms are most likely to reduce their use of debt in high-risk periods. We would thus expect
firms’ debt-equity ratio to be negatively associated with risk. While estimating the effects
of risk on a firm’s debt-equity ratio we control for several firm-specific variables.99 The
choice of these variables is based on the prior cross-section studies of capital structure
that examine the determinants of the firms’ choice of financing instruments (see, for ex-
ample, Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Hovakimian (2006), and Huang and Ritter
(2009)).
Table 4.7 shows results for the regression of firms’ debt-equity ratio. The estimates
on firms-specific variables reveal that while investment expenditures, firms’ profitability,
firm size, and non-debt tax shields are positively related to a firm’s debt-equity ratio,
the market-to-book value ratio, asset tangibility, and stock returns are negatively related
to the firm’s choice of a debt-equity ratio. The effects of these firm-specific variables are
significant statistically and generally consistent with those reported in Hovakimian, Opler,
and Titman (2001), Hovakimian (2006), Brav (2009), and Huang and Ritter (2009). In
particular, the results show that firms with high market-to-book ratios tend to decrease
their debt-equity ratio, which is consistent with the notion that the stocks of growing firms
are generally overvalued and thereby they tend to finance their capital needs by issuing
equity rather than issuing debt, reducing their debt-equity ratio. The negative effect of
99Since we here are not interested in testing the target adjustment hypothesis we do not control for
deviations from the target ratio. Rather, one-period lagged debt-equity ratio is included in the regression
to control for persistent effects.
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asset tangibility on firms’ debt-equity ratio is consistent with the prediction of pecking
order theory that since firms with more tangible assets are likely to face less asymmetric
information problems, they issue more equity. The negative coefficient estimate for 2-year
stock returns confirms previous findings that firms with high stock returns have a larger
tendency to issue equity and thus, they lower their debt-equity ratios (see, for example,
Hovakimian (2006) and Huang and Ritter (2009)).
The results in Table 4.7 also reveal that profitable firms are most likely to increase
their debt-equity ratio. This findings confirms the Jenson’s (1986) prediction: high-growth
firms are most likely to incur free cash-flow related agency costs and they thus increase
their use of debt financing, considering debt as a device to reduce these costs. The positive
effect of profitability on firms’ debt-equity ratio is consistent with the findings of Huang
and Ritter (2009), who find that more profitable firms are more likely to issue debt rather
than equity. However, it is in contrast to the findings of Hovakimian (2006), who finds a
positive but statistically insignificant effect of profitability on firms’ choice of debt versus
equity issuance.
The results also suggest that a firm’s investment expenditures are positively related to
firms’ debt-equity ratio, conforming the findings of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) that
firms that do more investment expenditures tend to issue debt and repurchase equity. We
find that, consistent with the findings of Hovakimian (2006), large firms appear to prefer
debt borrowing over equity finance when making decisions to finance their financing needs
from external resources. The same is true for firms which have high non-debt tax shields.
That is, non-debt tax shields affect the choice of firms between debt and equity positively.
Turning to our central interest, risk effects on firms’ debt-equity choice, we observe
the following results. The effect of firm-specific risk is significant and negative, suggesting
that firms are likely to have low debt-equity ratios when firm-specific risk is high. The
same holds true for macroeconomic risk, evidence that firms lower their debt-equity ratios
when they go through periods of high macroeconomic risk.
The negative effect of firm-specific risk on firms’ debt equity choice is consistent with
the idea that since banks and other lending institutions charging higher risk premiums
to risky firms make debt financing costly and, since debt increases the likelihood of
bankruptcy, firms are most likely to issue equity and retire their outstanding debt during
a periods of heightened firm-specific risk.100 This finding also confirms our earlier findings
reported in Table 4.6 that indicate that while the issuance of equity is positively related
to firm-specific risk, the issuance of debt is negatively affected by heightened firm-specific
risk. In other words, increased uncertainty about firms’ own business activity is most
100Taub (1975) also presents evidence of a negative relationship between the uncertainty of firms’ earnings
and firms’ debt-equity ratio for US firms.
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Table 4.7: Robust Two-step System-GMM Estimates for the Debt-Equity Ra-
tio
Table 4.7 reports the robust two-step system-GMM estimation results of the impact of risk on the debt-
equity ratio for the following model:
DERi,t = β0 + Zi,t−1β1 + β2Risk
idio
i,t−1 + β3Risk
macro
t−1 + υi + εi,t
where DERi,t is the ratio of the book value of total debt (short + long term debt) to the book value
of total equity for firm i in year t. Zi,t is a vector of firm-specific variables. Risk
idio
i,t is a measure of
time-varying firm-specific risk. Riskmacrot is a measure of time-varying macroeconomic risk. The term
υi captures the effects of time-invariant unobservable firm-specific factors such as reputation and capital
intensity. The term εi,t represents the time-varying residuals. The subscripts i and t denote firm and
time period, respectively. The market-to-book value ratio is defined as the book value of total assets less
the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the total book assets. Investment
is the ratio of total expenditures to purchase fixed tangible assets to the total book assets. Profitability
is the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio
of net plant, property, and equipment to total assets. The 2-year stock return is the difference between
share prices at time t and share prices at time t − 2. Firm size is defined as the logarithm of net sales
deflated by the GDP deflator. The non-debt tax shield is defined as total depreciation expense divided
by total assets. One-period lagged debt-equity ratio is included in the regression to control for persistent
effects (not reported). Firm-specific risk is drawn from firms’ sales. Macroeconomic risk is proxied by the
conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under investigation. The sample consists of all UK
manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any point over the period 1981-2009. The
data are drawn from the WorldScope file via DataStream. Panel B reports the number of firms, the firm-
year observations, the J statistics, which is a test of the overidentifying restrictions, the Arellano-Bond
test, AR(2), for second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, and firm-year observations.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Panel A: Estimation results
Regressors Coefficient Std. Error
Market-to-Booki,t−1 -0.026 (0.010)**
Investmenti,t−1 0.220 (0.103)**
Profitabilityi,t−1 0.429 (0.089)***
Tangibilityi,t−1 -0.180 (0.081)**
Firm Sizei,t−1 0.004 (0.002)**
2-year Stock Returni,t−1 -0.069 (0.025)***
Non-debt Tax Shieldsi,t−1 0.774 (0.365)**
Riskidioi,t−1 -0.059 (0.024)**
Riskmacrot−1 -0.007 (0.002)***
Constant 0.514 (0.043)
Panel B: Diagnostic tests
Firm-years 9,343
Firm 945
AR(2) -1.640
p-value 0.130
J-statistic 58.950
p-value 0.207
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likely to make firms shun debt borrowing, and rely instead on new equity financing.
The negative relationship between macroeconomic risk and the debt-equity ratio of
firms is in line with the idea that high levels of debt make firms more exposed to macroe-
conomic risk, firms are likely to reduce their outstanding debts when macroeconomic
conditions worsens. This findings is also consistent with the findings of Hatzinikolaou,
Katsimbris, and Noulas (2002), who show that firms that listed in the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Index tend to have lower debt-equity ratio in periods when inflation uncertainty is
high. The finding that macroeconomic risk affects the firm’s debt-equity ratio negatively,
in combination with those reported in Table 4.6, suggests that although firms reduce their
use of both debt and equity financing when macroeconomic risk is high, they do a reduction
in debt issues by a larger amount than equity issues. Thus, they lower their debt-equity
ratio.
4.7.5 Do Data Provide Support for the Effects of Risk on Financing Deci-
sions?
Given the evidence presented in the chapter so far, we conclude that the capital structure
decisions of firms are significantly affected by both firm-specific and macroeconomic risk.
In this section, we present the frequency distribution of firm-year observations related to
firms’ financing decisions across low and high levels of risk. The objective of this simple
exercise is to examine whether the data provide support to the regression results regarding
the effects of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk on corporate financial structure. Al-
ternatively, this attempt may be observed as a robustness check of the effects of risk. The
figures reported in Table 4.8 are in percentages of the firm-year observations where firms
take the particular decision in times of both lower and higher risk. We consider a firm as
increasing (decreasing) security issuance if the change in the security is positive (negative)
during an accounting year period. We define the high and low level of risk based on the
mean value of underlying risk series. In Particular, low risk is measured below the 50th
percentile, while high risk is measured above the 50th percentile.
The figures presented in the table reveal that the data strongly support the evidence
on the effects of risk on firms’ financing decisions. Comparing the firm-year observations
where firms issue debt across both low and high levels of risk, one can observe a larger
propensity of firms to increase debt issuance in times of low risk than in times of high risk.
This observation holds for both types of risk. For instance, while around 62% (60%) of
the time firms issue debt in periods when firm-specific (macroeconomic) risk is low, firms
issue debt only 38% (40%) of the time when the risk is relatively higher. In contrast,
the number of firm-year observations where firms do a reduction in debt issuance are
more in periods of high risk than in periods of low risk, irrespective of the type of risk.
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Table 4.8: Distribution of Financing Decisions across Low and High Risk
Table 4.8 reports the distributions of the financing decisions of firms about external financing across
low and high levels of risk. Low risk is measured below the 50th percentile and high risk is measured
above the 50th percentile. The figures are in percentages of the firm-year observations where firms
increase (decrease) the issuance of the particular financial security during both low and high risk.
Net equity issues are defined as the ratio of change in book equity minus the change in retained
earnings to total assets. Newly retained earnings are the change in balance sheet retained earnings
during an accounting year period divided by the book value of total assets. Net debt issues are
then defined as the change in total assets to total assets less the sum of net equity issues and newly
retained earnings. For a given firm-year, we consider a firm as increasing (decreasing) security if
the change is positive (negative). Firm-specific risk is drawn from firms’ sales. Macroeconomic
risk is proxied by the conditional variance of UK real GDP over the period under investigation.
The sample consists of all UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange at any
point over the period 1981-2009. The data are drawn from the WorldScope file via DataStream.
Panel A: Firm-Specific Risk
Increase Decrease
Low Risk High Risk Low Risk High Risk
Debt Issues 62 38 45 55
Equity Issues 33 67 58 42
Newly R. Earnings 51 49 48 52
Panel B: Macroeconomic Risk
Increase Decrease
Low Risk High Risk Low Risk High Risk
Debt Issues 60 40 43 57
Equity Issues 61 39 45 55
Newly R. Earnings 60 40 47 53
Specifically, around 57% (55%) of the time firms reduce their outstanding debts in periods
when macroeconomic (firm-specific) risk is high, whereas, they do so only about 43% (45%)
of the time when the risk is high. These figures suggest that firms are more (less) likely
to decrease (increase) their debt financing when either the overall state of the economy
becomes uncertain or when firms experience high uncertainty about their own business
activity.
It is also worth noting that the fraction of the firm-year observations where firms issue
equity is significantly larger in periods when firm-specific risk is high (i.e., around 67% of
the time compared with 33%) and when macroeconomic risk is low (i.e., around 61% of the
time compared with 39%) than in periods when firm-specific uncertainty is low and when
macroeconomic risk is high. It turns out that firms may appear to face lower cost of equity
issuance relative to debt issues when firm-specific risk is high and when macroeconomic
risk is low and thereby they have more tendency to issue equity. Further, while around
55% of the time firms decrease equity issues when macroeconomic risk is high, they do
so only 45% of the time when macroeconomic risk is high. Conversely, firms repurchase
equity around 58% of times when firm-specific risk is low and only 42% of times when
firm-specific risk is high.
As seen in the table, in periods of low macroeconomic risk, about 60% of the time
firms increase the use of internal funds (retained earnings) to finance their capital needs,
158
whereas, in periods of high macroeconomic risk, firms do so only 40% of the time. On the
other hand, there is no considerable difference in the corresponding figures across low and
high levels of firm-specific risk. Another aspect to note from figures presented the table is
that the percentage of the firm-year observations where firms decrease the use of internal
funds in their capital structure is around 53% of the time when macroeconomic risk is
high, while this figure is about 47% during the low level of macroeconomic instability.
Regarding firm-specific risk, about 52% of the time firms appear to make a reduction in
their use of internally generated funds when the risk is high compared with about 48%
when the risk is low. In sum, the figures given in the table provide support to our results
on the effects of risk on the capital structure decisions of firms and suggest that firms give
substantial considerations to the extent as well as the type of risk while either deciding to
increase or decrease security issuance and the use of internally generated funds.
4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we examine the effects of risk on firms’ financing decisions focusing on
changes in leverage and its components. Our results suggest that firms tend to reduce the
level of leverage when they operate in periods of high risk. Specifically, we find that the
effects of both firm-specific and macroeconomic risk on changes in leverage are negative
and significant, even after controlling for firm-specific determinants of leverage identified
in the existing literature. These findings hold true regardless leverage is measured as a
ratio of the market or book value of total debt to total assets.
When we examine how the components of the change in leverage respond to risk we
find that the negative effects of idiosyncratic risk arise not only because of a reduction
in debt but also due to the use of equity financing and newly retained earnings. These
results suggest that given that banks and other lending institutions would charge higher
risk premiums to risky firms, these firms are likely to finance their operations through
issuing equity and hence preserve their capacity of debt financing for the future.
Regarding the effects of macroeconomic risk on firms’ financing decisions, we find that
firms not only reduce their total external financing (debt borrowing and equity issues) but
also reduce their use of internal funds (retained earnings) during more uncertain times.
The negative sensitivity of both the issuance of debt and equity to macroeconomic risk
implies that firms significantly time their issues, i.e., firms are more likely to issue securities
when macroeconomic prospects are favorable.
Two important implications arise from these findings: (i) the negative effect of macroe-
conomic risk on the change in leverage, the opposite to what we observe in the case of
idiosyncratic risk, is largely due to the reduction in debt financing rather than a rise in
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new equity financing or newly retained earnings and (ii) even those firms that are rich in
earnings may prefer to hold cash rather than investing it. Firms do so because during an
uncertain state of the economy they increase their cash holdings as a buffer against any
financial distress they may face in future.
The results regarding the effect risk on the firms’ debt-equity choice suggest that both
firm-specific and macroeconomic risk have a negative, sizable, and statistically significant
effect on firms’ debt-equity ratio. The results also suggest that the effects of firm-specific
variables are asymmetric across all three components. Firms’ profitability is negatively
related to the issuance of equity, while it is positively associated with the issuance of debt.
On the other hand, firms having more tangible assets relative to their total assets are
more likely to issue equity and less likely to use debt in their capital structure. Firms with
high levels of non-debt tax shields are more likely to issue debt but tend to decrease the
use of internal funds to finance their capital needs. Further, the results reveal that the
market-to-book value ratio is significantly positively linked with all three components of
the change in leverage. Finally, our results indicate that large firms are less likely to issue
equity but are more likely to issue debt. However, we also find evidence that high-return
firms have a large propensity to issue equity rather than debt while firms that incur more
investment expenditures are more likely to issue debt.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1 Thesis Background
Most of the existing empirical research on corporate capital structure has mainly focused
on the role of firm characteristics in firms’ financing decisions. Previous empirical studies
that have taken into account risks experienced by firms have mainly examined how risk
affects the optimal level of firms’ leverage. However, they have ignored the role of risk in
both firms’ security issuance decisions and firms’ capital structure adjustment strategies.
Further, these studies have largely investigated the risk-leverage relationship for only pub-
licly traded firms. Thus, we do not have any empirical evidence of the effect of risk on
firms’ capital structure based on privately owned firms’ data. Furthermore, almost none
of the existing studies on the relationship between risk and corporate capital structure
have explored the indirect effect of risk on firms’ financing policies.
In this dissertation, we hypothesize that if the costs and benefits of financing choices
of firms vary across different types and across different levels of risk, so does the optimal
capital structure of firms. We have tested our hypothesis in several ways in this study.
Specifically, we have focused our analysis on how risks affect firms’ leverage targets, the
speed of adjustment of firms toward those targets, the security issuance decisions of firms,
and the debt-equity choice of firms. In particular, we first examined whether the sensi-
tivity of firms’ optimal leverage to risks associated with firms’ own business activity and
macroeconomic conditions differs across publicly listed and privately owned (non-public)
firms. We focused on asymmetry in the effect of risk on leverage between public and non-
public firms for the simple reason that these two types of firms are substantially different
with respect to their access to external capital markets, size, opaqueness, and ability to
absorb the negative business shocks.
Unlike the existing empirical studies on the effect of risk on leverage, we have given
particular attention to the indirect effect of risk as well. Specifically, we have explored the
implications of cash reserves-risk interactions for firms’ leverage decisions. In exploring
this, we have examined how the effect of risk on leverage changes when firms change
their cash holding levels. If the cash hoards of firms serve as a safeguard against any
financial insolvency, it is likely that firms with different levels of cash holdings respond to
risks differently. Doing this investigation, we have utilized UK manufacturing firms’ data
covering the period 1999-2008 obtained from the FAME database. We favour these data
because they allow us to sort out the firms by their legal form.
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We then study how firm-specific and macroeconomic risk influences the capital struc-
ture rebalancing activities of firms over a relatively longer time span. In particular, we
have conditioned the speed of adjustment at which firms move toward their leverage tar-
gets on both the level and the type of risk. We have controlled for several firm-specific
factors known to affect the costs and benefits of adjusting toward the target capital struc-
ture while estimating the effect of risk on adjustment speeds. The reason why we study
asymmetry in the speed of adjustment is that if risk increases risk premia, deteriorates
potential cash flow streams, and raises the likelihood of bankruptcy, it is likely that risk
affects various costs and benefits of both movements toward and away from the target
capital structure. Accordingly, one would expect to find asymmetry in the rate at which
firms adjust toward their leverage targets across different types and levels of risk. In this
investigation, we have used data spanning the period 1981-2009 on a fairly large panel of
UK manufacturing firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. These data are assembled
from the WorldScope files accessed via DataStream.
Using the same dataset, we next have examined the interlinkages between the two
types of risk and firms’ financing sources, namely retentions, debt borrowing, and equity
financing. This exercise has enabled us to identify the channels through which risks affect
firms’ target leverage. We have also analyzed how the dynamics of firms’ target leverage
respond to risks. Finally, we have studied the effect of firm-specific and macroeconomic
risk on firms’ choice of debt versus equity issuance which has allowed us to examine more
explicitly whether firms prefer debt borrowing or equity financing when they experience
risks.
Given the structure of our dataset and the nature of our empirical models, we have ap-
plied the Blundell and Bond (1998) two-step system dynamic panel data (DPD) estimator.
We have preferred the use of this estimator because (1) it effectively mitigates potential
endogeneity problems and control for heterogeneity across individual firms; (2) it retains
variations among firms as this estimator estimates the model both in levels and first dif-
ferences, and differenced lagged regressors are utilized as instruments for level equations;
(3) it allows researchers to make use of different instruments with different lag structure
for both the levels and the first-differenced equations; (4) it improves the estimation over
others GMM estimators, such as first differenced estimator, particularly in the case when
the underlying series are moderately persistent; and (5) it utilizes all available moment
conditions by combining moment conditions for the model in first differences and moment
conditions for the model in levels.
We have applied a battery of diagnostic tests to the estimated models to confirm that
the system-GMM process is correctly specified, the instruments used in the estimation
are valid, and the residuals do not exhibit the second-order serial correlation, confirming
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the instruments are strictly exogenous. Further, we have examined the robustness of
our findings in several alternative ways. Specifically, the strategies used for testing the
robustness are: 1) re-estimate the effect of risk using alternative measures of firm-specific
and macroeconomic risk; 2) re-examine the impact of risk on the adjustment speed of firms
toward the target using an alternative measure of target leverage; 3) quantify the effect
of firm-specific risk and unpredictable variations in macroeconomic conditions on leverage
separately; and 4) seek out whether data provide support to the regression results on the
effect of risk on firms’ financing decisions.
In what follows, we present a brief summary of our empirical findings, discuss the
policy implications of the findings, identify strengths and limitations of the study, and
highlight potential areas for further (future) research on the role of risk in firms’ financing
decisions.
5.2 Summary of Findings
In Chapter 2, we study how risk associated with firms’ own business activity and macroe-
conomic conditions affect the financing decisions of public and non-public manufacturing
firms in the United Kingdom. In the first part of the chapter, we review both the theoret-
ical and empirical studies that have tried to establish the interlinkages between risk and
firms’ optimal leverage. From theoretical prospectives, while studies, such as Castanias
(1983) and Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984), have shown that idiosyncratic risk negatively
affects firms’ ability to use debt financing, other studies, such as Myers (1977) and Jaffe
and Westerfield (1987), have documented that the relationship between idiosyncratic risk
and firms’ use of debt is positive.
Prior empirical evidence also leads to conflicting conclusions on the relationship be-
tween idiosyncratic risk and leverage. For instance, papers by Marsh (1982), Titman
(1984), and Baum, Stephan, and Talavera (2009) have provided evidence of the nega-
tive effect of risk on firms’ capital structure. However, the findings of Kim and Sorensen
(1986), Kale, Noe, and Ramirez (1991), and Chu, Wu, and Chiou (1992) have suggested
that firms appear to use more debt in their capital structure when face high idiosyncratic
risks. Overall, we conclude that in the case of theoretical models, results are related to
the underlying assumptions, and in the case of empirical studies, results differ based on
the sample and measure of risk used in the investigation. We also observe that none of
the existing studies on the relationship between risk on capital structure have examined
this relationship for privately owned firms.
Regarding the effect of macroeconomic risk on firms’ capital structure, several recent
theoretical studies, such as Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010), Chen (2010), Levy
and Hennessy (2007), and Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006), have documented that
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variations in macroeconomic conditions are significant for firms’ financing choices. On
empirical grounds, nevertheless, we have limited evidence because only few studies have
examined the effect of macroeconomic risk on leverage empirically.
Prior to focus on our empirical investigation, we also survey some recent studies that
have generated proxies for firm-specific and macroeconomic risk. We find that most of
these studies favour time-varying measures of risk such as ARCH/GARCH models and
autoregressive specifications. In the empirical section, we first estimate the effect of firm-
specific and macroeconomic risk on leverage for our full sample of firms, using two different
measures for each type of risk. We find that there is a negative and significant relationship
between these two types of risk and firms’ leverage ratio measured by the ratio of the book
value of short-term debt to total assets. This evidence is robust to alternative measures
of both firm-specific and macroeconomic risk. This finding suggests that firms reduce the
amount of short-term debt in their capital structure in periods when either firm-specific or
macroeconomic risk is high. Firm-specific factors that affect leverage significantly in our
this regression are the investment spending of firms, the ratio of cash & equivalent to total
assets, firms’ growth opportunities proxied by net sales/total assets, and the one-period
lagged leverage.
Having established the impact of both firm-specific and macroeconomic risk on leverage
for our full sample of firms, we next study the effect of these two types of risk on leverage
for public versus non-public firms. First, we establish the fact that both idiosyncratic and
macroeconomic risks exert a significant and negative impact on the leverage of both public
and non-public firms, indicating that when a firm regardless of its type experiences risks,
it tends to decrease its leverage ratio. Second, we find that the impact of idiosyncratic risk
on non-public firms’ leverage is significantly stronger than that on public firms’ leverage.
This finding is in line with our expectation that non-public firms’ financing decisions
are more sensitive to idiosyncratic risk as compared to public firms. However, we do
not find any statistically significant asymmetry in the effect of macroeconomic risk on
leverage between both categories of firms. This finding suggests that both groups of firms
experience negative effects due to macroeconomic risk of similar intensity.
For several reasons, we think that the relatively greater sensitivity of non-public firms
to idiosyncratic risk that we document makes sense. First, since non-public firms are
more informationally opaque to their external financiers, and since banks are likely to
be more cautious about adverse selection and moral hazard problems in an environment
where business risk is high, non-public firms will be unable to attract external financing
in periods of heightened risk. Second, since the evaluation and monitoring costs are
fixed, and since privately owned firms are small in size as compared to their publicly listed
counterparts, bankruptcy is relatively costly for private firms than public firms. Relatedly,
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in order to repress the probability of bankruptcy, private firms are likely to reduce their
outstanding debt by a relatively greater amount than do public firms in periods when
firm-specific risk is high. Another point worth noting about the non-public firms is that
their ability to absorb the negative business shocks is generally less than that of their
public counterparts. As a result, the leverage of non-public firms is very likely to be more
sensitive to idiosyncratic risk.
Our results also suggest that the effects of the underlying firm-specific factors are
similar for both publicly listed and privately owned firms with an exception of firms’ fixed
investment which appears statistically significant for only public firms. Another noticeable
finding emerged from our investigation is that the leverage of non-public firms exhibits a
greater persistence than the leverage of public firms does.
The final innovative aspect of Chapter 2 is our investigation of how the effect of risk
on leverage changes when firms increase their cash buildups. In particular, we study
whether the sensitivity of public and non-public firms’ leverage to both firm-specific and
macroeconomic risk differs across different levels of firms’ cash holdings. This exercise
has also provided us an opportunity to examine asymmetry in response of public and
non-public firms to risks when both types of firms hold equal percentiles of cash holdings.
We find that the sensitivity of leverage to both types of risk significantly varies depending
on the level of cash holdings of firms. In particular, we show that the negative effect
of idiosyncratic risk on leverage increases monotonically as firms accumulate their cash
stocks. This finding suggests that in response to higher business-risk, firms with more cash
in their hands tend to reduce their leverage by a greater amount as compared to those
firms which have relatively lower levels of cask holdings.
Our results also suggest that the effect of macroeconomic risk on leverage is significantly
negative at lower levels of cash holdings; however, it becomes statistically insignificant
as firms accumulate higher levels (at around or more than 75th percentile) of cash. This
finding is the opposite to that for the case of idiosyncratic risk. It should also be noted that
while these observations hold true for both publicly listed and privately owned firms, they
are more pronounced for the latter one. When we compare the effect of risk on leverage
conditional on the level of cash holdings across both non-public and public firms, we find
that the negative sensitivity of leverage to variations in firms’ earnings (macroeconomic
conditions) at lower levels of cash reserves is higher for non-public (public) firms than for
public (non-public) firms. However, when both categories of firms hold very high levels of
cash, the effect of both types of risk on leverage is almost the same across the two types
of firms. One potential explanation of why public firms tend to reduce their leverage by a
larger amount in times of higher macroeconomic risk than their non-public counterparts
do is as follows. Since public firms have the broadest menu of financing choices–such as
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bank borrowing, equity financing, and commercial papers, they can afford to reduce their
reliance on sort-term borrowing easily as compared to non-public firms.
Overall, the results presented in Chapter 2 suggest that both types of risk are important
in determining the optimal level of firms’ leverage. The results also suggest that while the
negative impact of macroeconomic risk is larger for public firms than that for non-public
firms, non-public firms’ leverage appears to be affected more adversely by firm-specific risk
than the leverage of public firms. Taken as a whole, the results provide strong evidence
that the cash holdings of firms are significantly related to both types of risk, and risks
thus potentially affect the optimal level of firms’ leverage through this channel, besides
their direct impact on firm leverage decisions.
In Chapter 3, we empirically examine the role of risk in the capital structure adjustment
decisions of publicly listed UK manufacturing firms over the period 1981-2009. Specifically,
we condition the speed with which firms adjust their leverage toward their targets on the
level and the type of risk, firms’ financing needs, and leverage deviations from the target
to analyze asymmetry in the speed of adjustment.
In the beginning of the chapter, we review previous studies that have estimated the
rate of adjustment with a specific focus on the papers that have conditioned the speed of
adjustment on firm-specific characteristics. We then rationalize why firms are expected
to adjust asymmetrically when they go through periods of different extents and types of
risk. Most of the existing studies on the capital structure adjustment provide convincing
evidence that firms tend to adjust their capital structure toward their leverage targets.
Yet, it is apparent from the literature that the speed with which firms move toward their
targets is not a settle issues. In fact, several recent studies have documented asymmetry
in the adjustment patterns of firms, conditioning on the characteristics of the underlying
firms, such as surpluses and deficits in cash flows, positive and negative deviations of
leverage with respect to the target, firm size, equity market timing, and macroeconomic
conditions. Examples of these studies include Baker and Wurgler (2002), Flannery and
Hankins (2007), Kayhan and Titman (2007), Byoun (2008), Cook and Tang (2010), Elsas
and Florysiak (2011), Faulkender, Flannery, Hankins, and Smith (2011), and Warr, Elliott,
Koe¨ter-Kant, and O¨ztekin (2011).
In principle, firms adjust their capital structure only if the costs of doing so are less
than the benefits of achieving the target capital structure (Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner
(1989)). We expect, as various costs and benefits of adjusting toward and moving away
from a leverage target vary with changes in the degree of risk that a firm experiences, so
does the speed of adjustment. Further, we also hypothesize that whether risk accelerates
or decelerates the speed of adjustment toward the target leverage depending on whether
firms have positive or negative financing deficits and whether firms’ actual leverage ratios
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are above or below their targets.
In the empirical section of the chapter, we first quantify the effect of firm-specific
and macroeconomic risk on firms’ target leverage while controlling for several firm-specific
factors that are known to affect firm leverage. Our results suggest that there is a significant
and negative relationship between both forms of risk and firms’ target leverage ratio,
confirming our earlier findings on the adverse effect of risk on the leverage of both public
and non-public firms. Regarding the firm-specific determinants of firms’ target leverage, we
find that while leverage is positively related to firms’ investment spending, the profitability
of firms, firm size and the non-debt tax shield, it is negatively affected by an increase in
firms’ market-to-book value, tangibility, and returns on equity.
When we turn to analyze the impact of risk on adjustment speeds, we first estimate
the partial-adjustment model of capital structure, which does not allow for asymmetries
in capital structure adjustments across firms. We find significant evidence of asymmetry
in adjustment speeds across different levels of risks. We indicate that firms tend to adjust
slowly toward the target when they experience higher risk–regardless of the source of
risk–than when we suppose that they do not face any sort of risk in their operations. In
particular, we find that firms tend to adjust faster toward their target leverage (with a
speed of 45.2% per year) in periods when both types of risk are set to zero. In contrast,
we show that the adjustment in leverage is relatively slower (35.7% per year) when both
types of risk are high.
Our these findings suggest that both the trade-off model and the market timing model
have a significant role to play in explaining the dynamics of capital structure. In periods
of low risk, the observation of fast adjustment supports the trade-off models in that firms
quickly shake-off the effects of a shock to trace back to their target capital structure. In
periods of high risk, however, the low speed of adjustment provides evidence that firms do
not immediately adjust their capital structure toward the target, supporting the market
timing theory’s predictions. In other words, firms time both equity and debt markets as
firms are more likely to issue or retire their financial securities during periods of stable
economic environment.
We further analyze this heterogeneity in speeds of adjustment across the level of risk
by taking into account the deviations of firms’ observed (actual) leverage from their target
leverage. In particular, we estimate the the modified version of the standard adjustment
model of capital structure which not only relates the speed of adjustment to risk but it
also allows asymmetry in the rate of adjustment between over-levered and under-levered
firms. The results provide strong evidence that both over-levered and under-levered firms
respond to risk very differently when adjusting their capital structure toward their leverage
targets. In particular, the estimated estimates of the speed of adjustment indicate that
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firms having leverage above the target adjust their capital structure faster toward the
target when firm-specific risk is high and when macroeconomic risk is low. On the contrary,
firms with below-target leverage are likely to adjust their capital structure quickly toward
their targets in times of low firm-specific risk and high macroeconomic risk.
Another finding of interest is that in the absence of both types of risk, while firms that
are above target leverage adjust their leverage toward the target with a relatively rapid
speed (around 32.2% per year), firms that are below target leverage do so with the speed
of only around 24.7% per year. Overall, the estimates of the speed of adjustment that we
present here suggest that firms adjust their actual leverage toward their targets at different
speeds as they face different levels of risk when the actual leverage is above or below the
target. This implies that firms consider the levels of firm-specific and macroeconomic risk
as well as positive and negative deviations of actual leverage from their targeted leverage
ratios when adjusting their capital structure. The asymmetrical response of both over-
levered and under-levered firms to risk while adjusting their leverage could probably be
reflecting the differences in various costs and benefits of adjusting at different levels of risk
for both categories of firms.
Last, but certainly not least, we study the effect of risk on the speed of adjustment
of firms by controlling for both firms’ cash flow imbalances and leverage deviations simul-
taneously. Controlling for financing deficits and surpluses provides further insight into
asymmetry in adjustment patterns across different types and across different levels of risk.
Specifically, our this investigation provides us an opportunity to infer whether the im-
pact of risk on firm leverage adjustments differs when firms have financial surpluses and
deficits with above-target and below-target leverage. This analysis provides several inter-
esting evidence. We find that UK manufacturing firms appear to increase their leverage
regardless of whether they have financial deficits or surpluses. This finding is in line with
the statistics that we present in this study, showing that firm leverage in the UK has been
increasing over the period of investigation. However, this observation is in contrast to that
of Byoun (2008) which shows that US firms with a financial surplus reduce their leverage.
Another point worth noting is that firms with a financial surplus tend to increase their
leverage more than those that experience a financial deficit. One possible explanation of
the positive relationship between leverage and positive cash flows is that firms rich in cash
might prefer to hold cash in their hands as a safeguard against any financial hinderance
rather than using it to pay back debt. Instead, they increase their use of debt as financially
strong firms can borrow without any hardship and at their favorable terms as banks and
other financial institutions consider relatively safe providing funds to these firms.
Regarding firm leverage adjustments, we show that when there is no risk, firms that
have a financial surplus with above-target leverage attain the lowest speed of adjustment
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in contrast to the cases when there is risk. Our results suggest that firms with a financial
surplus and above-target leverage adjust their capital structure faster when macroeconomic
risk is high, whereas the speed of adjustment declines with a decline in macroeconomic
risk. In contrast, firm-specific risk exerts a negative effect on the adjustment process.
However, the impact of firm-specific risk is minor compared to that of macroeconomic
risk. For instance, when macroeconomic uncertainty is high and firm-specific uncertainty
is low, the speed of adjustment is 82.5%. The speed of adjustment drops to 67.4% if
macroeconomic risk is low and firm-specific risk is high. This implies that firms that
hold a financial surplus with above-target leverage reduce their outstanding debt faster
as macroeconomic risk heightens the cost of holding more leverage. Further, given the
level of macroeconomic risk, these firms also prefer to lower their debt in periods when
firm-specific risk is low as they are sure of their cash inflows.
For firms with financial surpluses and below-target leverage, we come across with an
interesting phenomena that these firms do not significantly adjust their capital structure
when they experience risk. Rather, the estimates of the speed of adjustment indicate that
these firms deviate even further from their leverage targets by paying off their outstanding
debts. This is an interesting observation. But we are not able to comment why these firms
do so. This remains a mystery and warrants further investigation.
When we consider the speed of adjustment of firms that have financial deficits with
above-target leverage, we find that these firms are likely to make the most significant
adjustments toward the target capital structure when we set both types of risk to zero.
When we take the impact of risk on the speed of adjustment of these firms into account,
the estimates suggest that these firms adjust with the fastest speed when macroeconomic
risk is low and when firm-specific risk is high. The slowest adjustment will occur when
macroeconomic risk is high and firm-specific risk is low. A potential explanation behind
this finding is that the adjustment toward the target leverage for these firms requires
issuing equity as they are above the targeted leverage and have financial deficits. This
is because having financing deficits, reducing outstanding debt in order to close the gap
between the targeted and observed leverage is a hard task for these firms. In this context,
perhaps these firms find it easier to issue equity to meet their financial obligations and to
adjust their leverage toward their target when macroeconomic risks are lower than when
they are higher. Our these results are in contrast with the prediction of the simple pecking
order model that firm managers, always and strictly, prefer to raise funds by issuing debt
whenever they visit external financing markets. However, our observations firmly support
the market timing theory, which predicts that firms managers are opportunist and they
time their equity issues.
Focusing on the case when firms have financial deficits with below-target leverage, we
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show that firms in this category adjust their capital structure most quickly when there
is no risk. When considering the effects of risk, it is apparent that such firms adjust
the quickest when both firm-specific and macroeconomic risk are low where the speed of
adjustment is about 30% per year. Our results also suggest that the slowest adjustment
takes place when both types of risk are high as the speed of adjustment falls to around
24% per year. As the adjustment of capital structure toward the target for this category
of firms requires issuance of debt, these firms are more likely to issue debt when they are
relatively less uncertain about their potential cash flow stream and when macroeconomic
prospects are good. This is in line with the fact that firms are less cautious about the cost
of financial distress and bankruptcy in periods of low risk, and thus tend to increase their
use of debt in their capital structure.
The results that we present in this chapter, on the whole, indicate that the interlinkages
between risks, the imbalances in a firm’s cash flows, and the level of a firm’s actual leverage
relative to its target leverage are important in explaining the dynamics of firm leverage
adjustments. The crux of the findings is that there is a pronounced heterogeneity in
adjustment speeds depending on the magnitude and the type of risk, even after controlling
the factors known to affect the rebalancing behavior of firms. Our robustness tests confirm
that the effects of risks on capital structure adjustments are neither driven by the specific
measure of risk nor by the specific estimate of firms’ leverage targets.
In Chapter 4, we study how risk affects the security issuance decisions of firms using
data on quoted UK manufacturing firms, covering the period 1981-2009. Specifically, we
decompose the aggregate change in leverage into three components, namely the change in
debt financing, the change in equity financing, and the change in retained earnings, and
we analyze how each component responds to firm-specific and macroeconomic risk. We
also examine how these two types of risk influence the choice of firms between issuing debt
and issuing equity.
After reviewing the studies that have tried to formalize the theoretical interlinkages
between risks and corporate security issuance decisions, we conjecture that while firms
are likely to reduce the amount of debt in their capital structure, they are expected to
increase their use of internally generated funds and equity financing when they experience
firm-specific risk. On the other hand, we expect that all these three financing options are
negatively affected by macroeconomic risk.
We begin our empirical investigation by investigating how the dynamics of firms’ lever-
age respond to risk. Our results suggest that the effects of both firm-specific and macroe-
conomic risk on changes in leverage are negative and significant, suggesting that firms
tend to reduce the level of leverage when they operate in periods of high risk. Our this
observation holds true regardless leverage is measured as a ratio of the market or book
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value of debt to total assets.
The results on the effect of risk on the components of the change in leverage suggest
that firm-specific risk affects the incremental changes in debt negatively and significantly,
while its impacts on both the issuance of equity and the use of retained earnings are
positive and statistically significant. This implies that the negative sensitivity of changes
in leverage to idiosyncratic risk arises not only because of a reduction in debt but also due
to a rise in net equity financing and newly retained earnings.
Risky firms prefer to pay back their debt obligations and to use internally generated
funds and equity issues–when they are required to raise capital from external sources–
in their capital structure because of two reasons. First, since debt is positively related
to the likelihood of bankruptcy, firms with volatile earnings reduce their outstanding
debts possibly to repress the risk of bankruptcy. Second, since banks and other lending
institutions perceive volatility in earnings as a risk, they are less willing to channel funds to
risky firms, unless they are compensated with higher risk premium (interest rate). Given
this, firms find bank borrowing relatively expensive when they experience variations in
their income, and thus, they prefer equity financing.
With regard to the impact of macroeconomic risk on firms’ financing instruments, we
find evidence indicating that during times of heightened macroeconomic risk, firms not
only reduce external debt and equity issues in their capital structure but they also appear
to decrease their use of internally generated funds. The negative sensitivity of both the
issuance of debt and equity to variations in macroeconomic conditions suggests that firms
time their equity and debt issues. That is, firms are less likely to issue securities when
macroeconomic prospects are not favorable. These observations are consistent with the
findings of Korajczyk and Levy (2003) which indicate that macroeconomic conditions are
of significance for securities issuance. Further, our results on the effects of macroeconomic
risk are in line with the predictions of Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006), Levy and
Hennessy (2007), Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010), and Chen (2010). Two impli-
cations emerging from these results are worth noting. First, it turns out that the negative
effects of macroeconomic risk on changes in leverage are purely the result of a reduction
in debt financing. Second, firms in times when the overall macroeconomic environment is
uncertain and unstable are likely to design their investment and financing policies propas-
sively. One of the plausible explanation of this is that during uncertain states of the
economy, even those firms that are rich in earnings may prefer to hold cash in hand rather
than investing it, considering the cash holdings as a buffer to shield themselves against
financial distress.
We also find that firms tend to issue equity rather than debt when they experience firm-
specific risk, suggesting that firms lower debt-equity ratios when the risk is high. The same
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holds true for macroeconomic risk: the higher the level of macroeconomic risk, the lower
the debt-equity ratio of firms. However, the results suggest that although firms reduce
their use of external financing (debt and equity) in periods of volatile macroeconomic
conditions, they do a reduction in debt borrowing by a larger amount than they do in
equity financing. Our results also suggest that firm characteristics are also important
in the determination of the components of the change in leverage, yet the effects of the
underlying firm-specific variables are asymmetric across all three components of the change
in leverage. Profitability is negatively related to the issuance of equity, while it is positively
associated with the issuance of debt. On the other hand, firms having more tangible assets
relative to their total assets are more likely to issue equity and less likely to use debt in
their capital structure. Firms with high levels of non-debt tax shields are more likely to
issue debt but tend to decrease the use of internal funds to finance their capital needs.
We also find that the market-to-book value ratio is significantly positively linked with all
three components of changes in leverage. Further, we find that large firms are less likely
to issue equity but are more likely to issue debt. However, high-return firms have a large
propensity to issue equity rather than debt. In contrast, firms that incur more investment
expenditures are more likely to issue debt.
5.3 Policy Implications
This dissertation attempts to provide insight into the security issuance decisions and the
capital structure rebalancing behavior of firms when firms face different types and different
levels of risk. This study is also unique in terms of allowing for asymmetries in adjustment
speeds, because we condition the speed of adjustment of firms both on the level and
the type of risk over and above firm-specific characteristics which are known to cause
heterogeneity in firm leverage adjustments. In addition, this study provides an interesting
comparison by focusing on the differences in the sensitivity of leverage to risks between
publicly traded and privately owned firms. Finally, we examine asymmetry in sensitivities
of leverage to risk across different levels of firm cash holdings.
For policy prospective, the findings of the dissertation have several important impli-
cations. Specifically, we expect that our findings will be of interest to academic scholars,
policy-makers, and firm managers. We also expect that the findings of the analysis are
useful for active and potential financial investors as well as stakeholders including banks
and other credit-providing organizations. Our findings indicate that firms considerably
take into consideration both firm-specific and macroeconomic risk when deciding their
leverage targets and when making adjustments in their capital structure to achieve these
targets. Specifically, our findings suggest that both publicly traded and privately owned
firms reduce their leverage during periods of high risk. As well, the findings suggest that
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firm-specific risk has a relatively stronger negative impact on private firms’ leverage than
on public firms’ leverage, while macroeconomic risk exerts similar impacts on the leverage
of both types of firms. Our results also indicate that for both types of firms, the sensitivity
of leverage to risk differs at different levels of firm cash holdings (see Chapter 2).
Our finding that private firms’ leverage is more sensitive to firm-specific risk may
imply that there is need to commence financial reforms and other legal changes that are
conducive to offer funding to private firms, particularly when they experience variations
in their potential earnings. Our findings also suggest that the authorities should have
to come with measures that positively affect firms’ confidence level regarding their own
business activity as well as the overall economic conditions. Our findings that risky firms
with high cash holding levels are likely to reduce their debt borrowing by a larger amount
have important implications for firm managers. Specifically, these findings imply that
those firms that have higher level of cash holdings are more able to reduce their debt
obligations in periods when they face risk in their operations, and hence, they may well
minimize the risk of bankruptcy. Our findings on the implication of macroeconomic risk-
cash holdings interactions for firm leverage decisions have also important implications.
Firms may mitigate the effects of unpredictable variations in macroeconomic conditions
on their capital structures by holding more cash. We suggest this because our findings
indicate that the adverse effect of macroeconomic risk on the leverage of both public and
non-public firms decreases monotonically with the increase in cash holdings of firms.
Our findings suggest that risks have significant impacts on the leverage adjustment
decisions of publicly traded UK manufacturing firms. However, we also find that there is
a profound asymmetry in the rate at which firms correct the deviation of their observed
leverage ratio from their targeted leverage, depending on the type as well as the extent
of risk. Further, we show that the firm characteristics, namely cash flow imbalances and
the level of a firm’s observed leverage relative to its leverage targets have also a significant
role to play in generating asymmetries in leverage adjustment speeds (see Chapter 3).
All of these findings have important implications and are useful for understanding the
rebalancing behavior of firms: when, how, and at what speed firms adjust their capital
structure toward their targets when they deviate from them. These findings would also
greatly help investors in designing their investment plans efficiently as a firm’s value is
significantly related to its financing policy. These findings would also assist firm managers
in devising effective strategies to prevent firms from the adverse effects of variations in
firms’ own business activity and overall macroeconomic conditions. Broadly speaking, our
findings would help firms–particularly in periods of high risk–to economize on the costs
of issuing securities and deviating from or moving toward their targeted capital structure,
and thereby to optimize on the benefits of maintaining leverage targets. Based on the
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evidence of a significant influence of risk on firms’ financing decisions, stakeholders could
lay out their priorities and interests by taking into consideration the instability of the
overall macroeconomic environment and the variability of the firm’s underlying potential
future income stream.
The findings presented in Chapter 4 of the dissertation suggest that firms design their
external financing policy propassively, particularly bank borrowing, instead they increase
their use of internally generated funds when they go through periods of internal unrest. In
periods of macroeconomic instability, however, firms appear to reduce not only external
financing but also the use of internal funds in their capital structure. This propasive
behavior of firms has important implication on economic growth. Specifically, this implies
that if firms lessen their reliance on external financing, and reduce their uses of internal
funds perhaps they cut back their investment expenditures. This in turn affects the
production capacity of firms adversely and thereby influences economic growth negatively.
However, by extending firms’ due debt payments (renewing firm loans) and making easy
availability of further funds, banks and other credit providers would prevent - or at least
make relatively slower - a fall in economic growth and help markets to be out of an episode
of bearish caused by unpredictable variations in economic activities. The results of this
study, on the whole, suggest that authorities should take into account the sensitivity of
firms’ capital structure to risks when formulating economic and financial policies.
5.4 Areas for Future Research
The prime focus of this dissertation is to examine the impact of risks on corporate financing
decisions. Although we explicitly (and squarely) investigate firms’ responses to high,
medium, and low levels of risk when they rebalance their capital structure to achieve
their leverage targets, for the sake of simplicity and consistency, we do not study whether
firms respond differently to risks when the economy is thriving than when the economy
is slimming down. However, the effects and implications of risks on firms’ values and
capital structures during expansionary periods are expected to be different from those in
contractionary periods. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to study and find out whether
the impacts of risk on corporate financing decisions differ across business-cycle phases (i.e.,
expansion, peak, contraction, and trough).
In principle, firms take into consideration various costs and benefits associated with
capital structure adjustments when correcting any deviations from their targeted capital
structure. Indeed, we have hypothesized in this dissertation that if the costs, such as
the relative costs of external financing, equity valuations, and financial constraints, and
benefits, such as the expected value of tax shields and the potential costs of distress, of
adjusting toward the target vary across the types and the extents of risk, so does the
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speed of adjustment of firms. And we have documented strong evidence of asymmetry in
adjustment speeds, depending on both the magnitude and the type of risk. One possibility
to extend our work will be to examine – more explicitly and directly – how risk about
firms’ own business activity and macroeconomic conditions interacts with these costs and
benefits of capital structure adjustments. This sort of analysis would help in obtaining
an in-depth understanding of what exactly causes firms to adjust their capital structure
asymmetrically when they experience different types or different extents of risk in their
operations.
Since different industries have a different nature of business, it is likely that the impacts
of risk on leverage vary across industries. In the interest of brevity and for the purpose of
our analysis, in this dissertation, we explore the differential effects of risk on firms’ capital
structure across firms rather than industries. However, this could be another interesting
issue for further research on risk-leverage relationship. Examination of whether the effects
of risk on firms’ financing policy are same or different across the industries would be useful
to further understand the differential effects of risk on firms’ leverage across firms that we
reported in this dissertation. The analysis of cross-industry differences would also help
identify the industries where the optimal level of firms’ leverage is relatively more affected
by either the uncertain state of the economy (macroeconomic risk) or variations in firms’
potential earnings (idiosyncratic risk).
Another fascinating area for future work will be to study how risk affects the finan-
cial health of firms. Indeed, recent theoretical studies, such as Chen (2010) and Bhamra,
Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010), argue that the interactions between variations in macroeco-
nomic conditions and default rates, default losses, and default probabilities are important
for corporate financing decisions. Thus, it would be worth exploring how risks, particularly
about macroeconomic conditions, affect firms’ financing policy and the pricing of corporate
securities through these channels. It would be also interesting to explore the interactions
between macroeconomic conditions and firms’ financial flexibility and how variations in
macroeconomic conditions affect the behavior of financial intermediaries regarding the
holding of corporate securities.
Our study is based on UK data. However, it would be good to examine whether our
findings that both firm-specific and macroeconomic risks have significant impacts on the
capital structure adjustment and security issuance decisions of firms hold for other coun-
tries those have a similar structure of financial markets, such as the USA (market-oriented
economies) as well as for countries those have a different financial market structure, such
as Germany, France, and Japan (bank-oriented economies). A more interesting and use-
ful investigation would involve comparing firms’ responses to risks between market- and
bank-oriented economies as firms operating in these two different financial structures have
175
to overcome different hurdles when acquiring their financing needs. Further, we have
mainly focused to examine the impact of risk on the financing decisions of publicly listed
and privately owned UK manufacturing firms. However, it might be useful to extend this
investigation to other sectors of the economy.
In this dissertation, we have examined the relationship between risks and firms’ capital
structure for a large panel of UK manufacturing firms. While estimating the effects of
risk, we do not take into account whether firms are involved in international trade or not.
However, it would be nice to examine the impact of risk on the financing decisions of
exporter and non-exporter firms separately. This is important and would be interesting,
because it is well established in the literature that firms are likely to diversify their shocks
by exporting (see, for example, Maloney and Azevedo (1995) and Garcia-Vega, Guariglia,
and Spaliara (2012)). Thus, risks about firms’ earnings and the state of the economic
possibly will affect firms that sell a significant part of their productions globally and firms
that do not do business across borders differently.
With regard to firm adjustment decisions, for the purpose of this dissertation, we have
restricted our attention to study the influence of risk on the capital structure adjustment
behavior of firms. However, for future research prospective, another enlightening area of
interest will be to evaluate the cash holding behavior of firms in response to risks. Indeed,
papers by Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) and Baum, Caglayan, Stephan, and
Talavera (2008) provide rich evidence of the impact of risk on firms’ cash holding levels
(liquid assets). On the other hand, studies by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), Dittmar and
Duchin (2010), and Venkiteshwaran (2011) document evidence that firms have a tendency
to re-adjust their cash holding levels when they deviate from their cash holding targets.
Given such empirical evidence, the analysis of whether risks about firms’ earnings/cash
flows and macroeconomic conditions influences the cash holding adjustment decisions of
firms may be of interest and it will provide further insight to understand the role of risk
in firm decisions.
Despite the findings of this dissertation provide a prima facie evidence for the impor-
tance of risks in explaining the dynamics of corporate capital structure, examination of
the above mentioned unexplored issues would be of significance to prove our knowledge
further about the role of risks in corporate financing decisions. The in-depth understand-
ing of the interactions of various types of risk that firms face with the financing behavior
of firms would undoubtedly sharp our ability to perceive what exactly going inside the
black box.
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